

**THE EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF TRADE UNIONS: A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA
NATIONAL TEACHERS' UNION (UNATU),
KAMPALA REGION**

BY

LORNA KOMUGISHA

14/MMS HRM/33/045

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE
MASTERS DEGREE IN MANAGEMENT STUDIES (HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT) OF UGANDA MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE**

FEBRUARY, 2016

DECLARATION

I, **LORNA KOMUGISHA**, Registration No: **14/MMSHRM/33/045** declares that this dissertation report is my original work and has never been submitted to any University or tertiary institution for an award.

Signature.....

Date.....

LORNA KOMUGISHA

APPROVAL

We certify that this dissertation report by **LORNA KOMUGISHA** Registration No: **14/MMS HRM/33/045** titled **“THE EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES ON THE PERFORMANCE OF TRADE UNIONS: A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA NATIONAL TEACHERS’ UNION (UNATU), KAMPALA REGION”** has been under our supervision and is now ready for submission to the School of Management Sciences of Uganda Management Institute for consideration.

Signature.....

Date.....

DR. WILBERFORCE TURYASINGURA
SUPERVISOR

Signature.....

Date.....

MS. MARIA KAFEERO
SUPERVISOR

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my dear friend Joseph, my daughter, parents and siblings for their commitment and genuine prayers that have finally seen me through the long difficult academic journey at Uganda Management Institute.

May God forever reward you all abundantly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I thank the Almighty GOD for the strength, support and wisdom for without Him, nothing is possible and I glorify his Name for enabling me complete my studies.

I extend my utmost gratitude to my supervisors Dr. Wilberforce Turyasingura and Ms. Maria Kafeero for their selfless guidance that helped me produce this art of work.

I am greatly indebted to Joseph, my dear parents and siblings for all the financial, spiritual and moral support without which I would not have gone this far in my academic career.

My appreciation also goes to the members and staff of Uganda National Teachers' Union, Kampala and the members teaching at Bat Valley and Buganda Road Primary Schools for the support they offered to me during the time of data collection.

Special thanks also go to my course mates at Uganda Management Institute for creating an enabling climate for learning and discussions.

May GOD bless them all abundantly.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACTU	Australian Council of Trade Unions
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
EAC	East African Community
EATUC	East Africa Trade Union Confederation
EFA	Education For All
KFL	Kenya Federation of Labour
MOES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MOPS	Ministry of Public Service
NEC	National Executive Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
TFL	Tanganyika Federation of Labour
UFL	Uganda Federation of Labour
UNATU	Uganda National Teachers' Union
UNUT	Uganda National Union of Teachers
USA	United States of America
UTA	Uganda Teachers Association

ABSTRACT

The main objective of this study was to examine the effect of governance and leadership structure on the performance of trade unions using a case study of Uganda National Teachers' Union Kampala region. The study specifically sought to establish the extent to which governance and leadership structures affect the performance of trade unions. A correlation research design was adopted for this study incorporating quantitative methods of data collection and the population of the study was 90 respondents consisting of members and staff of Uganda National Teachers' Union, Kampala region. Data were analyzed using SPSS data analysis package version 19 which ran descriptive statistics and inferential statistics such as Pearson chi-squares to test hypotheses. The study findings revealed a positive correlation (0.789) between governance structure and UNATU's performance; positive correlation (0.674) between leadership structure and UNATU's performance. The study concluded that governance and leadership structures when handled effectively can yield immense positive results hence leading to improved performance of trade unions.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This study sought to examine the effect of governance and leadership structure on the performance of trade unions in Uganda using Uganda National Teachers' Union Kampala Region as a case study. This chapter focuses on the background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research objectives, research questions, research hypotheses, conceptual framework, significance of the study, justification of the study, scope of the study and operational definitions.

1.2 Background of the study

1.2.1 Historical Background

Governance and leadership structure have become popular discussion themes in developed and developing countries. The widely held view that good and effective governance and leadership structures determine organisational performance and help protect the interests of shareholders has led to increasing global attention (Weisbach, 1997). However, the way in which governance and leadership structures are understood differs between countries, depending on the economic, political and social contexts. For example, organisations in developed countries that have dispersed shareholders and operate within stable political and financial systems have well developed regulatory frameworks and effective governance and leadership structure practices while organisations operating in developing countries are affected by political instability, resulting in severe economic dislocation and sharp escalation in their expenditure, which result in a widening fiscal deficit.

According to Weisbach (1988), organisations with a higher proportion of outside directors are likely to replace the CEO after a period of poor performance of the company. Similarly, outside

directors are likely to join boards after a poor performance or leave when a shift in strategy requires new or additional outside guidance (Hermalin & Weisbach 1988). Some studies find that there is a positive link between organisation performance and board composition. Lee et al. (1992) and Rosentein and Wyatt (1990), state that boards dominated by independent outside directors are associated with substantially higher abnormal returns. There are others which state that having more outside directors on the board, increases performance (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein 1994; Daily & Dalton 1992; Schellenger, Wood & Tashakori, 1989). There is also evidence which indicates that the percentage of inside directors is high on boards of declining organisations (Pfeffer 1972). Study by Valenti et al (2011) reports that during periods of declining the performance number of outside directors would be affected. Conversely, when performance improves organisations were able to add more outside directors. According to Baysinger and Butler (1985), the degree of financial health is affected by the board composition. They also found that boards with a higher percentage of outside directors have an above average performance compared to organisations with a lower number of non-executive directors.

Bhagat & Black (1998), in their study show a negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and organisational performance. Weir and Lang (2001) state that there are a number of reasons why empirical evidence may not support the positive relationship between non-executive directors and performance. Non-executive directors are only employed on a part-time basis and are likely to have other work commitments, which may result in devoting insufficient time to the company. They may lack the expertise required to understand certain technical issues in the business and they may not possess sufficient information when called upon to make key decisions.

Studies by Lorsch and MacIver (1989), Daily (1994, 1996) and Kesner (1988) explain that most critical processes and decisions are derived from a board subcommittee such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees, rather than boards-at-large. These committees enable the boards to cope with the limited time factor and the complexity of information that they need to deal with (Dalton et al. 1998).

It has been predicted that governance and leadership structural systems which promote corporate transparency and accountability are significantly associated with voluntary disclosures (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). Examination of the impact of board composition on corporate disclosures, as measured by the ratio of independent directors, is positively associated with mandatory disclosures (Chen & Jaggi, 2000) and increases in the number of independent directors improves voluntary disclosures (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Huafang & Jianguo 2007). Studies also report that combined leadership structure is associated with a lower level of voluntary disclosures (Gul & Leung 2004; Huafang & Jianguo 2007).

Trade union performance in the literature is based on the value of the organisation. Studies show that governance and leadership structures affect organisational value as a result of reduced expropriation by insiders and improvement in the expected cash flows that can be distributed to investors (Black, Jang & Kim 2006; Claessens & Fan 2002; Gomper, Ishii & Metrick 2003; Klapper & Love 2004). Four different approaches to organisation value have been identified in the corporate finance literature (Qureshi 2007). They are: the financial management approach which focuses on the estimation of cash flows and investment levels before identifying and evaluating the impact of financing sources on organisation value; the capital structure approach which studies the impact of capital. There are many measures of organisation performance; for example financial

measures of organisation performance used in empirical research on governance structure fit into both accounting-based measures and market-based measures (Kiel & Nicholson 2003).

Most commonly used accounting based-measures are return on assets (ROA) (Kiel & Nicholson 2003), return on equity (ROE) (Baysinger & Butler 1985) and earnings per share. The most commonly used market-based measures are market to book value ratio and Tobin's Q (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein 1994). There is criticism about accounting as opposed to market-based measures. Accounting-based measures can be easily manipulated by the management through changes to accounting methods or accruals and are difficult to interpret across industries. They are historical and report a more backward focus on past success (Kiel & Nicholson 2003), and exclude risks and investment requirements, and time value of money (Rappaport 1986). Market-based measures are based on the value of companies' common stock and are often affected by factors beyond the control of the leaders of the organisations. They reflect risk adjusted performance and are not adversely affected by multi-industry or multinational contexts (Daily & Dalton 1998). They are considered forward looking and reflect current plans and strategies (Kiel & Nicholson 2003).

Results of the study by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) indicate that a significant relationship exists between the accounting based measures of performance and combined leadership structure. Irrespective of the type of performance measures used, whether accounting-based or the market-based measures, Daily and Dalton (1998) found no systematic relationship between board composition and organisation performance. Various studies have been done on governance and leadership structures but no detailed study has been made in the Ugandan context. The study therefore sought to examine the effects of governance and leadership structures on the performance of Trade Unions in Uganda using Uganda National Teachers' Union Kampala Region as a case study.

1.2.2 Theoretical Background

The study employed the agency theory in explaining the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of Trade Unions. The general aim in studying governance and leadership structures is to explain how different corporate structures develop and what influence they have on corporate stakeholders. The OECD (1999) defines governance structure as "...a system by which business corporations are directed and controlled". Liandu (2002) defines it "as the way the management of an organisation is influenced by many stakeholders, including owners/shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers, customers, local residents and the government".

In recent years some very high profile corporate failures that involved fraud and questionable business practices (such as Enron and WorldCom) have damaged the reputation of business managers. This has led to greater scrutiny of governance structures and for the need for governments to tighten the regulations on governance and leadership structures further. In the USA this was done through legislation (the Sarbenes-Oxley Act) whereas countries such as Uganda introduced regulations via Inspectorate of Government (IGG) and Office of the Auditor General.

Therefore one of the objectives of an effective governance structure is to mitigate potential conflicts between the principal and agent (Ashbaugh et al., 2004). The principal being the party that provides the finance (whether it is shareholders or debt holders) whereas the agent is represented by the management whose task is to manage in an efficient manner so that maximum returns are provided for the principal. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) these agency conflicts may result in agency costs.

Agency costs include monitoring expenditures by the principle however may be due to losses as a result of the conflicts of interests between the owners and the managers. The agency costs may be reflected in a decrease in share price. Hence to increase organisation value, one must reduce agency costs. This is how the link between governance structure and organisation performance may be viewed.

Disclosure and transparency are also attributes of effective governance and leadership structural practices. The OECD (1999) asserts that a governance structural framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the organisation including the financial situation, performance, ownership and the governance of the organisation. Further to this Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) assert that sound financial disclosure as is an objective of governance structures can bridge the information asymmetry gap between the managers and shareholders and can minimize agency problems. They also assert that poor financial disclosure that misleads investors will have an adverse effect on organisation value. They found that effective board and audit committee structures might help the quality of disclosure and that will have a positive impact on organisation value.

Another objective of an effective governance structure is investor protection. OECD (1999), states that an element that promotes good governance structural practice is for the shareholder rights to be protected. According to ICAEW (2010) investor protection can be provided through an efficient legal and regulatory framework. Governance and leadership structures can be used as a key factor in improving economic efficiency and in building investor confidence. Further to this clear governance and leadership structures will give incentives to the owners and management to adopt objectives that are in the best interests of the organisation (OECD, 2004).

Economic models that are incentive-based to influence management behaviour may motivate some governance features. One such economic model is an agency model that supports the view that managers have different interests to those of the shareholders. It assumes that human behaviour is opportunistic and self-serving. This may lead to decisions being made that meet the manager's interest and that are costly to the shareholders. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of the managers and the owners. Those who support the agency model believe that the best option is that governance and leadership structures should be implemented to protect shareholders from management's conflict of interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Otherwise this will generally result in negative effects on financial performance and hence affect the overall performance of the organization.

1.2.3 Conceptual Background

The OECD (1999) defines governance structure as "...a system by which business corporations are directed and controlled" while Lindu (2002) defines it "as the way the management of an organisation is influenced by many stakeholders, including owners/shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers, customers, local residents and the government." Studies have indicated that governance structures can be measured through the following elements: (i) board size; (ii) presence of female board members; (iii) duality of the CEO; (iv) education level of board members; (v) board working experience; (vi) independent (outside) directors; (vii) board compensation; (viii) board ownership; and (ix) stakeholders.

A trade union like UNATU's performance is measured by membership and service. Being a service oriented organization; it has to ensure that all teachers are registered with it so as to generate a unified voice hence increasing its membership potential. The organization must work to ensure that the quality of service offered to her members are of high quality such as increased

lobbying of government to ensure that members have high returns on their services and finally the issue of sustaining the organization through mobilization of members membership fees and making wise investment decisions on members' savings to generate more revenue.

For developing countries, significant benefits can be linked to higher corporate governance standards in the private sector. These include better access to external finance, lower costs of capital and better organisation performance (Classens, 2003). Governance and leadership structural agenda has also been broadened by the recognition of the reach of corporate models characterized by different forms and structures to the Anglo-American model of an investor owned organisation. However until now little attention has been paid to the governance needs of other institutional forms of business such as trade unions despite their considerable presence in many developing countries. Trade unionism as a whole remains poorly understood and its specific governance challenges remain as yet largely unexplored (Huse, 2005).

However, in concurrence to the Governance Panel Report to ACTU, (2013) to governance in this context is the means by which a union is run, rather than what it does in relation to employers or others to protect and advance members' industrial and social interests. The means by which a union is run are a combination of structures within the union of the organs which enable members to govern it, such as committees and plenary meetings with varying levels and scope of power, and the powers given to particular officers or employees, the values and culture of those who make and carry out decisions about how the union is to be run, the union's rules and policies for the efficient and effective running of the union, processes, procedures and practices to give effect to those values and policies and relationships between these factors and between members and their leaders

Good governance and leadership structures stem from clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the board of directors, committees and senior managers and stems from codes of conduct which directors and staff at every level of the institution sign on to and respect in the completion of their tasks. Sound by- laws and policies seek to avoid conflicts of interest and provide mechanisms for dispute resolution where they do arise. While many factors contribute to the governance of an institution, good governance begins and ends with the board and its leadership (Donaldson, 2005). Governance and leadership structures enable organisations to realize their corporate objectives, protect members' interests, meet legal requirements and demonstrate to a wider public how they are conducting their business (International Chamber of Commerce, 2006).

1.2.4 Contextual Background

The history of the East African Community (EAC) member states' struggles for independence has documented evidence indicating significant contribution of labour union movement to respective national colonial emancipation (East African treaty, 1999). Labour unions from earlier times such as Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL), Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL), Uganda Federation of Labour (UFL) and others across the EAC member states made significant contribution to independence of their respective countries but also amidst the struggle, negotiated for better working conditions and pay for its workers. Such struggles of trade unionism still continue to this day through the now existing labour unions in the East African Region with our own example of UNATU in Uganda (The East African, 2011).

The East Africa Trade Union Confederation (EATUC) the umbrella organization of national trade union centres in the EAC partner states was formed to represent EAC workers at the regional level. With observer status, it attends the EAC Summit and the Sectorial Committee on Labor and Employment, (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2013/4). In the Ugandan context, Uganda Teachers'

Association (UTA) was formed in 1944 but started operating in 1945, it registered little success over the years which eventually led to the emergence of Uganda National Union of Teachers (UNUT) that was formed in the late 1990s (UNATU Strategic plan 2013-2017). UTA and UNUT later merged in November 2002 to form a trade union, Uganda National Teachers' Union that got registered on the 4th of March, 2003 with 20 unsubscribing members (UNATU Strategic plan, 2013-2017).

UNATU was formed to be a statutory teacher organization formed to promote and protect teachers' rights and obligations for improved working and living conditions. UNATU uses the strength of members to bargain and advocate for improved teaching and learning environment in order to realize quality public education in Uganda and because of the success they have registered, its membership has now grown to a tune of 159,684 subscribing members making it the largest and fastest growing trade union in Uganda today.

According to UNATU's strategic plan 2013-2017, UNATU is an organization that looks at attaining certain levels of performance and the moment UNATU feels that it has not fully reached out to their target teachers in the pre-primary, primary, secondary schools and that is why its membership status is estimated at 81%. For a union that has been in existence for the last 11 years, it has achieved significant success in their membership drive but the union desires to achieve growth and expansion by having a larger number of membership mobilisers to increase the union's subscribing members, partnerships and resource base for operational efficiency and effectiveness. This study sought to examine the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of Trade Unions in Uganda using Uganda National Teachers' Union Kampala region as a case study.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Governance and leadership have been part of research in business economics since Adam Smith's (1776) seminal publication of *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* and undoubtedly given impetus through Berle and Means's (1932) classic publication of the separation of corporate ownership from control. The latter authors sought to explain why a organisation with several dispersed shareholders gave vested control powers to the manager who may not have substantial shares in the organisation.

According to UNATU's Strategic Plan (2013-2017), UNATU has been instrumental in striving for the improvement of teachers' welfare that include; membership and Service. UNATU considers the teachers' conditions of service and has continued to engage government on several occasions on mobilizing teachers to register with it and pay their membership subscriptions, improve on the services they offer to the teachers such as matters of teacher pay rise and other teacher welfare needs such as allowances for science teachers, allowance for teachers in hard to reach areas by means of dialogue, collective bargaining and industrial action and ensuring that the teachers' union remain sustainable by investing teachers' resources in viable investments to help attract more resources to help improve on their welfare in abid to meet the stated objectives.

Whereas there have been some achievements, there have been some failures in the above pursuit like the fact that there are still delays in payment of teachers' salaries and in other cases, non-payment. There are still unnecessary deletions from the government payroll, deductions on teachers' allowances, the perennial and meager pay all leading to low morale leading to constant strikes in Uganda. The study sought to examine the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of trade unions in Uganda with specific reference to UNATU

1.4 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to examine the effect of Governance and Leadership Structures on the performance of trade unions using Uganda National Teachers' Union Kampala Region as a case study.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives

- i. To establish the extent to which governance structure affects the performance of trade unions.
- ii. To establish the extent to which leadership structure affects the performance of trade unions.

1.5 Research Questions

- i. To what extent does the governance structure affect the performance of trade unions?
- ii. To what extent does the leadership structure affects the performance of trade unions?


1.6 Hypothesis of the Study

- i. Governance structure has no significant effect on the performance of trade unions.
- ii. Leadership structure has no significant effect on the performance of trade unions.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

In the conceptual framework below, governance and leadership structures was the independent variable with governance structure which had variables such as the board's level of education, the size and the levels of experience; another factor was leadership structure with variables such as leadership control and leadership composition. The dependent variable was union performance with its variables being membership and service.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework showing the Relationship between Governance and Leadership Structures and Trade Union Performance.



Source: Adapted from Lipton, M and J.W Lorsch (1992): “A modest proposal for improved corporate governance” with modification

1.8 Significance of the Study

The study findings may help the union members amongst other stakeholders to look critically at the decisions made upholding the values of transparency, accountability and integrity by the NEC and the union employees and it is how all these factors will affect trade union performance. If governance and leadership policies and systems are indeed followed and adhered to, they can lead to effective and efficient governance and hence good performance.

1.9 Justification of the Study

There is little evidence at the local level linking governance and leadership structures to trade union performance in Uganda. With this mind, UNATU through their strategic plan was made to act as a guide for achieving their goals as a union, some of which have been achieved. However in the 2014/ 2017 strategic plan, the union intends to improve its performance by institutionalizing governance and leadership structures as means to help increase their member satisfaction in the most efficient and effective way they possibly can. However, there is no concrete evidence to show

how governance and leadership structures have impacted on trade union performance therefore, the purpose of this study is to fill in that gap.

1.10 Scope of the study

This study was limited in terms of geographical location, time period and content that is only relevant to this study.

1.10.1 Geographical Scope

The study was carried out in Uganda at UNATU headquarters and subscribing member schools in Kampala District.

1.10.2 Time Scope

The study focused on a period between 2010 and 2014. This was the period when members of UNATU laid down their tools more often than ever protesting government failure to increase their salaries as had earlier been agreed. In total the period saw five (5) sustained strikes that paralyzed teaching in Kampala schools (The Monitor, August 2014).

1.10.3 Content Scope

The study examined governance and leadership structures as the independent variable under which governance structure encompassed variables such as the board's level of education, the size and the levels of experience and the second factor was leadership structure with variables such as levels of leadership control and leadership control. The dependent variable was trade union performance with variables such as membership and service.

1.11 Operational definition

Accountability: refers to being responsible for what one does and must be able to give a satisfactory reason for it.

Governance Structure: It is a system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed and controlled.

Integrity: refers to the degree to which people (e.g., managers) satisfy the legitimate expectations of the world around them basing on trust and honesty.

Leadership Structure: It is the hierarchy of the each member in a team whose role is to respond to goals and strategies of the organization. Each member has a function within the company activities and oversees how they are carried out.

Organisation: Is a social unit of people that is structured and managed to meet a need / pursue a collective goal.

Organisational Performance: In this study, organisational performance refers to increased membership, quality of service offered to members and union sustainability.

Service: means to provide something that is needed with a standard of excellence

Transparency: refers to a characteristic that is easy to see through.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the different literature available on governance structure and leadership structure and organisation performance, which is measured in terms of membership and service. The chapter also reviews the theoretical foundations of the study, the effect of Board structure on organisation performance, literature on the effect of governance and leadership structures on organisation performance and the chapter summary.

2.2 Theoretical Review

The study employs the agency theory in explaining the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of Trade Unions. The general aim in studying governance and leadership structures is to explain how different corporate structures develop and what influence they have on corporate stakeholders. The OECD (1999) defines governance structure as "...a system by which business corporations are directed and controlled". Lindu (2002) defines leadership structure in a similar way "as the way the management of an organisation is influenced by many stakeholders, including owners/shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers, customers, local residents and the government".

In recent years some very high profile corporate failures that involved fraud and questionable business practices (such as Enron and WorldCom) have damaged the reputation of business managers. This has led to greater scrutiny of corporate governance and for the need for governments to tighten the regulations on corporate governance further. In the USA this was done through legislation (the Sarbenes-Oxley Act) whereas countries such as Uganda introduced regulations through the Inspectorate of Government and Office of the Auditor General.

Therefore one of the objectives of governance and leadership structures is to mitigate potential conflicts between the principal and agent (Ashbaugh et al., 2004). The principal being the party that provides the finance (whether it is shareholders or debt holders), whereas the agent is represented by the management whose task is to manage in an efficient manner so that maximum returns are provided for the principal. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) these agency conflicts may result in agency costs.

Agency costs include monitoring expenditures by the principle however they may be due to losses brought about by conflicts of interests between the owners and the managers. The agency costs may be reflected in a decrease in share price. Hence to increase organisation value, one must reduce agency costs. This is how the link between governance structure and organisational performance may be viewed. Disclosure and transparency are also attributes to effective corporate governance practice. The OECD (1999) asserts that a governance structural framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the organisation including the financial situation, performance, ownership and the governance of the organisation. Further to this Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) assert that sound financial disclosure (that is an objective of governance structure) can bridge the information asymmetry gap between the managers and shareholders and can minimize agency problems. They also assert that poor financial disclosure that misleads investors will have an adverse effect on organisation value. They found that effective board and audit committee structures might help the quality of disclosure and that will have a positive impact on organisation value.

Another objective of governance and leadership structures is investor protection. OECD (1999), states that an element that promotes good governance structural practice is for the shareholder rights to be protected. According to ICAEW (2010) investor protection can be provided through

an efficient legal and regulatory framework. Governance and leadership structures can be used as a key factor in improving economic efficiency and in building investor confidence. Further to this good governance and leadership structures will give incentives to the owners and management to adopt objectives that are in the best interests of the organisation (OECD, 2004).

Economic models that are incentive-based to influence management behaviour may motivate some governance features. One such economic model is the agency model that supports the view that managers have different interests to those of the shareholders. It assumes that human behaviour is opportunistic and self-serving. This may lead to decisions being made that meet the manager's interest and that are costly to the shareholders. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of the managers and the owners. Those who support the agency model believe that the best option is that governance and leadership structural mechanisms should be implemented to protect shareholders from management's conflict of interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Otherwise this will generally result in negative effects on financial performance and hence affect the overall performance of the organization.

2.3 Governance Structure and Organisational Performance

Bhagat and Black (2002), in studying the effect of independent board directors on organisation performance, found that low-profit organisations are more likely to increase the percentage of independent directors on their boards, though without finding any evidence that this strategy actually works. That is, there was no statistical support for the common belief that independent boards improve performance. In this study, the authors used data from 934 organisations for the period 1985 to 1995. Denis and Sarin (1999) also performed a long-term study on boards, using data from 583 organisations during 1983 to 1992. They found that ownership and board changes are strongly related to corporate events such as top executive turnover and prior stock performance,

and weakly related to corporate control threats. Similar results were found in Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1996), where higher levels of director appointments and departures were both associated with poor performance.

Perry (2000) reports, for a sample of 94 organisations with financial problems during 1994 to 1996, that organisations with outsider-dominated boards (at least half of the directors independent) show positive changes in operating performance two years following financial crisis. In contrast, using a subsample of organisations with inside boards, this relation was negative. However, the author could not find any difference between the two groups when tested together. Other interesting results were that after the crisis, the percentage of independent director increased and the percentage of inside directors decreased. Perry also found that organisations with boards dominated by outsiders were more likely than organisations with insider boards to respond to declines in performance by initiating actions such as asset sales and employee layoffs. In a sample of 355 companies in the insurance industry, Mayers, Shivdasani and Smith (1997) found that changes in board composition are strongly related to changes in the ownership structure. They also found that operating costs (including salary expenses) were lower in organisations with more outside directors.

Another factor usually investigated in the research literature on boards of directors is the impact of board size on performance. With a sample of 452 large U.S. organisations during 1984 to 1991, Yermack (1996) found that board size was negatively related to organisation value. He showed that smaller boards are more likely to dismiss the CEO following periods of poor performance and to key CEO compensation to organisation performance. Eisenberg et al. (1996) similarly found significant negative correlation between board size and profitability. For a sample over the period of 1992 to 1994 of approximately 900 organisations in Finland—including of course many smaller

organisations—these authors studied possible effects of larger boards such as problems of communication and coordination and greater control by the CEO. These findings support the interpretation that board size influences organisation value and performance (and not the reverse).

Interestingly, the results of Eisenberg et al. were consistent with Yermack's (1996) despite being based on a very different sample, namely smaller and non-U.S. organisations. But the question remains whether smaller and non-U.S. organisations can be assumed to be affected in the same way, by the same factors, as the larger U.S. organisations that typically constitute research samples. Although there is considerable empirical research on governance structures in general and on boards of directors in particular, this research is almost exclusively based on major U.S. corporations, and it is very likely that the conclusions drawn will be not be applicable in a different context.

2.3.1 Board's Size

In relation to a relationship between the size of a board and an organisation's performance, there are two distinct schools of thoughts. The first school of thought argues that a smaller board size will contribute more to the success of an organisation (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). However, the second school of thought considers that a large board size will improve an organisation's performance (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 1998; Coles, 2008). These studies indicate that a large board will support and advise organisation management more effectively because of a complex business environment and an organizational culture (Klein, 1998). Moreover, a large board size will gather much more information. As a result, a large board size appears to be better for organisation performance (Dalton, 1999).

In their study, Truong et al. (1998) considered that, in Vietnam, there is a significant difference in management culture compared to the international practice. For example, they concluded that

Vietnamese management does not appear to share managerial power. This philosophy reflects a “gap of power” culture in Vietnamese companies. This culture in Vietnam is completely different with the principles of working as a group and management delegation. As such, these authors concluded that when board size increases, delegation will be reduced.

2.3.2 Board’s Educational Level

The role of a board is the internal most important role in the governance structure of an organisation (Fama, 1980). A board is also a control system in a business (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A board of directors supervising management decisions in an efficient manner will improve organisation’s performance. Doing so requires each board member to be fully equipped with management knowledge such as finance, accounting, marketing, information systems, legal issues and other related areas to the decision making process. This requirement implies that the quality of each board member will contribute significantly and positively to management decisions which is then translated into the organisation’s performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Fairchild and Li, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007).

2.3.3 Board’s Experience

It is argued that board members with a higher age average will have much more experience compared to a younger age average. This experience is expected to positively contribute to the better performance of an organisation. However, older-age board member appears to be more aggressive and dictatorial with decisions. These characteristics of board members may result in risky decision making, which may undermine an organisation’s performance (Carlson and Karlsson, 1970). In addition, board members with a higher age average may face more limited pressures to a changing business environment and this may hinder the implementation of more strategic decisions (Child, 1975). Even though there has been a conflicting view on the relationship

between a board's level of experience and an organisation's performance, a theory on restrained resources considers that board members with more experience will cope better within a business environment by working well in a group which will contribute positively to a organisation's performance (Wegge et al., 2008).

2.4 Leadership Structure and Organisational Performance

2.4.1 Leadership Control

Berle and Means (1932) set forth that ownership dispersion implies management is distinguished from ownership, which, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize, may contribute to agency problems between managers and shareholders or shareholders and debtors. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) detect the phenomenon of ownership concentration. La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) usher in the conception of ultimate controller; they define organisation ownership as voting rights, unearthing that many controlling shareholders of listed organisations predominate organisations by means of pyramid structure and cross holding, which could result in central agency problem.

Kao, Chiou and Chen (2004) reveal that organisations in financial distress are closely related to high ratio of the shares pledged by directors, causing concern about the agency problem resulting from the pledge of corporation shares. Chiou, Hsiung and Kao (2002) indicate that, directors and supervisors could fund by the collateralized shares and further purchase more organisation stocks to manipulate stock price or enhance their power. Directors' and supervisors' financial stress, because of the collateralized shares, is closely related to share price. Share price slumping, the value of the collateralized shares depreciates and even drops below the standard of the required margin; correspondingly, collateralizing shareholders will be requested to collateralize more shares, while debtors fail to afford more shares as collaterals, financial institutions as creditors will

close the position of collateralized shares. As a result, collateralizing shareholders, making use of their position, may make a prey of small shareholders or embezzle company funds.

One of the key objectives in modern governance and leadership structures is to deal with agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A representative agency theory considers that the goals adopted by an organisation's management and the shareholders are generally not similar. As such, shareholders should attach their financial benefits to compensation paid to an organisation's management. Once management behavior is unclear, compensation is a corporate governance mechanism to encourage management to run an organisation in the interest of shareholders. This link will resolve an agency issue between management and shareholders and contribute positively to an organisation's performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995).

Brickley et al. (1988) concluded that the board's ownership is an encouragement for board members. This encouragement will help board members supervise management in a more efficient way. Consistent with this view, Jensen and Murphy (1990), Chung and Pruitt (1996) considered that, board's ownership will improve organisation's performance. Mehran (1995) presented empirical evidence that there is a positive correlation between board ownership and organisation's performance. In addition, other empirical studies such as Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998); Bhabra et al. (2003) have also presented a nonlinear relationship between a board's ownership and an organisation's performance. In their study, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that contribution of board's ownership is considered as a "*two-edged knife*" in which there is an optimal level of board ownership which contributes positively to an organisation's performance.

2.4.2 Leadership Composition

Female members are examined very often in empirical studies. The female members reflect a diversified characteristic of the board (Dutta và Bose, 2006). In addition, Smith et al. (2006) considered three different reasons to recognize the importance of females on an organization. *First*, female board members usually have a better understanding of a market in comparison with male members. As such, this understanding will enhance the decisions made by the board. *Second*, female board members will bring better images in the perception of the community for an organisation and this will contribute positively to organisation's performance. *Third*, other board members will have enhanced understanding of the business environment when female board members are appointed. Moreover, this study also indicated that female board members can positively affect career development of junior female staff in a business. As a result, an organisation's performance is improved directly and indirectly with the presence of female board members.

About organisation performance, according to convergence of interest hypothesis, higher insider ownership could reconcile managers' and outside shareholders' interests, which would lessen agency problems. Empirical results by Kesner (1987), Oswald and Jahera (1991), Eng and Mak (2003) bear evidence of that insider ownership has a positive relation with organisation performance. Empirical studies on shareholders by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) concluded that, to a certain extent, block holders contribute to the supervisory activities of an organisation's management. On the other hand, agency costs related to shareholders exist. First, small shareholders will bear serious consequences from shareholders who may abuse the power how to run a business. Second, strict control from shareholders to an organisation's management will hinder the organisation's performance. An organisation's management will become inflexible with the changing business environment. The decision making process is no longer an initiative from the organisation's management and this results in lowered organisation performance (Burkart et.

al, (1997) and Myers, 2000). Even though there is a conflicting view on how shareholders affect an organisation's performance, many empirical studies have recognized this importance. In particular, shareholders play an important role in determining the leadership structures of an organisation because they have the relevant skills, time and attention that are necessary to boost an organisation's performance. Denis and McConnell (2003), Becker et al. (2011) considered that, centralizing managerial power in block holding individuals will generally affect an organisation's performance positively.

2.5 Summary of Literature Review

Many of the scholars' work that has been reviewed agree that to a large extent governance and leadership structure play an important role in achieving organizational goals and objectives. A number of gaps have been identified such as the limited research done on the influence of governance and leadership structures on the performance of trade unions in Africa and more specifically Uganda. Second, it not clear what the role of government, financial institutions and other organs need to play to assist trade unions progress in their abid to cater for the needs of their members yet all these stakeholders are fundamental in the service quality delivery and sustainability of trade unions.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology that was used in the study. This chapter captures different sections; research design, area and target population, sample size selection and determination, sampling technique procedure, data collection methods, data collection instruments, data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.2 Research Design

This research employed a correlation study design combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This correlation survey design helped the researcher to collect information from a sampled population and demonstrate the relationships among the variables. Triangulation of methods helped to gather data for an overall interpretation that looks at a variety of different factors (Creswell, 2009). The primary advantage of triangulation of methods in data collection lies in the ability to find agreement and validation of results through a variety of research methods. If different research methods come to the same conclusion, the researcher can be more confident that the results are truly a reflection of what actually is happening and not a reflection of the method of testing used to gather the data

3.3 Study Population

In this research, the study population used was based on Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sample table and 110 respondents were used to help capture a broader number of the secretariat staff, the subscribing members from the two Kampala schools used and the NEC members operating in Kampala region.

3.4 Determination of the Sample Size

The study used the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) attached in Appendix 1. According to this table, for a population of 10, a sample of 10 was used for the key informants while a sample of 80 respondents was used from a population of 100.

Table 1: Sample size of each category of respondents from UNATU

Title	Target Population	Sample Size	Techniques
UNATU NEC Members	10	10	Purposive Sampling
UNATU staff and Members	100	80	Simple Random Sampling
Total	110	90	

Source: Sampling from UNATU Staff manual (2014) using Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sampling technique

3.5 Sampling Techniques and Procedures

The researcher used both the probability and the non- probability types of sampling depending on the type of data needed. Probability sampling involved the simple random sampling technique targeting staff of UNATU. This type of sampling is suitable when the population is large and where the researcher wants to give everybody chance to belong to the survey. The study further purposively sampled the members of the NEC who acted as key informants for purposes of information triangulation. This category (key informants) was identified due to their knowledge and experience they have accumulated while working with the teachers' union (UNATU). The information gained from this category helped to ensure the validity and reliability of the data.

3.6 Data Collection Methods

The methods for collecting data from the social science surveys are twofold; quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection.

3.6.1 Quantitative Method

Under the quantitative method of data collection, the study used the questionnaire to target the 68 respondents to participate in the survey. The survey questionnaire method was used because it can collect data on large population and it was less expensive for data collection (Amin, 2005).

3.6.2 Qualitative Method

Under the qualitative method of data collection, the study mainly used the in-depth interview guides to gather responses on purposively from key informants through face to face interview. The method is suitable when handling key informant interviews which help in triangulation of the data. This was done to reduce possible bias arising from the field and seeking for the correct information.

3.7 Data Collection Instruments

The study used a mixture of data collection instruments to generate quality and reliable data during the collection process. The study used survey questionnaire forms and the interview guide to gain insight on the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of trade unions in Uganda using UNATU as a case study.

3.7.1 Questionnaire

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), survey questionnaire form (Appendix I) is a valuable tool for collecting a wide range of information from a large number of respondents. Amin (2005), confirm that carefully designed questionnaires easily answer research questions. The researcher ensured that each item in the closed ended questionnaire is fine-tuned to address a specific objective as well as the research question in the entire research process and the responses were arranged on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 means ‘strongly disagree’, 2 means ‘disagree’, 3 means neutral, 4 means ‘agree’, 5 ‘strongly agree’ with the assertion. This enhanced simplicity

where straight forward answers are required and ticked. The questionnaires were hand delivered to respondents and collected within an agreed upon time frame since the respondents category was educated enough to read and write the responses.

3.7.2 Interview Guide

An interview guide (Appendix 2) was used to collect qualitative data from the key informants that include; selected NEC members were identified and provided in-depth information through probing during the face-to-face interview. Data obtained during the interview supplemented the data that was obtained through the survey questionnaire forms.

3.8 Validity and Reliability

3.8.1 Content Validity

Validity means the extent to which the findings of the study are valid and can be applied to the wider population. To ensure validity, the questionnaire was developed and given to the supervisors and peers to score the relevance of each question in providing answers to the study after which content validity index will be computed using a formula; number of contents declared valid/number of items in the questionnaire. A CVI of above 70% will be accepted (Amin 2005) a content validity index (C.V.I) was computed using the formula;

$$C.V.I = \frac{R}{R + N + IR}$$

The closer the value is to 1, the more valid is the instrument (Amin, 2005). Score from Supervisor 1: R = 72%, N = 5%, IR = 5% giving the result = 87%. Score from Supervisor 2: R = 60%, N = 5%, IR= 10% giving the result= 75%. From the expert and two peers the average score was 78.5% which made the questionnaire content valid which was way above the score of 72% according to Amin (2003).

3.8.2 Reliability of the Research Instruments

The reliability of a research instrument concerns the extent to which the instrument yields the same results on repeated trials (Katebire, 2007). The survey questionnaire and the interview guide were pretested and the reliability was tested using Cronbach alpha coefficient method of internal consistency. The formula of Cronbach Alpha Coefficient (α) used was as follows:

$$\alpha = \frac{k}{k-1} \left(1 - \frac{\sum \sigma_i^2}{\sigma_y^2} \right)$$

Where k is the number of items in the questionnaire $\sum \delta_i^2$ is the sum of the item variances (i.e., the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix) and δ_y^2 is the variance of the total test score (which equals the sum of all elements in the covariance matrix). Plugging in the numbers

$$\alpha = \frac{37}{37-1} \left(1 - \frac{3.894}{15.161} \right) = 0.764$$

So the Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient for this scale was 0.764, which is far better and “acceptable” reliability of the Research Instruments of 0.70 according to Carmines & Zeller, (1979).

3.9 Data processing and Analysis

The data processing and analysis involved the process the data underwent before, during and after collection.

3.9.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

The quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS computer software package 19. Data was edited, coded, and analyzed with the help of frequencies and percentages out of the occurrence of responses (Fielding, 2001) on particular aspects of study, and was presented in form of tables and graphs from which generalizations were made out of quantitative data. A Pearson correlation

coefficient was used during analysis in order to establish the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of trade unions in Uganda with specific reference to UNATU.

3.9.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

Qualitative data on the other hand was grouped into categories of related explanatory themes (Fielding, 2001). Such explanations from key informants gave valid back up arguments to the generalized numerical data.

3.10 Measurement of variables

Data on staff and member's views was obtained using a five point Likert scale questionnaire (5 point likert scale). 1=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=not sure 4=agree and 5=strongly agree will be used to generate responses. The Likert scale was chosen because it is easy to use (Amin 2005). There was also the use of open ended questions in the qualitative analysis. The information was studied and categorized according to context; the responses were grouped according to the current issues. Direct questions from the interviews were offered as illustrations in some areas.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

The study process ensured that respondents' consent to participate in the study was sought prior to their participation. Confidentiality of all information given by respondents was ensured. Information that was gathered was not altered, but used to draw conclusions.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

4.1 Introduction

This study examined the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of trade unions using Uganda National Teachers' Union Kampala Region as a case study.

In this chapter, the data collected is presented, analyzed and interpreted to derive meaning from it. The chapter is structured in five sections that focused on the respondents' background, the descriptive statistics, on the correlation statistics and the regression analysis of the survey results

Table 2: Response Rate


Data Collection Method	Targeted Respondents	Actual Responses	Percentage
Interview	10	10	100
Questionnaire Survey	80	68	85
Total	90	78	86.6

Source: Primary Data (2015)

According to the respondents that participated, their response rate can be summarized as follows: The numbers of questionnaires distributed were a total of 80, 15 for the secretariat and 65 for the members teaching in Kampala schools and of these, 68 were returned making the return rate to be 85%. The two questionnaires that were not returned were either misplaced or lost by the respondents. The interviews that were to be conducted were 10 and all the 10 were successfully conducted making the response rate to be at 100%. And as per the interviews conducted, some NEC members commended the work of their National Chairperson who they believe has demonstrated sincere interest in the wellbeing of union members as well as the prosperity of the union as a whole. Others were bitter with government for failure to meet her promises like the teacher SACCO money that was promised three years ago but the union has not yet received it.

4.2 Results on the Background Characteristics of Respondents


Figure 2: Age of the Respondents



Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from figure 2 indicate age of the respondents. 48 percent (33) of the respondents were in the age bracket of 21-30 years, 37 percent (25) of the respondent were in the age bracket of 31-40 years while 15 percent (10) of the respondent were in the age bracket of 41-50 years. This is a reflection of the country's demographic characteristics where the population 0-40 years makes up 79% percent of the total population (UBOS, 2013). This could probably be explained by the fact that the youth are taking over the modern teaching environment.


Figure 3: Gender of the Respondents



Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from Figure 3 show the gender of the respondents. Majority 66 percent (45) of the respondents were of the males while 34 percent (23) of the respondents were of the female gender. The lower representation of females reflects their reluctance to work at teachers, a job despised by females preferring to work in softer places like Banks that do not involve a lot of work pressure and were they assume the payments are better.

Figure 4: Marital status of the respondents




Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from figure 4 indicate marital status of the respondents. Majority 59 percent (40) of the respondents were married, 34 percent (23) of the respondents were single while 7 percent (5) of the respondents were separated. The implication is that those who are married act as role models

also a source of responsibility to those who are not married which would encourage creativity and innovation; and also soften work related personality conflicts. This therefore points to their continued demand of higher pay since they have enormous responsibility to cater for.


Figure 5: Education level of the respondents



Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results for figure 5 indicate the education levels of the respondents. Majority 77 percent (52) of the respondents were degree holders, 19 percent (13) of the respondents were master degree holders while 4 percent (3) of the respondents were diploma holders. The implication of the results show that majority of the teachers in UNATU are educated and have requisite qualifications to teach unlike before.


Figure 6: Duration respondents have been members of UNATU



Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from figure 6 indicate the duration the respondents have been members of UNATU. Majority 75 percent (51) of the respondents indicated that they had been members of UNATU for between 1–10 years, 15 percent (10) of the respondents indicated that had been with UNATU for between 11-20 years while 10 percent (7) of the respondents indicated that they had been with UNATU for between 21-30 years. The implication is that UNATU as an organization/union strives to improve the welfare of her members that is why members stay with the trade union than moving out on their own to negotiate with government.

Figure 7: Length of respondents in Education service as a teacher



Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from figure 7 indicate the length of the respondents in education service as a teacher. Majority 75 percent (51) of the respondents indicated that they had been teaching for between 1–10 years, 15 percent (10) of the respondents indicated that had been teaching for between 11-20 years while 10 percent (7) of the respondents indicated that they had been teaching for between 21-30 years. The implication is that members have been in education service for quite long hence as long serving members in government, government should strive to listen to the pleas and act accordingly.

4.3 Results on the Substantive Objectives

The results presented in this section are from the analysis of the data collected through survey questionnaires that were administered to members of UNATU. A total of 80 questionnaires were administered and 68 questionnaires were returned. Analyzed descriptive data is therefore, presented the following sub sections.

4.3.1 Use of Governance Structure at UNATU

Descriptive statistics below refer to use of governance structure at UNATU, analyzing each one of them.

Table 3: Response Rates on UNATU Governance Structure

Statements on indicators of the UNATU Governance Structure	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Agree	Strongly Agree
The size of the board members is small		15 (22%)	3 (4%)	45 (66%)	5 (7%)
The UNATU board displays a high level of transparency		6 (9%)	2 (3%)	50 (74%)	10 (15%)
The union's board is accountable to its donors and funders, members and the different stakeholders	1 (1%)	7 (10%)		50 (74%)	10 (15%)
The UNATU board is comprised of highly qualified members who have a high level of integrity hence make good decisions for the union		8 (12%)		40 (59%)	20 (29%)
The union board is competent enough to achieve the union's objectives	6 (9%)	6 (9%)	1 (1%)	55 (81%)	
UNATU board supervises, supports and evaluates the work of the General Secretary on a regular basis	1 (1%)	15 (22%)	2 (3%)	45 (66%)	5 (7%)
UNATU board is actively involved in operations of the union	8 (12%)	3 (4%)		48 (71%)	9 (13%)
UNATU board is active with clear division of labour		7 (10%)	2 (3%)	50 (74%)	9 (13%)
UNATU board is highly consultative		8 (12%)	1 (1%)	50 (74%)	9 (13%)
UNATU board is for strategy supervision and not for operation		9 (13%)		50 (74%)	9 (13%)

Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from Table 3 indicate response rates on governance structure at UNATU by the members. Majority 73 percent (50) of the respondents agreed that the size of the board members is small, 22 percent (15) of the respondents disagreed while 4 percent (3) of the respondents were not sure.

Majority 89 percent (60) of the respondents agreed that UNATU board displays a high level of transparency, 9 percent (6) of the respondents disagreed while 3 percent (2) of the respondents were not sure. Majority 89 percent of the respondents agreed that the union's board is accountable to its donors and funders, members and the different stakeholders while 11% (8) of the respondents disagreed

Majority 88 percent (60) of the respondents agreed that the UNATU board is comprised of highly qualified members who have a high level of integrity hence make good decisions for the union while 12 percent (8) of the respondents disagreed. Majority 81 percent (55) of the respondents

agreed that the union board is competent enough to achieve the union's objectives, 18 percent (12) the respondents disagreed while 1 percent (1) respondent was not sure.

Majority 73 percent (50) of the respondents agreed that UNATU board supervises, supports and evaluates the work of the General Secretary on a regular basis, 24 percent (16) of the respondents disagreed while 3 percent (2) of the respondents were not sure. Majority 84 percent (57) of the respondents agreed that UNATU board is actively involved in operations of the union while 16 percent (11) of the respondents disagreed.

Majority 87 percent (59) of the respondents agreed that UNATU board is active with clear division of labour, 10 percent (7) of the respondents disagreed while 3 percent (2) of the respondents were not sure. Majority 87 percent (59) of the respondents agreed that UNATU board is highly consultative, 12 percent (8) of the respondents disagreed while 1 percent (1) respondents was not sure. Majority 87 percent (59) of the respondents agreed that UNATU board is for strategy supervision and not for operation while 13 percent (9) of the respondents disagreed. Some of the respondents mentioned that the union has a clear organogram and it's because of these clear structures that members and staff clearly know who is responsible for what and reports to whom. It is these controls and measures that have ensured transparency and accountability.

One respondent pointed out that the leadership of the union is doing a commendable job. She mentioned that under the leadership of its current NEC, the union has managed to stream line its governance structures, with clear roles and duties of each team leader, information dissemination channels that come from top management down to the grassroots at the regions and this has helped in the efficient coordination of the union affairs.

4.3.2 Use of Leadership Structure at UNATU

Descriptive statistics below refer to use of leadership structure at UNATU, analyzing each one of them.

Results from Table 4 indicate response rates on the use of leadership structures at UNATU. Majority 84 percent (57) of the respondents disagreed that the union's leaders is divergent in nature while 16 percent (11) of the respondents agreed. Majority 79 percent of the respondents disagreed that the union leaders are concentrated in urban areas, 16 percent (11) of the respondents agreed while 4 percent (3) of the respondents were not sure.

Table 4: Response Rates on UNATU Leadership Structure

Statements on indicators of the UNATU Leadership Structure	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Agree	Strongly Agree
The union's leadership is divergent in nature	3 (4%)	54 (79%)		11 (16%)	
The union leaders are concentrated in urban areas		54 (79%)	3 (4%)	10 (15%)	1 (1%)
The union leaders have a clear growth strategy				60 (88%)	8 (12%)
The union leaders comply with Uganda government policies			3 (4%)	61 (90%)	4 (6%)
The union leaders adopts corporate governance code		2 (3%)	2 (3%)	55 (81%)	9 (13%)
The union leaders have instituted audit committees in the union for transparency		5 (7%)		53 (78%)	10 (15%)
The union leaders have instituted a remuneration committee in the union for transparency		6 (9%)	2 (3%)	50 (73%)	10 (15%)
The UNATU age gives it leverage over other unions in Uganda	7 (10%)	45 (66%)	3 (4%)	10 (15%)	3 (4%)
The UNATU size gives it leverage over other unions in Uganda	2 (3%)	20 (29%)		34 (50%)	12 (18%)
The UNATU leaders have strict control over the union affairs	4 (6%)	57 (84%)	5 (7%)	2 (3%)	

Source: Primary Data (2015)

All 100 percent (68) of the respondents agreed that the union leaders have a clear growth strategy. Majority 96 percent (65) of the respondents agreed that the union leaders comply with Uganda government policies while 4 percent (3) of the respondents were not sure. Majority 94 percent of the respondents agreed that the union owners adopt corporate governance code while 3 percent (2)

of the respondents either disagreed or were not sure whether union leaders adopt corporate governance code.

Majority 93 percent (63) of the respondents agreed that the union leaders have instituted audit committees in the union for transparency while 7 percent (5) of the respondents disagreed. Majority 88 percent (60) of the respondents agreed that the union leaders have instituted a remuneration committee in the union for transparency, 9 percent (6) of the respondents disagreed while 3 percent (2) of the respondents were not sure.

Majority 76 percent (52) of the respondents disagreed that UNATU age gives it leverage over other unions in Uganda, 19 percent (13) of the respondents agreed while 4 percent (3) of the respondents were not sure. Majority 68 percent (46) of the respondents agreed that UNATU size gives it leverage over other unions in Uganda while 32 percent (22) of the respondents disagreed. Majority 90 percent (61) of the respondents disagreed that UNATU leaders have strict control over the union affairs while 10 percent (7) of the respondents agreed. The respondents mentioned that the union's growth and strength is a result of its ever growing numbers and since it is the fastest growing trade union in Uganda, they have more leverage to carry out their activities such as industrial action and create a response from government and other stakeholders.

One respondent mentioned that the board diversity is based strictly on elections. Those interested in taking on leadership roles in the union openly campaign and through voting at the different levels do they win positions on the union leadership boards. The expression of transparency is that positions are open to both sexes and every member has a right to express interest to run for office as well as vote for the best candidate.

Another respondent mentioned that the Union also keeps audited books of accounts and it also has external auditors of PKF

4.3.3 Use of Union Performance

Descriptive statistics below refer to UNATU performance, analyzing each one of them.

Table 5: Percentages on the Performance of UNATU as a Trade Union

Statements on indicators of use of Union Performance	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Agree	Strongly Agree
The union continues to register new members		8 (12%)	1 (1%)	47 (69%)	12 (18%)
The union has experienced expansion in membership		6 (9%)		50 (73%)	12 (18%)
The union continues to make informed decision on investment ventures to make it sustainable	2 (3%)	50 (73%)	4 (6%)	12 (18%)	
The union has lobbied for increased members net pay		12 (18%)		46 (68%)	10 (15%)
The union draws consensus on members pressing issues			2 (3%)	54 (79%)	12 (18%)
The services the union offers members are of high quality	4 (6%)	40 (59%)	2 (3%)	22 (32%)	
The union has a strategic plan		16 (23%)	1 (1%)	39 (57%)	12 (18%)
The union has stringent regulations for disciplining arrogant members	10 (15%)	12 (18%)	1 (1%)	40 (59%)	5 (7%)

Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from Table 5 indicate response rates on UNATU Performance. Majority 87 percent (59) of the respondents agreed that the union continues to register new members, 12 percent (8) of the respondents disagreed while 1% (1) respondent was not sure. Majority 91 percent (62) of the respondents agreed that the union has experienced expansion in membership while 9 percent (6) of the respondents disagreed.

Majority 76 percent (52) of the respondents disagreed that the union continues to make informed decision on investment ventures to make it sustainable while 24 percent (16) of the respondents agreed. Majority 82 percent (56) of the respondents agreed that the union has tried to lobby for increased members net pay while 18 percent (12) of the respondents disagreed.

Majority 97 percent (66) of the respondents agreed that the union draws consensus on members pressing issues while 3 percent (2) of the respondents were not sure. Majority 65 percent (44) of the respondents disagreed that the services the union offers members are of high quality, 35 percent (24) of the respondents agreed while 3 percent (2) of the respondents were not sure.

Majority 75 percent (51) of the respondents agreed that the union has a strategic plan, 23 percent (16) of the respondents disagreed while 1 percent (1) respondent was not sure. Majority 66 percent (45) of the respondents agreed that the union has stringent regulations for disciplining arrogant members, 32 percent (22) of the respondents disagreed while 1 percent (1) respondent was not sure.

4.4 Correlation Results

Table 6: Correlation between Governance Structure and Union Performance

Correlations			
		UNATU Performance	Governance Structure
UNATU Performance	Pearson Correlation	1	.789**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.004
	N	68	68
Governance Structure	Pearson Correlation	.789	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.004	
	N	68	68
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

Source: Primary Data (2015)

The results from Table 6 indicate a positive correlation (0.789) between governance structure and UNATU Performance. Governance structure and UNATU Performance is significant at 5% (0.05) with p-value of 0.004 meaning we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. The positive Pearson correlation (0.789) shows that a unit increase in the levels of governance structure leads to an increase in UNATU performance by 78.9%. The implications from the above results are that trade unions must have strong board of directors to help pursue member demands from government. In Africa and Uganda in particular trade union bargaining power has always been hampered by weak members on the board and executives manning the trade unions hence members have continued clashing with government without any substantial gains being made.

Table 7: Correlation between Leadership Structures on UNATU Performance

Correlations			
		UNATU Performance	Leadership Structure
UNATU Performance	Pearson Correlation	1	.674**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	68	68
Ownership Structure	Pearson Correlation	.674	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	68	68
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

Source: Primary Data (2015)

The results from Table 7 indicate a positive correlation (0.674) between leadership structures and UNATU Performance. Leadership structures and UNATU Performance is significant at 5% (0.05) with p-value of 0.000 meaning we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. The positive Pearson correlation (0.674) shows that a unit increase in the levels of leadership structure leads to an increase in UNATU performance by 67.4%. The implication from the above results points to the fact that when the unions are fully managed by the members, the it becomes easy for such unions to negotiate with the government for higher pay and amicably solve any challenges that develop in the process of operating such unions. Many unions in Africa and Uganda have been infiltrated by state machinery making it so hard for them achieve their desired objectives. This has bred disharmony in such unions to the extent that the owners of the unions have been rendered useless when it comes to bargaining.

4.5 Regression Analysis

Table 8: The Model Summary

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.606 ^a	.517	.498	3.09978
a. Predictors: (Constant), governance structure and leadership structure.				

Source: Primary Data (2015)

The Model summary Table 8 of the regression result above provides information about the regression line's ability to account for the total variation in the dependent variable (operations performance). In this regression model the dependent variable (UNATU performance) is measured by its variance or the independent variables (governance structure and leadership structure) the regression helps 'explain' a limited proportion of the dependent variable's total variation. The significance in the regression analysis is the R-square which shows what level of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. Results from Table 4.6.1 indicate the value of our R^2 is 0.517, which means that 51.7 percent of the total variance in UNATU performance has been 'explained'. Not a bad result if compared with the results we get for survey.

Table 9: Regression Coefficients

Coefficients^a				
Model	Standardized Coefficients			
	Beta	T	Sig	Decision on the Null Hypothesis
(Constant)		.000	.003	
Organisation structure	0.664	1.824	.004	Rejected
Leadership structure	0.459	1.546	.007	Rejected

a. Dependent Variable: UNATU performance

Source: Primary Data (2015)

Results from Table 9 of the regression analysis confirm the results in the correlation in those governance structure has a positive coefficient (0.664) and is statistically significant at 5% levels of confidence with the p-value of 0.004 which is less than the 0.05 meaning that we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that governance structure significantly affect UNATU performance.

Results further show that leadership structure has a positive coefficient (0.459) and is statistically significant at 5% levels of confidence with the p-value of 0.007 which is less than the 0.05 meaning that we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that leadership structures significantly affect UNATU performance.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary, discussion, conclusion and recommendations based on the findings of the study. The general objective of the study was to examine the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of trade unions using Uganda National Teachers' Union Kampala Region as a case study. Specifically, the study sought to; establish the extent to which governance structure affects the performance of trade unions and establish the extent to which the leadership structure affects the performance of trade unions.

5.2 Summary of Findings

5.2.1 Governance Structure and the Performance of Trade Unions

The results indicate a positive correlation between governance structure and UNATU Performance. A unit increase in the amount of work of the UNATU governance and her structures leads to an increase in UNATU Performance, thereby making members improve on their livelihoods as it leads to widening of their activities hence leading to increased membership and sustainability.

5.2.2 Leadership Structure and the Performance of Trade Unions

The results indicate a positive correlation between leadership structure and the Performance of trade unions. A unit increase in the amount of work of the UNATU leadership and their structures leads to an increase in UNATU Performance, thereby making members improve on their livelihoods as it leads to widening of their activities hence leading to increased membership and sustainability.

5.3 Discussion of findings

5.3.1 Governance Structure and the Performance of Trade Unions

The results indicate a positive correlation (0.789) between governance structure and UNATU Performance. Governance structure and UNATU Performance is significant at 5% (0.05) with p-value of 0.004 meaning we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

The study findings agree with Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) studies that observed that there is a relationship between the size of a board and organisation's performance. They argue that a smaller board size will contribute more to the success of an organisation. The study findings however disagree with Pfeffer (1972), Klein (1998) and Coles (2008) studies that argue that a large board size will improve a organisation's performance by supporting and advising organisation management more effectively because of a complex of business environment and an organizational culture and that a large board size will gather much more information. As a result, a large board size appears to be better for organisation performance.

The study findings disagree with Truong et al. (1998) study in which they considered that, in Vietnam; there is a significant difference in management culture compared to the international practice. For example, they concluded that Vietnamese management does not appear to share managerial power. This philosophy reflects a "gap of power" culture in Vietnamese companies. This culture in Vietnam is completely difference with the principles of working as a group and management delegation. As such, these authors concluded that when board size increases, delegation will be reduced.

The study findings agree with Fama (1980) study that observed that the role of a board is the internal governance structure of an organisation. A board is also a control system and that a board

of directors supervising management decisions in an efficient manner will improve organisation's performance. Doing so requires each board member to be fully equipped with management knowledge such as finance, accounting, marketing, information systems, legal issues and other related areas to the decision making process. This requirement implies that the quality of each board member will contribute significantly and positively to management decisions which are then translated into the organisation's performance.

The study findings are in agreement with Carlson and Karlsson (1970) study that argued that board members with a higher age average will have much more experience compared to a younger age average. This experience is expected to positively contribute to the better performance of an organisation. However, older-age board member appears to be more aggressive and dictatorial with decisions. These characteristics of board members may result in risky decision making, which may undermine a organisation's performance.

The study findings are in agreement with Child (1975) study that concluded that the board members with a higher age average may face more limited pressures to a changing business environment and this may hinder the implementation of more strategic decisions Even though there has been a conflicting view on the relationship between a board's level of experience and a organisation's performance, a theory on restrained resources considers that board members with more experience will cope better within a business environment by working well in a group which will contribute positively to a organisation's performance.

5.3.2 Leadership Structure and the Performance of Trade Unions

The results indicate a positive correlation (0.674) between leadership structures and UNATU Performance. Leadership structures and UNATU Performance is significant at 5% (0.05) with p-value of 0.000 meaning we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis

The study findings are in agreement with Berle and Means (1932), Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) studies that observed that leadership dispersion implies management is distinguished from leadership, which if not done may contribute to agency problems between managers and shareholders or shareholders and debtors.

The study findings agree with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study that detected the phenomenon of leadership concentration, by ushering in the conception of ultimate controller; they define organisation leadership as voting rights, unearthing that many controlling shareholders of listed organisations predominate organisations by means of pyramid structure and cross holding, which could result in central agency problem.

The study findings further agrees with Kao, Chiou and Chen (2004) study that reveal that organisations in financial distress are closely related to high ratio of the shares pledged by directors, causing concern about the agency problem resulting from the pledge of corporation shares. The study findings also agrees with Chiou, Hsiung and Kao (2002) study that indicate that, directors and supervisors could fund by the collateralized shares and further purchase more organisation stocks to manipulate stock price or enhance their power. Directors' and supervisors' financial stress, because of the collateralized shares, is closely related to share price. Share price slumping, the value of the collateralized shares depreciates and even drops below the standard of the required margin; correspondingly, collateralizing shareholders will be requested to collateralize more shares, while debtors fail to afford more shares as collaterals, financial

institutions as creditors will close the position of collateralized shares. As a result, collateralizing shareholders, making use of their position, may make a prey of small shareholders or embezzle company funds.

The study findings are in addition justified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) study that revealed that one of the key objectives in modern governance and leadership structures is to deal with agency problems. A representative agency theory considers that the goals adopted by an organisation's management and the shareholders are generally not similar. As such, shareholders should attach their financial benefits to compensation paid to an organisation's management. Once management behavior is unclear, compensation is a governance and leadership structural mechanism to encourage management to run an organisation in the interest of shareholders.

The study findings are in agreement with Brickley et al. (1988), Murphy (1990) and Chung and Pruitt (1996) studies that concluded that the board's leadership is an encouragement for board members. This encouragement will help board members supervise management in a more efficient way. Consistent with this view considered that, board's leadership will improve organisation's performance.

5.4 Conclusions

5.4.1 Influence of the Governance Structure on the Performance of Trade Unions

Governance structure is statistically significant and correlated with UNATU performance and a unit increase in the levels of governance structuring will result in an improvement in UNATU

performance. Meaning that for UNATU performance in Uganda to improve and benefit the owners, the UNATU governance structure must be operational and running efficiently and should be emphasized by the owners of UNATU. I conclude that UNATU governance structure should be strengthened to provide requisite services to improve on UNATU performance.

5.4.2 Influence of Leadership Structure on the Performance of Trade Unions

Leadership structure is statistically significant and correlated with UNATU performance and a unit increase in the levels of ownership structure will result in an improvement UNATU performance. Meaning that for UNATU performance in Uganda to improve, UNATU's leadership structures need to be strengthened to effectively serve the clients and should be emphasized by the UNATU members. We conclude that ownership structures be strengthened to

5.5 Recommendations

5.5.1 Governance Structure and the Performance of Trade Unions

The study recommends that trade unions emphasize the need to create and operationalize small but efficient governance structures to help run the affairs of the unions as this is bound to bring about quick decision making on issues of contention and offer a way forward/direction for their members.

5.5.2 Leadership Structure and the Performance of Trade Unions

The study recommends that trade unions create leadership structures where leaders can express their views in a freer environment on issues of concern such as how they should be governed, how they can demand for their rights especially with regard to payments and any other feedback from their head quarters. With such leadership structures in place, trade unions are bound to grow their membership and benefit them.

5.6 Limitations of the Study

There was a possibility of that accurate answers were dodged and wrong answers given. This bias was controlled in another method of data collection by using questionnaires.

5.7 Contributions of the Study

The study has been able to highlight the effect of governance and leadership structures on the performance of trade unions in Uganda and the researcher is strongly convinced that the study of the effect of governance and leadership structure on the performance of trade unions that was conducted following the quantitative and qualitative scientific procedures and methodological approaches offers organisations information and adds on the body of literature on the three areas of study which are governance structure, leadership structure and organisational performance.

Through the study findings and conclusions, an effort has been made to make recommendations of significant policy and management implications for policy makers. Institutionally and managerially, the recommended areas will go along in distilling issues critical for improving on organisational performance caused by corporate governance practices that can be emphasised by organisations.

5.8 Areas Recommended for Future Research

With the findings of the study together with the conclusions drawn on each of the study objectives, limitations and recommendations, there are opportunities for further research that would give insight into areas of governance and leadership structures and trade union performance in Uganda and these include:

The study looked at the effect of governance and leadership structure and the performance of UNATU. Future research would look at governance policies and their effect of trade union performance using UNATU still as a case study using before and after study design.

The study focused on governance and leadership structures and so conducting a research in leadership practices can be used to offer comparison.

The study recommends that there is need to examine the influence of governance structures and systems on the performance of trade unions in Uganda.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Krejcie And Morgan (1970) Sample Size Estimation Table

N^*	S^\dagger	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	346
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	354
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	191	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	170	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	180	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	190	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	200	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	370
65	56	210	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	220	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	230	144	550	226	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	240	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	250	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	260	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	254	2600	335	1000000	384

*N is the population

†S is the sample size

**THE EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES ON
THE PERFORMANCE OF TRADE UNIONS: A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA
NATIONAL TEACHERS' UNION (UNATU), KAMPALA REGION**

Appendix 2: Interview Guide

I am **Komugisha Lorna**, Reg. No. **14/MMS HRM 045/33**, a final year student of Masters in Management Studies (MMS) Degree Program at Uganda Management Institute (UMI). This questionnaire is for obtaining your views on how corporate governance affects the performance of UNATU. You are kindly requested to respond to the questions objectively as possible. Please note that this questionnaire is purely for academic purposes and that your response shall be treated with maximum confidentiality. The researcher will only use the data collected/ obtained for her Master's dissertation of MMS.

Yours sincerely

Komugisha Lorna (Tel: 0782-041770)

1. For how long have you served on the NEC of UNATU?
2. Do you encourage gender diversity on the board?
3. Have you implemented any of the reforms you made in your Strategic Plan 2013- 2014?
4. What is your understanding of CG in your words?
5. What CG values are important to you as a UNATU NEC member?
6. What is the union's strategic plan to increase its membership?
7. How would you describe the service quality of UNATU to its members?
8. Do you think the government offers you enough support to run the union?
9. (a) Does the organization prepare financial statements at least annually?

- (b) Does UNATU appoint external auditors to review the union's financial statements at least once a year?
10. Does the NEC have strong policies that encourage transparency, integrity and accountability while running the union's affairs?
11. How often are NEC meetings held?
12. Can you identify strategies that can be adopted to improve the service quality to the UNATU members?
13. In your opinion, what do you think has worked well for UNATU? Why?
14. What has not worked well for UNATU? Why?
15. Any suggestions for improvement?
16. How would you describe the service quality of UNATU to its members?
17. Do you think the government offers UNATU enough support to run the union?
18. (a) Does the UNATU prepare financial statements at least annually?
- (b) Does UNATU appoint external auditors to review the union's financial statements at least once a year?
19. Do you think the NEC have strong policies that encourage transparency, integrity and accountability while running the union's affairs?
20. Can you identify strategies that can be adopted to improve the service quality to the UNATU members?
21. In your opinion, what do you think has worked well for UNATU? Why?
22. What has not worked well for UNATU? Why?
23. Any suggestions for improvement?

Thank you for your time and effort!

Appendix 3: Questionnaire Checklist

Dear Respondent,

I am **Komugisha Lorna**, Reg. No. **14/MMS HRM 045/33**, I am a final year student of Masters in Management Studies (MMS) Degree Program at Uganda Management Institute (UMI). This questionnaire is for obtaining your views on how corporate governance affects the performance of UNATU. You are kindly requested to respond to the questions objectively as possible. Please note that this questionnaire is purely for academic purposes and that your response shall be treated with maximum confidentiality. The researcher will only use the data collected/ obtained for her Master's dissertation of MMS.

Yours sincerely

Komugisha Lorna (Tel: 0782-041770)

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Instructions: Tick an appropriate answer

1. Age (i). 21-30 years (ii) 31-40 years (iii) 41-50 years (iv) Above 51 years
2. Gender (i) Male (ii) Female
3. Your marital status (i) Single (ii) Married (iii) Separated (iv) Others
4. What is your level of Education? (i) Diploma (ii) Degree (iii) Masters (iv) others specify.....
5. For how long have you worked with UNATU? (i) between 1-10 years (ii) 11-20 years (iii) 21-30 years (iv) Above 40 years
6. Length of service in Education (i) Between 1-10 years (ii) 11-20 years (iii) 21-30 years (iv) Above 40years

SECTION B: GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF TRADE UNIONS

Kindly indicate your level of agreement with the statement provided by ticking the appropriate box

Key: Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Not sure (NS); Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree (SD)

No.	Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA
B1	The size of the board members is small					
B2	The UNATU board displays a high level of transparency					
B3	The union's board is accountable to its donors and funders, members and the different stakeholders					
B4	The UNATU board is comprised of highly qualified members who have a high level of integrity hence make good decisions for the union					
B5	The union board is competent enough to achieve the union's objectives					
B6	UNATU board supervises, supports and evaluates the work of the General Secretary on a regular basis					
B7	UNATU board is actively involved in operations of the union					
B8	UNATU board is active with clear division of labour					
B9	UNATU board is highly consultative					
B10	UNATU board is for strategy supervision and not for operation					

SECTION C: LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE PERFORMRMCE OF TRADE UNIONS

No.	Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA
C1	The union's leaders is divergent in nature					
C2	The union leaders are concentrated in urban areas					
C3	The union leaders have a clear growth strategy					
C4	The union leaders comply with Uganda government policies					
C5	The union leaders adopts corporate governance code					
C6	The union leaders have instituted audit committees in the union for transparence					
C7	The union leaders have instituted a remuneration committee in the union for transparence					
C8	The UNATU age gives it leverage over other unions in Uganda					
C9	The UNATU size gives it leverage over other unions in Uganda					
C10	The UNATU leaders have strict control over the union affairs					

SECTION D: PERFORMANCE OF TRADE UNIONS

No.	Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA
E1	The union continues to register new members					
E2	The union has experienced expansion in membership					
E3	The union continues to make informed decision on investment ventures to make it sustainable					
E4	The union has lobbied for increased members net pay					
E5	The union draws consensus on members pressing issues					
E6	The services the union offers members are of high quality					
E7	The union has a strategic plan					
E8	The union has stringent regulations for disciplining arrogant members					

Thank you for your time and effort