



**POLITICAL CAUCUSING AND POLICY LEGISLATION IN UGANDA'S  
PARLIAMENT**

**BY**

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**MAY, 2013**

**DECLARATION**

I, David Ivan Masajjage, do hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is solely mine and has never been submitted to any university for award of the Masters Degree or any other award whatsoever.

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Signature.....

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**APPROVAL**

We certify that David Ivan Masajjage wrote this dissertation under our supervision.  
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Date.....

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UMI- Second Supervisor

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this dissertation to all the Masajjages present and those yet to come plus all the Mufumbas of Bugembe, Jinja District, Uganda most especially my mother, Florence Joyce Mufumba. May the good Lord's light dwell in you forevermore and give you empathy.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

CP: Conservative Party

DP: Democratic Party

EALA: East African Legislative Assembly

FDC: Forum for Democratic Change

HIV/AIDS: Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

JEEMA: Justice, Education, Economic Revitalization, Morality and African Unity aka Justice  
Forum

KY: Kabaka Yeeka

LDC: Law Development Centre

MP: Member of Parliament

NAADS: National Agricultural Advisory Services

NALI: National Leadership Institute

NRM National Resistance Movement

UGX: Uganda Shillings

UPC: Uganda People's Congress

UPFYA: Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs

UWOPA: Uganda Women's Parliamentarians Association

SPSS: Statistical Package for Social Scientists

## ABSTRACT

This study was about “*Political Caucusing and Policy Legislation in Uganda’s Parliament,*” which is a paradigm shift from the conventional representative legislation in parliament to the contemporary political caucusing one. These emerging scenarios have in a way affected policy legislation. The study, therefore, explored the possibility that political caucusing contributes to legislation through three objectives that included: to examine the extent to which political caucusing influences agenda setting; to examine the extent to which political caucusing influences policy enactment; and to examine the extent to which political caucusing influences policy outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda. The study applied the cross-sectional research design and administered questionnaires to 103 respondents and an interview guide to 10 respondents. The respondents comprised Members of Parliament and staff from the Parliamentary Affairs arm of the Parliament of Uganda. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were applied in data collection and analysis. Findings of the study depicted that policies are originated from mainly the President’s campaign manifesto, State of the Nation Address and Budget Speech. However, incidentals like vagaries of nature; landslides and floods and internationally ratified conventions and treaties may cause urgency and thus deviation of attention to either a government or a private member’s bill to be tabled before parliament. It was on this basis that it was analysed that political caucusing influences agenda setting, policy enactment and policy outcomes through behind-the-door meetings that influence caucus members’ presentations and decisions on the floor of parliament. The study espouses Max Weber’s elitist theory that the elites shape mass opinion. In this study, the elites included the Members of Parliament; both in the ruling party and opposition, in addition to civil society. The study, to some extent, confirmed Easton’s systems theory which portrays public policy as an output of the political system in that Cabinet is constitutionally mandated to originate, formulate and implement policies. The study, therefore, recommended that political caucusing should, as much as possible, be open to all members of each political party and stakeholders, including the civil society and more accommodative to each other’s views for the common good. The study was, however, not exhaustive enough since it is a relatively novel concept. It, therefore, recommends an area for further research to include the influence of stakeholders outside the ruling party in shaping public policy.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.0 Introduction

This study analysed the influence of political caucusing as a new ideological orientation on Uganda's policy legislating landscape. Caucusing was perceived as the independent variable while policy legislation was considered the dependent variable. The study subsumed that political caucusing was meant to enhance popular and productive policy outcomes and entrench the tenets of good governance. Chapter one presents such sub-themes as: the background to the study, statement of the problem, general objective, specific objectives, research questions, conceptual framework, hypothesis of the study, and the significance of the study.

### 1.1 Background to the Study

#### 1.1.1 Historical Background

During the classical times of the ancient period, political governance and management of societies were a monopoly of kings and queens. As such, there was nothing like caucusing or assembling for legislation following colonial systems. Policies and laws spontaneously came directly from the kings. In this regard, Frank and Brownstone (1986), observe that legislative bodies did not exist in the ancient classical age of Greece.

Africa as a colony with a distinct shortage of literature on politics (Spiro, 1966) no doubt fell prey to the European ideological orientations that subsequently shaped their political party ideological systems of governance and policy legislature. Following the Lockian school of thought of the social contract theory, African governments, after their individual political independency, from their colonial European masters, created administrations.

Uganda which originally began as a one party state later transformed into a multiparty dispensation. As such, by the early 1940s and 1950s, two dominant political parties emerged with their ideological orientation built on religious values. These were: the Democratic Party

(DP) for Catholics and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) for Protestants (Kalinge, 2011). Shortly after, another traditional political party popularly referred to as "Kabaka Yeeka" (KY) or Kings Party emerged. The emergency of KY changed the political landscape of Uganda's political framework in that KY entered into an alliance with the UPC. From this standpoint, one can argue that the UPC-KY alliance was the beginning of political caucusing in Uganda. But because this caucus was not built on honest and popular political ideologies, it soon collapsed in the wake of what came to be called the 1966 Buganda crisis. However, the leadership of UPC together with other African leaders including Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Milton Obote of Uganda formed the Mulungushi club in which they regularly interacted with African intellectuals to brainstorm on what was good for Africa (Balunywa, 2005). Based on the decision-making and actions of the club, one can ably argue that the Mulungushi club was as good as a non democratic political caucus that was meant to legislate for African people.

Beginning 1966, political parties in Uganda went into abeyance. This left UPC as the only actor; a factor which made political caucusing take to the covert stage. This absence or weakness of political caucusing in Uganda's legislative assembly inevitably enhanced internal divisions in the dominant UPC which gave way to the emergency of an authoritarian government led by Maj. Gen. Idi Amin. This soldier majorly governed through decrees and disregarded the legislature as an important institution of policy making. He, therefore, undermined political caucusing and multiparty dispensation (Karugire, 1990; Kivejinja, 1995).

In 1980, multiparty democracy was restored in Uganda. The restoration of political party dispensation gave rise to the emergency of several interest groups in parliament. However, the multiparty restoration was short lived; it lasted 4<sup>1/2</sup> years. In 1986, the new NRM government suspended political parties and mooted a new legislative body politic called the National Resistance Council (NRC), which was built on a one party ideological political system. NRC was now charged with policy legislation (Akena, 2005).

Seven years later, in 1993, it became vividly clear that pressure groups, civil society organisations, human rights activists and cultural associations had intensified pressure against the

NRM to open up political space. At the apex of the 1994 Constituency Assembly, different political interest groups were caucusing to constitute into critical masses for the demand of a specific policy direction, and by the time of the promulgation of the 1995 National Constitution, Uganda had already embraced a multiparty ideology of governance (Kibalama, 2002).

Today, the growth of varying interest groups in Uganda's multiparty dispensation has greatly influenced the voting patterns. Voters elect Members of Parliament basing on political, cultural, religious and economic values. As such, the Parliament of Uganda has become a melting pot of several political caucuses. These are: NRM caucus, Buganda caucus, Opposition caucus and the caucus of MPs from the north (Olum, 2011). These caucuses are built on cultural and political ideologies. One standing caucus that seems to be engaging into active policy ideological legislation is the Opposition Caucus. At times when it comes to critical policy legislation, the NRM and opposition political caucuses dominantly emerge, swallowing up the Buganda and the Northern MPs caucuses. These political caucuses meant to strengthen and improve policy legislation in Uganda have frequently turned the parliament into a centre of clashes, conflicts, tension and at times open confrontation and marginalisation of views of various caucuses other than the NRM caucus. The future of political caucusing or coalition in parliament seems unclear. There is a potential threat to resurgence of a political gridlock which is a kin to the 1966 Buganda crisis. It is, therefore, under these circumstances that an investigation into the influence of political caucuses to Uganda's policy legislation became critical with a view of shaping the destiny of the Republic of Uganda.

### **1.1.2 Theoretical Background**

The study majorly relied on two theories; the Elitist Theory and the Systems Theory. The Elitist theory suggests that people are apathetic and ill informed about public policy; that elites actually shape mass opinion on policy questions more than masses shape elite opinion. This means that public policy turns out to be the preference of elites. Public officials and administrators, merely implement policies decided on by the elite. Policies flow down ward from elites to the masses.

Max Weber's elite theory model of policy making is summarized as: Society is divided into the few who have power and the many that do not, (Harman, 2010). Only a small number of persons



allocate values for society. The few who govern are not typical of the masses that are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socio-economic strata of society. The movement of non elites to elite positions must be slow and continuous in a bid to maintain stability and to avoid a revolution. Only non elites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to the governing circle. Elites share consensus on behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system. Public policy does not reflect the demands of the masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremented rather than revolutionary, (Weimar and Vining, 2005). This theory surprisingly undermines the power of the non elites to over throw the elites in the legislature.

Kahz and Kahn's (1978) Systems Theory model portrays public policy as an output of the political system. The concept of system implies an identifiable set of institutions and activities in society that functions to transform demands into authoritative decisions requiring the support of the whole society. The concept of the system also implies that elements of the system are interrelated; that the system can respond to forces in its environment and that it will do so to preserve itself, (Dye, 1995). Any system without accountability and principled parliamentarians is only used to fulfil their personal interests, which partly explains why corruption deeply exists there in.

### **1.1.3 Conceptual Background**

This part dealt with political caucusing and policy legislation in parliament which are the key concepts in the study and operationalised them. There are four main concepts entailed in this study, namely: caucusing, policy, policy formulation and parliament. Webster (1913) defines a caucus as a political primary meeting. The caucus is, therefore, a meeting, especially a preliminary meeting, of persons belonging to a party, to nominate candidates for public office, or to select delegates to a nominating convention, or to confer regarding measures of party policy; In this study, caucus meant a meeting of persons belonging to either a party or grouping to discuss matters of either party policy or of that grouping.

Public policy refers to whatever governments choose to do or not to do, (Dye, 1995). For purposes of this study, public policy was limited to policy matters or bills brought by either government or any private member to Parliament for legislation.

Policy formulation is the development of an effective and acceptable course of action for addressing what has been placed on the policy agenda (Hayes, 2008). In this study, policy formulation included all bills and policy matters tabled by either government or any private member in parliament for legislation.

Legislation which is a synonym of policy formulation is the process through which statutes are enacted by a legislative body that is established and empowered to do so, Hironori (2007).

Hironori (2007) defines parliament as the legislative branch of government. For purposes of this particular study, parliament referred to the Eighth Parliament of Uganda (2006-2011) and Ninth Parliament of Uganda (2011-2016).

#### **1.1.4 Contextual Background**

Article 77(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda stipulates that there shall be a Parliament of Uganda. The functions of Parliament are outlined in Article 79 of the same Constitution which stipulates that: *“Parliament shall have power to make laws on any matter for the peace, order, development and good governance of Uganda.”* But in order to do that, bills have to be presented to parliament by way of either a private member’s bill or government bill.

The policy formulation process in the Commonwealth parliaments of which Uganda is a member can either be initiated by the government or through a private member’s bill and very rarely by a committee of the House, which also follows the private member’s bill procedure. In the case of the government, policy is derived from: the President’s Election Manifesto; Budget Speech; and State of the Nation Address. It can also be adopted from treaties and conventions ratified by government (Kibirige, 2009). A situational analysis is made through research to answer cases like disaster outbreaks and other issues reported in the media or by other whistle blowers.

Technical papers are originated by the line ministry and taken to Cabinet for consideration and approval since *Article 111(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda* mandates Cabinet to determine, formulate and implement policies in Uganda.

Once the Cabinet approval is got, the Parliamentary Counsel is instructed to draft the bill and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development is asked to issue a certificate of financial implications as a mandatory requirement stipulated in Rule 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda, which among others must indicate existing or proposed methods of financing the costs related to the bill and its feasibility.

In the case of a private member's bill, the line ministry affected by the operations of the bill shall afford the MP moving it reasonable assistance on top of having to get a certificate of financial implications from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. However, should government, which controls the Consolidated Fund, lack interest in the bill, it may feign lack of money to implement the propositions and so the bill will not see the light of day; and that will be the end of it.

On introduction to the House, a bill must go through three stages of reading prior to being passed into law (Parliament of Uganda, 2012). After the first reading, which is the introduction, a bill is committed to the appropriate committee of parliament for scrutiny – further analysis where all MPs regardless of which committee they sit on and members of the public are free to go and make their input before reporting back to the Committee of the whole House in Parliament for the second and subsequently third reading.

The parliamentary committee stage is quite pertinent in that its report forms the basis of the second reading and subsequent discussion during plenary in parliament. A strategic party caucus will send its crème de la crème in that professional line to argue their case and influence the committee's position since the committee report forms the basis of what is reported and subsequently debated during the second reading in plenary. Should the report sail through plenary without amendments, the caucus with the better argued-out-propositions would have taken the day and their positions enacted during the third reading. But should the report meet

resistance and call for major amendments and perhaps voting on issues, the better-mobilised and bigger in number group or caucus will carry the day.

Caucuses team up to protect and defend their ideology and interests and not the interests of their constituents. While castigating the ruling NRM Government, retired Supreme Court Judge, Justice George Kanyeihamba said, *“The contributions of members of the opposition to debates in Parliament have become vital today because the ruling party has chosen to make laws and important decisions of governance behind closed doors in what have come to be known as caucuses,”* (Karugaba & Musoke, 2011). Each caucus gets to the floor of parliament with a fixated position; not ready to listen and digest any alternative view from across the divide but rather ready to vote ‘nay’ or ‘aye’ and call it a day, which leads to a stalemate. Legislators often become chaotic and abandon policy legislation as was the case during the proposed voting on recommitment of clause 9 of the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, to give unlimited powers to the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development (Imaka & Naturinda, 2012). This culminated in lack of policy enactment and thus lack of policy outcomes. This constrains public opinion and representative democracy in that the views of the people are not brought up since they are not party to the caucus decisions. In a nutshell, MPs literally abdicate their role as people’s representatives. These emerging scenarios in a way have greatly affected policy legislation and if they persist, the masses will lose confidence in the Parliament of Uganda. Therefore, this study focuses on the underlying causes and the possible remedy to halt the rather plausible aftermath of political crisis. The study explored the influence that political caucusing contributed to legislation.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Political caucusing as a critical and central aspect of policy legislation was adopted primarily to represent the various people’s interests and demands. It was meant to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of legislation in terms of time and resources. Ideally, caucuses are meant to be vehicles of dialogue and consensus building for democratic governance. However, political caucuses have subverted from their cardinal principle of parliamentary democracy, which emphasizes effective representation, to taking policy positions without seeking the consent of

their constituents (Olum, 2011). This position has made caucuses turn themselves into pseudo parliaments which, however, cannot take legitimate decisions and have to present their fixated positions on the floor of parliament to seek legitimacy and thereby try to impose their views on their constituents, which makes them abdicate their representative democratic role.

Despite all these set conventional forms of legislation, there is noticeably a paradigm shift in the Ugandan Parliament since the Eighth Parliament; political parties tend to regroup in their caucuses to lay strategies of carrying the motion on the floor of parliament. They only come to parrot and vote along an agreed upon fixated position despite dissent from their constituents, which contravenes their representative role in parliament.

### **1.3.0 General Objective**

The general objective of this study was to establish the extent to which political caucusing influences policy legislation in the Parliament of Uganda.

#### **1.3.1 Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives of the study were:

- 1) To examine the extent to which political caucusing influences agenda setting in the Parliament of Uganda;
- 2) To investigate the extent to which political caucusing influences policy enactment outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda; and
- 3) To study the extent to which political caucusing influences policy outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda.

## **1.4 Research Questions**

- 1) To what extent does political caucusing influence agenda setting in the Parliament of Uganda?
- 2) To what extent does political caucusing influence policy enactment in the Parliament of Uganda? and
- 3) To what extent does political caucusing influence policy outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda?


## **1.5 Hypotheses of the Study**

The study intended to test the following hypotheses:


- 1) Political caucusing does not influence agenda setting in parliament;
- 2) Political caucusing does not influence policy enactment in parliament; and
- 3) Political caucusing does not influence policy outcomes in parliament.

## 1.6 Conceptual Framework

### Independent Variables



### Dependent Variables



**Figure 1:** Conceptual Framework showing the relationship between political caucusing and policy legislation in the Parliament of Uganda.

**Source:** Dye (1995) and modified by the researcher.

## **1.7 Significance of the Study**

Findings of this study will form an insight into the on goings in parliament for parliamentarians, past, present and aspiring ones plus their staff and would make an invaluable resource for scholars of parliamentary studies. This study hopes to become a reference point for policy makers, mainly members of the Executive and the Legislature, parliamentary staff and scholars of parliamentary studies in relation to policy formulation; right from identification, analysis, enactment and implementation, which constitutes the outcomes. It is on this premise that it is anticipated that it will make a successful case study towards improving political caucuses as vehicles for effective political legislation. So, the researcher hoped to improve on the working environment of caucus members, something which would go a long way in improving the quality of policy enactment. This would also ease tension and conflicts among the various caucus groups in the Parliament of Uganda. This would also professionalise and deepen parliamentary democracy, a vehicle through which people's demands and expectations are supposed to be met.

## **1.8 Justification of the Study**

This study tested John Locke's theory on the vitality of separation of powers. It explored the viability of multiparty democracy and the relevancy of the public choice theory in Uganda's Parliament. By so doing, the study would improve the working relationships between and among individual caucus members. This would give rise to a new political legislative culture of dialoguing among caucus members. This study has identified policy gaps and offers scientific recommendations to improving policy enactment.

### **1.9.0 Scope of the Study**

#### **1.9.1 Geographical Scope**

The study was conducted from central Uganda, within the precincts of the Parliament of Uganda along Parliament Avenue and Sir Apollo Kagwa Road within Kampala City, Uganda. This geographical scope was chosen because it was the area where all Members of Parliament convene their political caucuses. Besides, the area was the residential district for the researcher and therefore convenient for the study.



### **1.9.2 Content Scope**

Thematically, the study limited itself to the role of political caucuses constituted by Members of Parliament in analysing policy strategies employed by caucus members towards influencing policy outcomes, establishing mechanisms of agenda setting in Uganda's Parliament and how political caucuses influence policy enactment. These variables were chosen because they were closely related and could mutually enable the researcher to understand how caucuses influence policy legislation.

### **1.9.3 Time Scope**

The study limited itself to the period beginning June 2006 to May 2013. This period was chosen because it was critical for having experienced a higher degree of the emergency of political caucuses and increased political manoeuvres among caucus members as compared to the 7<sup>th</sup> Parliament of Uganda. Besides, it was the period with the most recent complete form of multiparty democracy in the Parliament of Uganda's history of legislation.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter fundamentally reviewed previous studies and relevant information in regard to political caucuses and policy legislation. Thematically, the literature is according to the specific objectives and research questions of the study. Literature reviewed included: policy identification, enactment, analysis, outcomes and implementation. The study specifically looked at two parliaments; the Parliament of India- the Lower House (Lok Sabha) and Upper House (Rajya Sabha) and the United States Congress and Senate with specific review being made to strategically reconcile the theory and practice of political caucuses and policy legislation in the Parliament of Uganda. Primarily, the literature was aimed at identifying gaps. However, this being a new study, literature was scanty and the study generally relied on generalised attributes to the study.

#### **2.1 Theoretical review**

The study majorly relied on two theories; the Elitist Theory and the Systems Theory. The Elitist theory suggests that people are apathetic and ill informed about public policy, that elites actually shape mass opinion on policy questions more than masses shape elite opinion. This means that public policy turns out to be the preference of elites. Public officials and administrators, merely implement the policies decided on by the elite. Policies flow down ward from elites to the masses.

Max Weber's elite theory model of policy making is summarised as: Society is divided into the few who have power and the many that do not, (Harman, 2010). Only a small number of persons allocate values for society. The few who govern are not typical of the masses that are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socio-economic strata of society. The movement of non elites to elite positions must be slow and continuous so as to maintain stability and avoid a revolution. Only non elites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to the governing circle. Elites share consensus on behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system. Public policy does not reflect the demands of

the masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremented rather than revolutionary, (Weimar and Vining, 2005). This theory surprisingly undermines the power of the non elites over throwing the elites in the legislature.

Kahz and Kahn's Systems Theory (1978) model portrays public policy as an output of the political system. The concept of system implies an identifiable set of institutions and activities in society that functions to transform demands into authoritative decisions require the support of the whole society. The concept of the system also implies that elements of the system are interrelated, that the system can respond to forces in its environment and that it will do so to preserve itself, (Dye, 1995). Any system without accountability and without principled parliamentarians is only used to fulfil their personal interests, which partly explains why corruption deeply exists there in.

## **2.2 Political Caucusing and Policy Legislation**

### **2.2.1 Political Caucusing and Agenda Setting**

Rule 118 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda ( 2012) points out that, after a Bill has gone through the first reading in the House and is received by the responsible committee(s) it goes through a thorough study with lessons being drawn from countries or regions where it has worked. Benchmarking is a very common practice among Commonwealth countries, being that they ideally follow the Westminster model of legislation. In India, which is one of the Commonwealth countries, the line standing committee considers the broad objectives and the specific clauses of the bill referred to it and may invite public comments on a bill, (Lok Sabha, 1997). Currently the Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests has invited suggestions on the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010. But in case a Bill comes under the ambit of a number of different ministries, it may be referred to a Joint Committee, which after scrutinising it submits its recommendations in the form of a report to Parliament. During the Second Reading, the Bill is scrutinised thoroughly, clause by clause on the floor of the House and may be accepted, amended or rejected.

In the United States of America, all bills are sent to the House or Senate committees after being registered for scrutiny. The committee may either approve a bill or reject it. Approved bills move

further in the legislative process and rejected one are simply not worked on; they are considered to have “died in the committee.” The House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Appropriations Committee consider the bill’s potential impact on the Federal Budget, Robert and Dove (1997). The bills are sent to a subcommittee for further study and public hearings by any interested persons; be it Government officials, industry experts or the public to give testimony either in person or in writing. Notice of these hearings, as well as instructions for presenting testimony is officially published in the Federal Register. Once the sub-committee is satisfied, it may make some changes and amendments to the bill and recommend it back to the full committee for approval. This process is called "Mark Up." But should the subcommittee vote not to recommend a bill to the full committee, the bill dies right there.

After the full committee has reviewed the deliberations and recommendations of the subcommittee, it may conduct further review, hold more public hearings, or simply vote on the report from the sub-committee. If the bill is to go forward, the full committee prepares and votes on its final recommendations to the House or Senate. Once a bill has successfully passed this stage it is said to have been "ordered reported" or simply "reported." Once a bill has been reported, a detailed report about the bill, including the purpose of the bill, its impact on existing laws, budgetary considerations, and any new taxes or tax increases that will be required by the bill is published. Appendices of transcripts from public hearings on the bill, as well as the opinions of the committee for and against the proposed Bill are also attached, (Robert & Dove, 1997).

The bill now qualifies to be placed chronologically on the legislative calendar of the House or Senate and scheduled for debate, commonly referred to as “floor action” by the full membership of the House. The Speaker of the House and House Majority Leader use their discretion to decide the order in which reported bills will be debated. Debate for and against the bill, proceeds before the full House and the Senate, with strict rules of consideration and debate. Once debate has ended and any amendments to the bill have been approved, the full membership votes for or against the bill using either a voice vote or a roll-call vote.

Bills approved by one chamber of Congress (House or Senate) are then sent to the other chamber where they follow pretty much the same track of committee to debate to vote. The other chamber may approve, reject, ignore, or amend the bill.

Since legislation is intended to solve problems faced by Government and society generally, it is important to carry out what is referred to in Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7, as the purpose approach of the mischief rule where it was stated that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered: What was the common law before the making of the Act? What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; and the true reason of the remedy.

As one of the most famous English judges, Lord Denning noted, Common Law should acquire such provisions as local circumstances render necessary in *Nyali Ltd v. Attorney General* 1956 1QB 1, at pp. 16-17, regarding the applicability of the English common law to the African continent, while sounding a warning that extended to other parts of the world,

...Just as with an English oak, so with the English common law. You cannot transplant it...and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed, but it needs careful tending. ...In these far off lands the people must have a law which they understand and which they respect.

So, each parliament comes up with laws, which are directly applicable and can be understood by its citizenry and that are enforceable, lest the legislation impacts negatively on the policy outcomes and raises dissent among the populace which calls for a fresh process of legislation.

This study found out that the bigger the number of members of a caucus with the same ideology, the more they would influence the decisions of the agenda setting and subsequently its enactment and thus outcomes.

### **2.2.2 Political Caucusing and Policy Enactment**

In the modern state, the enactment of policy is a function of government. It is the party in power's vision that determines policies to be pursued. The party in power may either stifle or pass a private member's legislation. For example, it may feign lack of sufficient funds to implement the policy. The government also controls not only the time but the vote on all important matters and so when the government introduces a bill, it is almost for certain that it will go through, (Nakachwa, 2009).

In the United States of America, a Bill is introduced by either a Representative of the House or a Senator and is assigned a number and printed in the Congressional Record by the Government Printing Office. It is then referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Appropriations Committee to consider its potential impact on the Federal Budget. Once the committees approve the Bill, it moves on through the legislative process, (Robert and Dove, 1997).

Robert and Dove (1997) further point out that in the United States of America, once both the House and Senate have approved a bill in identical form; it is enrolled and sent to the President who may sign it into law. If the President takes no action on the bill within ten days while Congress is in session, the bill automatically becomes law. But if the President is opposed to the bill, he or she can veto it. If he takes no action on the bill within ten days after Congress has adjourned their second session, the bill dies, which is referred to as a "pocket veto." However, should Congress intend to override a presidential veto of a bill and force it into law, it requires a 2/3 vote by a quorum of members in the House and Senate, (Robert and Dove, 1997).

In India, once a bill has been approved by Cabinet, it is introduced in Parliament for the first reading, during which stage it may be opposed and the matter may be put to a vote in the House. After a Bill has been introduced, the Presiding Officer of the concerned House, the Speaker in case of the Lok Sabha; and Chairperson in case of Rajya Sabha, may refer the Bill to the concerned Department Related Standing Committee for examination. Bills which come under the ambit of several ministries may be referred to a Joint Committee, (Lok Sabha, 1997) After the bill has gone through the concerned committee and come back to the House for the second and

third reading and subsequently passed by both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, as a constitutional requirement, it is sent to the President for assent but may refer it back for clarification or reconsideration; and is then sent back. However, this can only be done once and if both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha pass it again, the President has no option other than to assent to it. So, this brings out the fact that policy enactment and thus legitimisation is the prerogative of the Legislature and assent is that of the Executive, which brings out the Lockean theory of separation of powers, where the three arms of government have to carry out checks and balances on each other.

However, it may also bring about a stalemate between the Executive and the Legislature in that, for example, much as the Executive is in control of the Exchequer, it is the Legislature's mandate to appropriate funds for service delivery and so a disagreement between the two may stifle service delivery and thus lead to poor policy outcomes and public disgruntlement.

My findings reveal that for as long as the Executive is interested in a policy direction, they will do all it takes, whether to re-caucus on it as many as ten times or to forego sleep to generate consensus, so as to have it enacted along those lines. And it is the role of the President, Chief Executive or Head of State, depending on the nomenclature, to promulgate the new policy that has been enacted.

### **2.2.3 Political Caucusing and Policy Outcomes**

Policy outcomes focus on a policy's societal consequences after the policy has been implemented. Hog wood and Gunn (1984: p. 222) argue that nothing illustrates more clearly the interaction of stages of the policy process than the way in which objective-setting shapes evaluation. If objectives are unclear or are not specified in any measurable form, the criteria of success are unclear. If there has been goal shifting or goal creep, should success be measured against the original objectives, then the outcome will also be as vague as its input. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the political institutions in Brazil generate policies in three broad but distinct categories: 1) stable but adaptable, 2) volatile and unstable; and 3) rigid and hard-wired.

### **2.2.3.1 Stable and Adaptable Policy**

This means that if exogenous conditions are stable, policy outcomes would be easily controlled but exogenous events happen and the government adapts to them so as to minimize the damage to fiscal stability. The policies that best fit into this category relate to economic growth, inflation and unemployment, which could easily be affected by IMF and World Bank policies plus other factors like vagaries of nature and international trade, (Aston J. et.al, 2006).

### **2.2.3.2 Volatile and Unstable Policy**

According to Aston J. et.al, (2006) “Policies are unstable because: 1) some have a strong ideological component and oscillate with changes in the Executive branch in particular; and 2) some are residual in that the appropriations are determined so as to meet a budgetary target that does not upset the overarching goal of stable monetary and fiscal policy. The mechanism by which receipts and expenditures are balanced by the government throughout the budgetary year so as to achieve the target primary surplus is known as *contingenciamento*.” The Government of Brazil normally passes a decree at the beginning of each fiscal year impounding part of the discretionary expenditures in the budget, that is not hard-wired but could subsequently be “un-impounded” if tax receipts are greater than expected and if hard-wired expenditures have not been greater than expected.

### **2.2.3.4 Rigid or Hard-Wired Policy**

Hard-wired policies are those that are stipulated in the Constitution over which the Executive has no discretion. For example, approximately 94 percent of the Brazilian expenditures in the 2003 budget were “rigid” - they could not be changed. They were cumulative expenditures which may not have been foreseen at the time of hard-wiring like pensions, which now accounts for 33 percent of the budget. However, other types of hard-wired expenditures were deliberate outcomes of deals between the Legislature and the Executive, which included; 18 percent transfers to states and municipalities; one percent to social assistance; one percent to Kandir Law (export tax breaks); two percent to subsidies; seven percent to the health system or SUS; and 11 percent to other expenditures. Only six percent of the expenditures were subject to being withheld by the Executive to reach fiscal targets. However, the total value of approximately



R\$20 billion still remained significant, which led to serious debate over what powers the Constitution and the Fiscal Responsibility Law actually confer to the President in terms of discretion to execute the budget, Lima (2004).

In Uganda, despite the various caucuses in parliament advocating for different votes, accounting officers like chief administrative officers (CAOs) at the district to retain unabsorbed funds at the end of a financial, they are compelled by the Accountant General to return all unabsorbed funds to the Consolidated Fund. For it is stipulated in the Public Finance Bill, 2012 Schedule 5 (2) (d) that: *“a statement of arrears of revenue signed by the Accounting Officer showing the amount outstanding at the end of the financial year for each source of revenue and containing information in the form the Accountant General may direct; a nil return should be submitted if appropriate.”* This disadvantages policy implementation and thus outcomes since all incomplete projects have to undergo a fresh bidding and appropriation process in the new financial year. This in relation to my study is a typical example of hard wired or rigid policies that are mandated by the Constitution and the legislature has no option but to abide by.

## **2.4 Summary**

An insight into policy issues shows that the ruling party is out to push its manifesto right from policy identification through all the levels of enactment, analysis, outcomes up to implementation of the so much sought policy. The sponsors of a policy influence its drafting, enactment and implementation as it is clearly noted in the Legislation Theory that legislators' political needs shape the policy of the country. A political caucus, therefore, has the inalienable role of winning the confidence of its supporters and should endeavour to involve all stakeholders in the party, like trade unions, special interest groups and elected leaders at different levels so as to shape the party's (caucus's) policy that reflects its identity and values. The policy process creates a unique and yet critical dialogue among the people about the anticipated challenges ahead of them, which helps them plan and enrich the political party's strategies towards achieving its set goals.

Literature on legislative policy largely considers the procedures of policy formulation in various countries and lacks investigation of political caucusing in influencing agenda setting, policy

outcomes and policy enactment. This study, therefore, is designed to establish whether political caucusing influences agenda setting, policy outcomes and policy enactment.

# CHAPTER THREE

## METHODOLOGY

### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter dominantly concentrates on the various methodological aspects which the researcher employed in order to address and reach at the expected findings of the study in line with specific study objectives. Largely the methodology employed aimed at establishing the extent to which political caucuses influence policy legislation in the Parliament of Uganda. These research methodologies include: Research design, study population, sample size and selection, sampling techniques and procedure, data collection methods, data collection instruments, validity and reliability, procedure of data collection and data analysis.

### 3.1 Research Design

The study used a case study design which is explanatory in nature. Specifically it employs description and correlation survey. Different methodologies were employed to obtain a reflective explanation of the case study of Uganda's parliament. This was essential in analysing the influence of political caucusing towards policy legislation in Uganda's legislative assembly. This was with the view of undertaking an in-depth analysis of political caucusing and the way it influences agenda setting, policy enactment and policy outcomes.

### 3.2 Study Population

The population involved in the study targeted the entire population of the 1,024 respondents. This includes 712 MPs of who 326 are Members of the Eighth Parliament, 386 Members of the Ninth Parliament of Uganda and 312 members of staff. This study population was expected to be instrumental in the analysis of political caucusing and policy legislation and was expected to be representative enough to give the researcher credible findings.

### 3.3 Sample Size and Selection

Sampling the entire population would not be possible, hence the need to select a sample due to time, expenses and the wide number of subjects involved. Whereas the study established that, a sample computed using the table of Krejcie and Morgan (1970) as adopted by Barifajo,

Basheka, Oonyu (2010) gave rise to N (population size) as 1,024 and S (sample size) as 278, the sample size was still large and not feasible to the researcher. Since 278 was still big number to study within the required time of the results, the researcher applied a sample size of 100 respondents. This targeted 50 MPs who were both in the Eighth Parliament and in the Ninth Parliament; and 50 members of staff from the Parliamentary Affairs arm of Parliament. This covered the departments of Legislative and Legal Services, Budget Office, Official Report, Clerks and Library. The Research targeted 100 respondents basing on Kothari and Palls' (1993) explanation that 100 people are representative enough for a big study population.

### 3.4 Sampling Techniques and Procedure

The researcher employed stratified sampling. Stratified sampling was largely administered on all Members of Parliament according to their representative ratio in the House and subsequently to their caucuses. These were both MPs of both the Eighth and Ninth Parliament.

**Table 1: Illustration of Sample Size and Sampling Technique**

Category	Population	Sample size	Sampling technique
MPs	712	53	Simple random sampling
Staff	312	50	Simple random sampling
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,024</b>	<b>103</b>	

**Source: Adopted and adapted from the Dairy of the Parliament of Uganda, 2012**

### 3.5 Data Collection Methods

The data collection methods consisted of face-to-face interviews, questionnaires and documentary review.

#### 3.5.1 Interview

The researcher prepared an interview schedule which guided his interview with the respondents. The targeted respondents were Members of Parliament and staff of Parliament of Uganda. The

interview schedule mainly focused on specific objectives and the general research topic. This method was vital to the researcher because of his direct interaction with the respondents. It also created a personal relationship and enabled the application of the observation technique through body language to establish actual feelings of the respondents about the topics through close observation by the interviewer.

### **3.5.2 Questionnaire Survey**

Closed and open-ended questionnaires were designed and distributed to the respondents. The questions were based on the research objectives. This method was useful to the researcher in that those respondents who did not have time to be interviewed were simply given copies of a prepared research instrument. This approach was applied to avoid bias of responses from respondents in the presence of the researcher and also to give them time to think and answer freely at their own time rather than being tensed up.

### **3.5.3 Documentary Review**

During the study, the researcher accessed political party caucus reports, agendas, and committee and sub-committee reports. These documentaries aided the researcher to analyse and compare policy outcomes in other sectoral areas. The researcher also consulted literature related to the study objectives from public libraries, including the internet, and brought in other countries' perspectives on political caucusing.

## **3.6 Data Collection Instruments**

### **3.6.1 Interview Guide**

Interview guides were used on sampled members of Parliament. These included all committee chairpersons, because a number of issues are tabled at committee stage. This instrument was useful in collaborating information obtained from the questionnaires. (Refer to Appendix B)

### **3.6.2 Questionnaire**

Closed and open-ended questionnaires were administered to the employees of parliament from the various departments within the Parliamentary Affairs arm of the Parliament of Uganda and to

Members of Parliament. This instrument was vital in collecting data on agenda setting, policy enactment and policy outcomes. (Refer to Appendix A)

### **3.6.3 Documentary Checklist**

Documentary review was administered on The Public Finance and Accountability Act, The Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Act, 2006 and The Parliamentary Score Card, 2008-2009. This category was employed because they are among the basic references that Members and staff of Parliament keep referring to while carrying out agenda setting, enactment as well as while pursuing policy outcomes. (Refer to Appendix C)

## **3.7 Data Quality Control**

### **3.7.1 Validity**

The first thing that the researcher did before setting out to collect data was pre-testing the research tools for validity and reliability. This was to verify whether they could produce accurate data (validity), measure what they are intended for and check whether they would be consistent (reliability). The instrument was pre-tested on 10 MPs who feature in the study sample and was modified to improve on their validity and coefficients to at least 70 percent or 0.70. According to Kothari and Palls (1993) as quoted by Oso and Onen (2009), items with such coefficients are acceptable as valid and reliable in research.

As for content validity, the researcher consulted two experts in the area of study to evaluate and rate each item in the instruments on the scale of Very Influential (4), Quite Influential (3), Somewhat Influential (2) and Not Influential (1).

Formula for Content Validity Index (CVI) =  $\frac{\text{Item rated 3 or 4 by both experts}}{\text{Total Number of Items in an instrument}}$

**Source: Adopted and adapted from Oso and Onen (2009)**

All those questions that were rated invalid were deleted and the researcher continued to pre-test the instruments on respondents that had the same characteristics as those in the sample but not part of the sample until the CVI was at 94%. (Refer to Appendix D)

### **3.7.2 Reliability**

As for reliability of the instruments, the researcher pre-tested instruments once on a sample of 10 respondents and the scores of the respondents were analysed until Chronbach's Alpha coefficient was at .0927 (92.7) from SPSS having ensured that the reliability index was at least 0.7 and above, as Amin (2005) recommends it as the minimum reliable index for survey studies.

## **3.8 Procedure of Data Collection**

Upon the recommendation and approval of the supervisors and the Higher Degrees department, the researcher obtained an introductory letter from the Uganda Management Institute, which was presented to various respondents, including the Clerk to Parliament, MPs and staff. In this process interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions were conducted and data was obtained.

## **3.9 Data Analysis**

### **3.9.1 Qualitative Data Analysis**

Qualitative data analysis was done through Thematic Analysis Techniques. The data was collected, sorted, categorised and analysed theme by theme. The justification is that this enabled the researcher more familiarisation with their data because data collection and analysis went on simultaneously and thus made it cheaper and cost effective.

### **3.9.2 Quantitative Data Analysis**

The qualitative data analysis was augmented by the quantitative analysis, which was done using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) which facilitated the statistical perspective of the study. Data was presented, analysed and interpreted theme by theme and by rank, using the Spearman's correlation to measure the degree and direction of influence between variables.

### **3.10 Measurement of Variables**

Mugenda and Mugenda (1999) stipulate that measurement of data is a prerequisite in quantitative studies like this one. In this study, codes and labels were assigned to emerging themes for the qualitative data while a Likert scale was used to measure variables for quantitative data with the scales of 5- Strongly Agree (SA); 4 - Agree (A); 3- Not Sure (NS); 2-Disagree (D); and 1- Strongly Disagree (SD)



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

This study aimed at establishing the extent to which political caucusing has influenced policy legislation in the Parliament of Uganda with emphasis on whether policies comprise the people's views.

The specific objectives that guided the study were:

1. To examine the extent to which political caucusing influences agenda setting in the Parliament of Uganda.
2. To study the extent to which political caucusing influences policy enactment in the Parliament of Uganda.
3. To investigate the extent to which political caucusing influence policy outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda.

#### **4.1 Response Rate**

A total of 103 self-administered questionnaires were distributed to both staff and Members of Parliament and all of them were filled and returned, thereby making 100 percent response. None of the returned questionnaires was rejected, which means the number of respondents used for testing the hypothesis remains 103.

A question guide with five questions was intended to be administered to 20 purposively sampled out respondents who comprised Members of Parliament who featured in both the Eighth and Ninth Parliament of Uganda. Only 10 respondents managed to be interviewed thereby making 50 percent of the targeted response. Overall, the response rate was at 75 percent, which was good enough according to Amin (2005); 70 percent and above for any given study is representative enough to give viable results.

## 4.2 Demographic descriptive statistics of the respondents

The quantified demographic characteristics of the respondents included gender, age, highest level of education, occupation in parliament, that is, Member of Parliament or civil servant (staff of parliament) and duration of service at parliament. With the help of a self-administered questionnaire, this data was captured and the findings are presented below:

### 4.2.1 Gender of the respondents

The gender of the respondents was deemed to be of importance to the researcher in order to find out whether both female and male Members of Parliament and staff concur on the extent to which political caucusing affects legislation in the Parliament of Uganda. Further to that, it was to ensure that the views of either sex were well taken care of in this study despite the fact that the female were less represented by percentage. The results are indicted in **Table 2** below:

**Table 2: Distribution of respondents by gender**

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Male	65	63.1
Female	38	36.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

From **Table 2**, it was established that the majority of the respondents were male who constituted 63.1 percent and 36.9 percent were female. This gave the researcher a fair presentation of the actual number of male and female Members of Parliament's influence and staff's role in political caucusing and policy legislation in the Parliament of Uganda.

### 4.2.2 Age of respondents

The age of the respondents was of serious consideration due to the researcher's optimism that respondents in the higher bracket were more knowledgeable about the influence political

caucusing has on legislation in the Parliament of Uganda. **Table 3** below shows the age bracket of the respondents:

**Table 3: Distribution of respondents by age bracket**

Age bracket	Frequency	Percentage
20 - 30	13	12.6
31 – 40	53	51.5
41 – 50	28	27.2
51 – 59	7	6.8
60 and above	2	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 3** above shows that the majority of the respondents were in the age bracket of 31 years to 40 years of age who were 51.5 percent. These were followed by the 41 years to 50 years of age bracket, which comprised 27.2 percent; followed by the 21 years to 30 years of age bracket who were 12.6 percent; followed by the 51 years to 59 years of age bracket who were at 6.8 percent; and lastly the 60 years of age and above bracket who were at 1.9 percent. The age analysis concurs with the public service model that people should be retiring at the age of 60 and the fact that most vibrant politicians are either youthful or middle aged; one fact with the composition of the current caucuses in the Ninth Parliament of Uganda, which has been described as youthful and very vibrant. This also implies that if democracy is to prevail in caucusing, decisions and actions of government could be skewed towards needs of the youths.

#### **4.2.3 Respondents’ duration at Parliament**

The respondents’ duration at parliament was of interest to the researcher in light of the adage that: “A new broom sweeps best but the old one knows all the corners.” This was to enable the researcher understand how well grounded or exposed the respondents have been to political caucusing and its influence on legislation in the Parliament of Uganda. The respondents’ duration so far at parliament is shown in **Table 4** below:

**Table 4: Duration of respondents at Parliament**

<b>Duration</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
1 - 5 yrs	47	45.6
6 - 10 yrs	38	36.9
11 - 15 yrs	16	15.5
16 - 20 yrs	1	1.0
20 - 25 yrs	1	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

According to **Table 4**, the 1-5 years duration had the highest percentage of 45.6; followed by that of 6-10 years, which had 36.9 percent; followed by the 11-15 years bracket which had 15.5 percent and then the 16-20 years and the 20-25 years bracket which tied at one percent each. From the results the researcher was able to deduce that all respondents would have valuable information for the study since so far the most pronounced years of political caucusing have been the last six years and the highest percentage of respondents have been around for at least five years. This would enable them have a didactic insight about what is on-going within the various caucuses in Parliament.

The retention capacity of parliament for staff is high and creates a good potential guide for effective agenda setting, policy enactment and thus policy outcomes. The members of staff work as the institutional memory. They have gained enormous exposure to parliamentary procedure through interaction with staff and Members of Parliament in the Commonwealth while on attachment and also through tailor made training by institutions like the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) and the Bureau of Parliamentary Studies (BPST), India plus the Institute of Parliamentary Studies (IPS), Uganda through the Westminster Foundation. With this kind of exposure, the staff offer very reliable guidance to the Members of Parliament in as far as the policy process is concerned.

#### 4.2.4 Respondents Occupation at Parliament

The respondents' capacity at parliament, that is, whether Members of Parliament or civil servants (staff of parliament) was of importance to the researcher so as to ascertain what role they play in the legislative function of parliament. The respondents' occupation at parliament is shown in **Table 5 below:**

**Table 5: Occupation of respondents**

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Member of Parliament	53	51.5
Civil servant (Staff)	50	48.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

According to **Table 5**, there were 53 Members of Parliament who made 51.5 percent and 50 civil servants (staff of parliament) who made 48.5 of the total respondents. This was a good response rate given the fact that they are not wide apart in the percentage difference since they work closely and may influence one another on the decisions they take. As the Members of Parliament do the politicking, the members of staff do research, discuss and draw reports for them in addition to providing technical input on aspects like budgeting. The members of staff who participated in this research have particularly been drawn from the Parliamentary Affairs arm of Parliament; Legal and Legislative Services, Library and Research, Official Report and the Budget Office. This portrayed that there are adequate staff to guide policy makers in Uganda.

#### 4.2.4 Respondents Level of Education

The respondents' level of education was of fundamental interest to the researcher because there are set minimum education standards for both Members of Parliament and staff of parliament according to their job description. And secondly, this research was based on a self-administered questionnaire, which called for personal input in as far as literacy is concerned. According to the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, the minimum education standard of a Member of Parliament is an A' Level Certificate or its equivalent and the entry level of an officer in the

Parliamentary Commission is a bachelor’s degree. In **Table 6** below is the data on the distribution of the respondents by their highest level of education.

**Table 6: Respondents level of education**

<b>Education Level</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
PhD	1	1.0
Master’s degree	46	44.7
Postgraduate diploma	3	2.9
Bachelor’s degree	46	44.7
Diploma	6	5.8
A Level	1	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100.0</b>

From the results in **Table 6**, respondents from the masters and bachelor’s degree bracket were the highest in number at 46 (44.7 percent) each; followed by diploma holders who were 6 (5.8 percent); followed by postgraduate diploma holders who were 3 (2.9 percent); followed by PhD and A’ Level holders who tied at 1(1.0 percent) respondent each. The above results confirmed to the researcher that all the respondents had the set minimum academic qualifications set by both Article 80 (c) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda for Members of Parliament and the Recruitment, Selection and Placement Policy of the Parliamentary Commission for the civil servant staff respectively. This would, therefore, ensure efficacy in political caucusing for good policies in that the staff have the required academic and professional credentials to guide the Members of Parliament who in turn have the basic constitutionally set minimum qualification to be able to debate in the august House.

#### **4.3.0 Political Caucusing in Uganda’s Parliament**

The findings on political caucusing and policy legislation in Uganda are presented and interpreted below as tabulated frequencies and percentages according to the developed themes of the study and analysed objective by objective. The following codes have the respective definitions: 5- Strongly Agree (SA); 4 - Agree (A); 3- Not Sure (NS); 2-Disagree (D); and 1-

Strongly Disagree (SD). The major objective of the study was to establish the extent to which political caucusing influences policy legislation in the Parliament of Uganda. In this regard, the researcher came up with seven questions in the questionnaire to exhaustively seek the views of respondents on this and the results are summarised in **Table 7** below.

**Table 7: Descriptive statistics of respondents views on political caucusing**

Statement	(SA) 5	(A) 4	(NS) 3	(D) 2	(SD) 1	Mean	SD
Policy issues are brought during caucusing	29(28.2%)	52(50.5%)	8(7.8%)	9(8.7%)	5(4.9%)	2.12	1.069
Prioritisation of policy issues takes place during caucusing	25 (24.3%)	39(37.9%)	14(13.6%)	22(21.4%)	3(2.9%)	2.41	1.158
Peoples interests are taken care of during caucusing	25(24.3%)	34(33.0%)	19(18.4%)	13(12.6%)	12 (11.7%)	2.89	1.244
Strategies to advance political causes takes place during caucusing	43 (41.7%)	44 42.7%)	9(8.7%)	5(4.9%)	2 (1.9%)	1.83	0.923
Manifesto development takes place during caucusing	31 (30.1%)	28(27.2%)	17 16.5%)	23(22.3%)	4 (3.9%)	2.43	1.241
Monitoring progress takes place during caucusing	10(9.7%)	28(27.2%)	18(17.5%)	36(35.0%)	11(10.7 %)	3.10	1.201
Disciplining of errant members of the party takes place during caucusing	40 (38.8%)	34(33.0%)	9 (8.7%)	15 (4.6%)	5 (4.9%)	2.14	1.221

**Source: Primary data**

#### **4.3.1 Political caucusing on policy issues**

The study as per the results in **Table 7** revealed that 29(28.2%) of the respondents strongly agree that policy issues are brought during caucusing; 52(50.5%) who are the majority agree; and 8(7.8%) were not sure. However, 9(8.7%) of the respondents disagree and (4.9%) strongly disagree. This gave us a mean of 2.12 and a standard deviation of 1.069. The mean of 2.12 tends

towards (2) which is the disagree position. The standard deviation of 1.069 is quite low showing the closeness of views.

In quite a similar manner, the majority of respondents to the qualitative data agree that they come together in the caucuses for consensus building by *“ensuring that you advocate for what you stand for through the parliamentary processes; through policy; through influencing policy and legislation towards the goals and objectives of what the caucus stands for,”* said one respondent. This, therefore, implies that if democracy was to take place in the caucuses, political caucusing would largely determine policy decisions in Uganda and would thus address individual aspirations at the expense of public needs.

#### **4.3.2 Political caucusing on prioritisation of policy issues**

The results in **Table 7** show that 25 (24.3%) respondents strongly agree that prioritisation of policy issues takes place during caucusing; 39(37.9%) respondents who are the majority agree; 14(13.6%) respondents are not sure; 22(21.4%) respondents disagree; and 3(2.9%) respondents strongly disagree. This gave us a mean of 2.41 and a standard deviation of 1.158. The mean of 2.41 tends towards (2) which is the disagree position, which means that the majority of the respondents were in disagreement that prioritisation of policy issues is done during caucusing. The standard deviation of 1.158 is quite close showing closeness of views. The mean is below average and, therefore, depicts that there is limited decision making at the level of political caucusing in order to prioritise policy decisions. This implies the role of political caucuses is in line with the definition of political caucusing as put forward by Webster (1913) that they are primary meetings for discussion but on the contrary, legitimisation of decisions occurs at the higher level in parliament.

Much as the qualitative data agreed that prioritisation of policy issues takes place during caucusing. it was further noted that political party Manifesto promises have been translated into national policy priorities by the ruling party. For example, the Universal Secondary Education policy, which has been further mentioned in the State of the Nation Address, 2011 and featured in the budget for implementation as envisaged below:



.....Madam Speaker, in the Budget Speech of FY 2010/11, Government placed emphasis on the provision of education and skills development. In pursuit of these priorities, the education sub-sector has achieved the following:

Government completed the construction of the following five (5) Seed Secondary Schools and handed them over for use: Bagezza SSS in Mubende district, Namugongo SSS in Kamuli, Mbarara SSS in Mbarara, Mateete SSS in Sembabule and Pakada SSS in Zombo district. Government also completed the rehabilitation, expansion and re-equipping of Rukungiri Technical Institute. Furthermore, the rehabilitation and expansion of the following 5 existing traditional secondary schools were also completed: - Kabalega SS in Masindi, Mpanga SS in Kabarole, Kigezi College Butobere in Kabale, Lango College in Lira and Kololo SS in Kampala, (Budget Speech, 2011).

This implies that the President's campaign Manifesto intervenes in policy decisions of the country and is further reflected in the budget implementation programmes.

### **4.3.3 Political caucusing on people's interests**

The results from **Table 7** further show that 25(24.3%) respondents strongly agree that people's interests are taken care of during caucusing; 34 (33.0%) respondents who are the majority agree; 19(18.4%) respondents are not sure; 12 (11.7%) respondents disagree; and 12 (11%) respondents strongly disagree. This gave us a mean of 2.89 and a standard deviation of 1.244. The mean of 2.89 is above average, which means political caucuses somewhat override on the policy decisions of parliament and public at large. The standard deviation of 1.244 is quite low, showing closeness of views.

During the interview, a number of respondents agreed with the proposition that people's interests are catered for during caucusing. They cited the recently concluded NRM Parliamentary Caucus

retreat at Kyankwanzi, 11<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> January, 2013 where it was resolved under Resolution 49 (C) that:

... the national budgeting process shall include clear prioritisation of investment in: the development of industrial estates; provision of planting materials i.e. seeds for coffee, tea, fruits; fish hatcheries; breeding stock for cattle, chicken, pigs etc.; roads, the railway and energy; (*Resolutions of the NRM Parliamentary Caucus Retreat, Kyankwanzi, 11<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> January, 2013*)

This implies that political caucuses cater for people's interests during their deliberations more so at such a time that the NRM is trying to create a self-sustaining economy.

It was further cited that very assertive caucuses like the Uganda Women Parliamentarians Association (UWOPA) have advocated for women rights and needs like sanitary towels for the girl child and Mama Kits to be budgeted for nationally. But unfortunately, the Uganda Revenue Authority levied a 28 percent tax, which rendered their importation by the National Medical Stores (NMS) futile and thus jeopardised the lives of pregnant women in Uganda since NMS claimed not to have the money (Arinaitwe, 2012).

This implies that one piece of legislation may deter the implementation of another, otherwise, good legislation and thus fail service delivery, which would call for the immediate harmonisation of laws in order to avoid having stalemates.

Further to that, was the position of the Muslim Caucus led by their Imam in Parliament, which petitioned the Speaker of Parliament on lack of equity or being marginalised. They argued that government contravened Article 32 of the Constitution while appointing members of the Immigration Board as documented in the Monitor Newspaper:

“Is the President aware that in Uganda we have Muslims who are qualified? If it's a question of academic qualifications, we also have many Muslims who are highly qualified with NRM blood if appointments are based on

party loyalty. President Museveni has consistently and persistently denied Muslims a chance to serve in the country,” (Naturinda, 2012).

This manifests lack of equity and a national character in the distribution of national employment, which is bound to create conflict and disgruntlement among the populace. But while reacting to the above during an interview, one respondent commented that:

Religion also influences views in parliament but it is no longer as influential as it used to be in the past. It is now becoming minimal although you can still see that, for example, a Muslim stands up to speak so as to defend the interests of the Muslims; the Catholics the same and so do the others. But I think that it is one factor that is dying out.

This implies that to a great extent, religion still has a role to play in shaping our national character and the decisions that we take are part of the biases that come along with the decision makers’ religious background.

#### **4.3.4 Political caucusing on strategies to advance political causes**

The results from **Table 7** further show that 43 (41.7%) respondents strongly agree that strategies to advance political causes take place during caucusing; 44 (42.7%) respondents agree; 9(8.7%) are not sure; 5 (4.9%) respondents disagree; and 2 (1.9%) respondents strongly disagree. This gave us a mean of 1.83 and a standard deviation of 0.923. The mean of 1.83 tends towards (2) which is the disagree position, meaning that on average, the respondents disagreed that strategies to advance political causes take place during caucusing. The standard deviation of 0.923 is small which shows a commonality of views.

Although qualitative data generally agreed that advancement of political causes takes place during caucusing, there was an element of under looking some people’s views and watering them down because of a person’s stature in the caucus. There is also pushing of individual character’s views like the party executives to which G.W. Kanyeihamba, former Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, retired Supreme Court Judge and social critic noted during the induction of

MPs of the Ninth Parliament at Imperial Royale Hotel. He said: “The practice of caucusing ahead of debate in Parliament has killed the art of national debate, stifled the opposition and deprived the country of the finer points of democracy.” This practice reduces the role of parliament as views of the caucus are withheld regardless of the people’s concerns. This, therefore, leads MPs to abdicate their representative role as people’s representatives.

However, during an interview with one of the respondents, it was noted that:

There are also some caucuses like the Opposition caucus through whose meetings we have been able to identify key challenges that the country faces. So, you find that some issues that arise in the caucuses find their way to the floor of Parliament. I see this as an achievement because when you sit together as a family and everyone who gets out of that meeting thinks in the same direction and speaks the same language, you will have achieved consensus on that issue even before it is presented on the floor of Parliament; and when it is presented, you have a common line of argument.

Coming up with a common position on contentious issues in a way helps solve the problem of numbers faced by our parliament. This is because not all MPs would be able to present the views of their constituents despite the fact that they were under a representative democracy. So, after building consensus and harmonising their position in the caucus, the few who would be accorded the chance present the views on behalf of the party thereby enhancing their ideology.

#### **4.3.5 Political caucusing on manifesto development**

The results from **Table 7** further show that 31 (30.1%) respondents, who are the majority, strongly agree that manifesto development takes place during caucusing; 28 (27.2%) respondents agree; 17 (16.5%) respondents are not sure; 23 (22.3%) respondents disagree; and 4 (3.9%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 2.43 and a standard deviation of 1.241. The mean of 2.43 implies that the majority of the respondents disagreed with the notion that manifesto development is done during caucusing and the standard deviation of 1.241 indicates

that there was closeness of views. This implies that political caucusing has little influence on the development of political manifestos.

However, the members of the Opposition Caucus in parliament, during an interview, said they use the caucus for creating an alternative position to the ruling party's manifesto:

We use that team spirit to pursue alternative policy provisions on all programmes and that is the reason why when the State of the Nation Address is given by the President, the Leader of the Opposition in a similar vein issues a statement in reply. This statement, in reply, is a reflection of the views of the parties in the Opposition, which, therefore, means that in order to reach that agreed position, a decision has to be taken in the caucus. So, the caucus ensures that alternative policy provisions of opposition parties are provided to government with a view of telling government that your programme has a weakness in areas a, b, c and d and if we were the ones in power, we would have done it differently by doing a, b, c and d. It sort of puts government into check in the sense that not all that government does is 100 percent perfect. There are instances where even the government of the day buys the views of the opposition through this type of provisions.

This is in line with the cardinal duty of the opposition side in all legislatures in the Commonwealth; which is to give alternative views to government, which helps make issues of governance better, (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2008).

During an interview, respondents majorly agreed that manifesto development takes place during caucusing. For example, the NRM Caucus in its press release of October 26, 2011, resolved to *“strongly endorse and support the continuation and vigorous implementation of the current overall economic policy framework, with the vital components and elements...”* They, however, noted that there are certain key aspects, for example, security matters, normally categorized as classified information. This includes deployment of troops to countries like Congo or Somalia, which are just brought to the caucus not for discussion but for furtherance of the core persons of the caucus's ideas.

Despite the fact that it is parliament that is meant to approve the deployment of troops outside Uganda, this is not often the practice. There is contravention of Article 210 (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which states that: *“Parliament shall make laws regulating the Uganda People’s Defense Forces and, in particular, providing for the deployment of troops outside Uganda,”* In the same perspective Section 11 (5) of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act, 1992, states that: *“The High Command shall advise the President in emergency situations and in matters relating to national security or deployment of the army.”* This implies that not even parliament would stop a sitting government from pursuing its chosen line of action.

#### **4.3.6 Political caucusing and monitoring progress**

The results from **Table 7** further show that 10 (9.7%) respondents strongly agree that monitoring of progress takes place during caucusing; 28 (27.2%) respondents agree; 18 (17.5%) respondents are not sure; 36(35.0%) respondents who are the majority disagree; and 11 (10.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 3.10 and a standard deviation of 1.201. This implies that the respondents were undecided and the standard deviation of 1.201 is quite small which shows that there was closeness of views. The neutral position is an indication of indecision on the matter. More so that it is not the role of caucuses to carry out monitoring and evaluation of the progress on policy matters in government ministries and departments.

During interview, different respondents gave different views. Some posited that, whereas monitoring progress may take place in the caucus like the NRM Caucus, which in its press release of October 26, 2011 *“recommended that Government fast-tracks the issuance of National Identity Cards by 2012 so as to stem the phenomenon of illegal immigrants,”* which led to the tabling of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs report on the inquiry into the Procurement of equipment for the National Security Information System (NSIS) and the National Identity Card Project by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Others posited that: *“All oversight committees in parliament, namely: the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Local Governments Accounts Committee, Committee on Government Assurances and Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises are*

chaired by members of parties in the Opposition and so may have an influence of bringing in their caucuses' ideologies." This implies that the chairpersons and their deputies could be influential in directing the meetings of the committees. However, that could only happen if they did not have members from other parties. Parliamentary committees are constituted according to the ratio of the political caucuses (parties) in parliament and so they can have very little or no influence at all basing on their numbers in the committee. And should there be discontent among some members of the committee, a minority report could always be drafted and presented before the Committee of the whole House alongside the committee report.

#### **4.3.7 Political caucusing and disciplining of errant members of the party**

The results from **Table 7** further show that 40 (38.8%) respondents who are the majority, strongly agree; 34 (33.0%) respondents agree; 9 (8.7%) respondents are not sure; 15 (14.6%) respondents disagree; and 5 (4.9 %) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 2.14 and a standard deviation of 1.221. The mean of 2.14 implies that the respondents disagreed that disciplining of errant members is done in the caucus. The standard deviation of 1.221 is quite low which indicates that there is a near consensus of thought.

During the interview, majority of the respondents agreed that errant members of the party are disciplined by the caucus. They cited the four recently expelled 'rebel' MPs from the NRM through a decision reached during one of the party caucus meetings. The four included: Theodore Ssekikubo, MP for Lwemiyaga County; Barnabas Tinkasiimire, MP for Buyaga County West; Wilfred Niwagaba, MP for Ndorwa East; and Muhammad Nsereko, MP for Kampala Central Division and Vincent Kyamadidi, MP for Rwampara who got a lighter punishment of three months suspension from all party activities.

The NRM Caucus argues that the 'rebel' MPs severally went against the agreed-upon party positions although the 'rebel' MPs argue that the NRM Caucus is trying to gag them and prevent them from playing their cardinal role in parliament; echoing their electorates' views. However, renowned Ugandan Columnist, Andrew Mwenda in his Blog Archive of 23<sup>rd</sup> April, 2013 ("*NRM and its rebels*") says these ('rebel') MPs are violating the fundamentals of multiparty politics;

A political party exists as a voluntary association of people who share common political objectives, an ideology and policy preferences.

You join a political party because you share its ideals. A party has to have rules for internal discipline to ensure that its members, and most especially its leaders, adhere to its agenda. That is why many have whips to enforce party discipline.

It was, however, cited that the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda provide for discipline of errant Members of Parliament by the Speaker of Parliament and chairpersons of committees through rules 78, 79, 80, 81 and 82 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda. One key respondent observed that:

Caucuses in parliament instil discipline in their members, which entails that a position that has already been taken by a political party whether in opposition or in government must be toed by its members. And as a sign of discipline, if you feel that you are not comfortable with such a position because it injures the interest of your voters in your constituency, the best thing that you are advised to do is to keep quiet and not participate in the debate to oppose your own side of the House. So, the caucuses ensure that there is discipline and that the members toe the official party line.

This implies that political caucuses may be weak to oppose policies that are not objective towards achievement of the needs of the citizenry and very often usurp the representative role of the Members of Parliament.

#### **4.4.0 Political caucusing and agenda setting**

The first objective of the study was to examine the extent to which political caucusing influences agenda setting in the Parliament of Uganda. The researcher came up with five questions that were used to get the views of the respondents in this regard and the results are summarised in **Table 8** below:



**Table 8: Descriptive statistics of respondents view on agenda setting**

Statement	(SA) 5	(A) 4	(NS) 3	(D) 2	(SD) 1	Mean	SD
Problem structuring is done during caucusing	14 (13.6%)	45 (43.7%)	19(18.8%)	18 (17.5%)	7 (6.8%)	2.60	1.132
Forecasting is done during caucusing	10 (9.7%)	37 (35.9%)	25 (24.3%)	24 (23.3%)	7 (6.8%)	2.82	1.109
Alternative creation is done during caucusing	8 (7.8%)	46 (44.7%)	25 (24.3%)	19 (18.4%)	5(4.9%)	2.68	1.021
Monitoring is done during caucusing	6 (5.8%)	25 (24.3%)	23 (22.3%)	38(36.9%)	11 (10.7%)	3.22	1.111
Evaluation is done in the caucus	8(7.8%)	36 (35.0%)	20(19.4%)	30 (29.1%)	9 (8.7%)	2.96	1.146

**Source: Primary data**

#### **4.4.1 Political caucusing and problem structuring**

The results in **Table 8** indicate that 14 (13.6%) respondents strongly agree that problem structuring is done during caucusing; 45 (43.7%) respondents who are the majority strongly agree; 19 (18.8%) respondents are not sure; 18 (17.5 %) respondents disagree; and 7 (6.8%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 2.60 and a standard deviation of 1.132. The mean of 2.6 there is strong democracy in problem structuring and policy development. The standard deviation of 1.132 is quite low which shows that there was a close interrelation of views.

During the interview, different respondents agreed that problem structuring is done during caucusing and then an agreed upon position is presented to the Committee of the whole House for consideration and enactment. Conversely, one member of the Uganda Women Parliamentary Association pointed out that:

We have managed to have some kind of influence on the Executive to ensure that through the Committee on Social Services the UGX 24 billion of the health loan of the World Bank is prioritised to reach all the health centres in the country and to specifically purchase materials that will help pregnant women deliver in hospitals and health centres. So, there will be

what we call mothers' kits in all Health Centres II, III and IV purchased from the 24billion.

This implies that whereas caucusing is applied for problem structuring, it is not sufficient to adequately handle issues according to the will of the people. Issues affecting the country are also mainstreamed in the government policy through other stakeholders. These include civil societies who work to enable balanced policy actions to cater for broad needs of citizens.

Another respondent cited that:

For us in UWOPA, we really work on some legislative agenda because we put a concerted effort in our priorities. We managed to pass some of the laws. We had the Female Genital Mutilation (FMG) Bill, the Trafficking of Persons Bill and the Domestic Violence Bill which were passed into law. So, those Bills which were passed into laws which were really gender related were worked on tirelessly by UWOPA. We put our heads together and did a lot of consultation across the country. Like in the Marriage and Divorce Bill, we also did a lot of consultation although that Bill has not yet been passed into law. We do all that so that we can listen to others and maybe that is what caucusing has been able to help us in.

This implies that matters concerning a section of society could be raised through caucuses, working closely with civil society organisations. After that, the Executive is bound to take them seriously thereby dissuading an otherwise dangerous culture.

#### **4.4.2 Political caucusing and policy forecasting**

The results in **Table 8** further indicate that 10 (9.7%) respondents strongly agree that forecasting is done during caucusing; 37 (35.9 %) respondents who are the majority agree; 25 (24.3 %) respondents are not sure; 24 (23.3%) respondents disagree; and 7 (6.8%) strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 2.82 which tends towards (3) the not sure position and a standard deviation of 1.109. The mean of 2.82 implies that the majority of the respondents are not sure and the standard deviation of 1.109 is quite low which indicates that there was a closeness of views.

During interview, the majority of the respondents concurred that forecasting is done during caucusing and cited the numerous NRM Caucus meetings that:

At times there are issues concerning the budget which the NRM Government wants to pass but with a feeling that many of the Opposition Members could be against. So, what the caucus normally does is to go and give information to its members to understand why they would want to pass that motion; and after convincing them, that is when they come to the floor of Parliament to debate. Here you are able to get support of the proposition of the party members, which normally sails through.

This implies that the caucuses have to first come together to harmonise their position on certain issues before tabling them in parliament so as to fully internalise what is happening and have a smooth sail through.

Another member noted that:

I come from Northern Uganda and issues that affect specifically Northern Uganda will of course be very close to my heart. And you know that each region has its own challenges; you find those from Northern Uganda, for example, experienced conflict while others from other parts of the country which haven't experienced it will not feel so touched while we talk about the same.

This means that members of a regional caucus confide in each other before tabling their concerns, mainly social welfare issues, before the House so as to garner support for legitimisation of the sought after policy issue.

#### **4.4.3 Political caucusing and alternative policy creation**

The results in **Table 8** further indicate that 8 (7.8 %) respondents strongly agree that alternative policy creation is done during caucusing; 46 (44.7%) respondents agree; 25 (24.3%) respondents are not sure; 19 (18.4%) respondents disagree; and 5 (4.9%) respondents strongly disagree. This

gives a mean of 2.68, which tends towards (3), the not sure position and a standard deviation of 1.021. The mean of 2.68 implies that the majority of the respondents are not sure and the standard deviation of 1.021 is quite low which indicates that there was closeness of views on the matter.

During the interview, a number of respondents' views concurred with qualitative responses and pointed out that alternative policy creation is done during caucusing. Respondents cited NRM Resolution No. 4 aimed at creation of an NRM Budgetary Committee to prioritise production as an alternative to a consumer economy during the NRM Caucus retreat at Kyankwanzi 11<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> January, 2013;

... the leadership and other individuals in the NRM form a committee to lead the national budget preparation process, in order to give the country an NRM budget.

These findings imply that without alternative views from other members, political caucuses especially those of ruling governments are too inadequate to manifest wholly the interests of the public, which, according to this study justified the regrouping of members into caucuses; to seek alternative views on rather complex situations like the opposition saving Mabira Forest which was to be given away to the Mehta Group of Companies for sugarcane growing despite its inalienable role in rain formation and preservation of nature.

#### **4.4.4 Political caucusing and policy monitoring**

The results in **Table 8** further indicate that 6 (5.8%) respondents strongly agree that monitoring is done during caucusing; 25 (24.3%) respondents agree; 23 (22.3%) respondents are not sure; 38 (36.9%) respondents who are the majority disagree; and 11 (10.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 3.22 and a standard deviation of 1.111. The mean of 3.22 tends towards (3) which is the not sure position meaning that on average, the respondents were not sure on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.111 is low, which indicates that there was a close relationship in the views.

The majority of the qualitative respondents concurred that monitoring is not done during caucusing but rather by individual Members of Parliament in their constituencies. These normally raise alarming issues, otherwise referred to as “matters of national interest” on the floor of parliament and with the line ministries through the ministers who direct their technical staff through their permanent secretaries to take appropriate action. During further interaction with interviewees, it was, however, noted that political caucuses like that of the NRM during its recent retreat at the National Leadership Institute (NALI) in Kyankwanzi, 11<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> January, 2013 made resolution 15 (d) that:

“Special sessions of the NRM Parliamentary Caucus will be held in Kampala in the near future, where ... line ministers will make presentations on the performance of the sectors in implementing the NRM Manifesto.” (Resolutions of the NRM Parliamentary Caucus Retreat, January, 2013)

This implies that it is not only individual MPs that monitor policy implementation and make recommendations to the technical staff of different line ministries through Cabinet. Political caucuses as a whole also do monitor government programs.

#### **4.4.5 Political caucusing and policy evaluation**

The results in **Table 8** further indicate that 8 (7.8 %) respondents strongly agree that evaluation is done during caucusing; 36 (35.0%) respondents agree; 20(19.4%) respondents are not sure; 30 (29.1%) respondents disagree; and 9 (8.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 2.96 and a standard deviation of 1.146. The mean of 2.96 is above average. The standard deviation of 1.146 is quite low which indicates that there is a closeness of views.

The majority of the qualitative respondents agreed that evaluation of policy issues and more so manifesto implementation is done in the caucus. One respondent intimated that:

“... we members of the Opposition have through our caucus registered our displeasure to government in a number of ways to say things are not happening well. There is a problem that Government needs to address. You saw members going for the walk-to-work. When the Opposition Caucus members came up with the idea of walk-to-work, a protest showing government that the cost of living was becoming unbearable, people first took it lightly.”

This implies that since members of the Opposition Caucus are not the implementing party in power – ruling party, and having failed to convince government to address the economic plight of the people, they resort to unconventional methods; take to the streets to express antipathy as a way of compelling the ruling party to see the alternative view.

Further findings of the study indicate that members of the NRM Parliamentary Caucus resolved during their recent retreat at the National Leadership Institute (NALI) in Kyankwanzi, 11<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> January, 2013 under resolution 5 (a) that: *“Government reviews the Youth Venture Capital Fund, with a view to easier and expeditious access to it by its intended beneficiaries, the youths,”* (Resolutions of the NRM Parliamentary Caucus Retreat, January 2013), which according to this study is premised on true findings and evaluation of the problem that has been faced by the youths lacking easy access to the funds.

It was further resolved at the same retreat under resolution 7 (h) to review and restructure the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) expeditiously, which the President of Uganda who is also the Chairman of the NRM Caucus came out and threatened to disband due to among others flouting of procurement procedures and lack of accountability. However NAADS executive director, Dr Mugasi in the Daily Monitor newspaper said that the debate was about “restructuring;” that: *“The on-going debate about NAADS is not, per se, to dissolve it. The outcry is because we have empowered farmers to demand for services. We will continue to implement NAADS uninterrupted,”* (Wesonga, *The Daily Monitor*, Wednesday, 27<sup>th</sup> March, 2013).

Therefore, it is imperative to argue that policy evaluation is done during caucusing and recommendations are made for the Executive to enforce, if need be, to the letter.

#### 4.4.6 Pearson Correlation

A Pearson correlation test was done between two indices; political caucusing and agenda setting and the results are shown in the **Table 9** below:

**Table 9 : Pearson Correlation test results between political caucusing and agenda setting**

		Political caucusing	Agenda setting
Agenda setting	Pearson Correlation	0.484	1
	Sig (2tailed)	0.000	103
	N	103	
Political caucusing	Pearson Correlation	1	0.484
	Sig (2tailed)		0.000
	N	103	103

**Source: Primary data**

**Table 9** shows Pearson Correlation (R), Sig (2 tailed) and N where R= 0.484, Sig = .000 and N = 103. The R value indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between political caucusing and agenda setting. This means that the more political caucusing takes place, the better the agenda setting becomes.

The hypothesis that political caucusing does not influence agenda setting was, therefore, rejected and the alternative proposition that political caucusing influences agenda setting was accepted.

#### 4.4.7 Regression Model Summary

The researcher used the regression technique to determine the variations between political caucusing and agenda setting. The results are presented in **Table 10** below:

**Table 10: Regression Model Summary between political caucusing and agenda setting**

Mode	R	R Squared	Adjusted Squared	R	Standard Error of the Estimate
1	.484	.234	.227		.58595

**Source: Primary data**

**Table 10** shows R, R<sup>2</sup>, adjusted R and the standard error of estimate. The adjusted R value of (.227 X 100) = 22.7 percent explains the variation political caucusing has on political analysis. This means that the activities of political caucusing contributed 22.7 percent towards agenda setting and the remaining 77.3 percent was contributed by other factors.

Therefore, results from the interview, both qualitative and quantitative, suggest that political caucusing influences agenda setting and indeed the more political caucusing occurs, the better agenda setting becomes. Policies are in place and are made after thorough analysis by political caucuses which make their input.

#### **4.5.0 Political Caucusing and Policy Enactment**

The second objective of the study was to examine how political caucusing influences policy enactment in the Parliament of Uganda. In this regard, the researcher came up with five questions to the respondents whose results are shown in **Table 11** below.

**Table 11: Descriptive statistics of respondents views on policy enactment**

Statement	(SA) 5	(A) 4	(NS) 3	(D) 2	(SD) 1	Mean	SD
Policy assent is done during caucusing	8(7.8%)	36 (35.0%)	12(11.7%)	35(34.0%)	12(11.7%)	3.07	1.215
Policy viability is determined during caucusing	9 (8.7%)	36(35.0%)	14 (13.6%)	35 (34.0%)	9 (8.7%)	2.99	1.184
Policy equity is determined during caucusing	5(4.9%)	23 (22.3%)	28(27.2%)	35(34.0)	12(11.7%)	3.25	1.082
Policy consensus is reached during caucusing	15 (14.6%)	41(39.8%)	16 (15.5%)	22(21.4%)	9 (8.7%)	2.70	1.211
Policy benchmarking is done during caucusing	11(10.7%)	34(33.0%)	20(19.4%)	29 (28.2%)	9(8.7%)	2.91	1.181

**Source: Primary data**



#### 4.5.1 Political caucusing and policy assent

The results from Table 11 indicate that 8 (7.8%) respondents strongly agree that policy assent is done during caucusing; 36 (35.6%) respondents who are the majority agree; 12 (1.7%) respondents are not sure; 35 (34.0%) respondents disagree; and 12 (11.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 3.07 and a standard deviation of 1.215. The mean of 3.07 implies that most of the respondents were not sure and the standard deviation of 1.215 indicates that there was closeness of opinion.

During the interview, a number of respondents disagreed with the statement that policy assent is done during caucusing. They said, “What is done during caucusing is agreeing on a position that will be presented by caucus members during debate and voting on a bill by parliament.” The bill is subsequently passed on to the President for assent as provided for by Article 91 (1) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which in part stipulates that: “... *the power of Parliament to pass laws shall be exercised through bills passed by Parliament and assented to by the President.*” However, should the President fail to either, assent to the bill, return the bill to Parliament for review or write to the Speaker that he declines to assent to the bill within the prescribed 30 days, Article 91(7) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda shall be invoked. This in part provides that: “... *the President shall be taken to have assented to the bill and at the expiration of that period [30 days], the Speaker shall cause a copy of the bill to be laid before Parliament and the bill shall become law without the assent of the President.*”

This implies that for the smooth running of government, the Executive and the Legislature should endeavour to avoid a stalemate in as far as policy matters are concerned. Consensus ought to be reached to avoid a situation where a policy is passed into law and the government cannot fund its implementation, thereby stifling policy outcomes.

#### 4.5.2 Political caucusing and policy viability

The results from Table 11 further show that 9 (8.7%) respondents strongly agree that policy viability is determined during caucusing; 36 (35.0%) respondents agree; 14 (13.6%)

respondents are not sure; 35 (34.0%) respondents disagree; and 9 (8.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.184. The mean of 2.99 implies that most respondents are undecided on the matter. The standard deviation of 1.184 indicates that there was closeness of views.

However well a policy is intended to be, it must be thoroughly scrutinised before being read for the first time in parliament. Article 93 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, restricts among others the imposition of taxation in any bill. It also restricts imposition of a charge on the Consolidated Fund and proceeding on a motion or amendment that could have an effect on the Consolidated Fund. It is on this premise, among others, that a Certificate of Financial Implications is sought by the mover who may be a government minister or a backbench Member of Parliament, herein called a private member, from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development to escort the bill as it is being read for the first time.

In the case of a private member's bill, Article 94 (4) (c) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides that: *"the member moving the private member's bill shall be afforded reasonable assistance by the department of Government whose area of operation is affected by the bill."* In the same perspective Article 94 (4) (d) of the same Constitution further provides that: *"the office of the Attorney General shall afford the member moving the private member's bill professional assistance in the drafting of the bill."*

This implies that once a policy has been deemed to be in line with government's policies, pro people and cost effective, even if it was to be moved by a private member, it would get all the government assistance and funding necessary to make it sail through the three stages of reading and be implemented.

#### **4.5.3 Political caucusing and policy equity**

The results in **Table 11** further indicate that 5 (4.9%) respondents strongly agree that policy equity is determined during caucusing; 23 (22.3%) respondents agree; 28 (27.2%) respondents are not sure; 35 (34.0%) respondents disagree; and 12 (11.7%) respondents

strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 3.25 and a standard deviation of 1.082. The mean of 3.25 implies that the majority of the respondents were not sure on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.082 is quite low and indicates that there was a closeness of views.

During the interview, a number of respondents said, “It is the duty of any sitting government to ensure that there is equitable distribution of national resources, fondly called, the “resource envelope.” This was backed by documentation of Article 8A (1) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which stipulates that: “*Uganda shall be governed based on principles of national interest and common good enshrined in the national objectives and directive principles of state policy.*” It is on the basis of this and the functions of government outlined in the Sixth Schedule of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda that Parliament is mandated to make relevant laws for the purpose of giving full effect to policy equity.

This implies that the Government of Uganda ought to satisfy all the caucuses and people across the divide; be it regional, religious or gender in distribution of national resources, jobs and representation.

#### **4.5.4 Political caucusing and policy consensus**

The results in **Table 11** further show that 15 (14.6%) respondents strongly agree that policy consensus is reached during caucusing; 41 (39.8%) respondents agree; 16 (15.5%) respondents are not sure; 22 (21.4%) respondents disagree; and 9 (8.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 2.70 and a standard deviation of 1.211. The mean of 2.70 tends towards (3) which is the not sure mark meaning that on average, the respondents took a neutral stand on the matter. The standard deviation of 1.211 is quite low indicating that there is a close interrelation in the views.

During the interview, it was agreed that policy consensus is reached during caucusing. More so when the party already has a policy on the subject matter in its manifesto; the role of the caucus is merely to articulate that position in Parliament and vote in its favour. A case in

point is on the furtherance of women emancipation by the NRM Government through affirmative action. This provided for an addition of 1.5 entry points to any girl child at university entry. It also provides for promotion of employment of women in all government sectors and a woman seat at all political levels right from LC I to the district level through to the district woman representative in parliament in the ever new districts that are created. These are in support of Article 78 (1) (b) which states that: “*Parliament shall consist of one woman representative for every district.*” However, should a caucus lack an official policy position; it should quickly develop one based on its policy ideals and strategy.

One respondent said:

Sometimes we go to parliament to discuss when we have already taken a position on something. If the position is taken properly as a party per se, it is not bad because parties stand for certain ideals and for people. If all the parties make sure that they speak the minds of their people, then it is okay. But if parties take an individual’s position, then that is where we go wrong. So, collective party positions influence debate in parliament, which is okay.

This implies that party caucuses normally strike a common position on any debate on the floor of parliament before debating so as to maintain a smooth flow of ideas and policy line of argument in order to attain success.

#### **4.5.5 Political caucusing and policy benchmarking**

The results in **Table 11** further indicate that 11 (10.7%) respondents of the respondents strongly agree that policy benchmarking is done during caucusing; 34 (33.0%) respondents agree; 20 (19.4%) respondents are not sure; 29 (28.2%) respondents disagree; and 9 (8.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 2.91 and a standard deviation of 1.181. The mean of 2.91 implies that most of the respondents were not sure on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.181 is quite low which indicates that there was close interrelation in thought.

Policy benchmarking is a common strategy adopted by caucuses depending on the ideology being toed. In democratic and economic matters, caucuses in countries belonging to a common grouping like the East African Community and the Commonwealth tend to benchmark one another while introducing new policies. The aim here is to measure products, services, and practices against those in better established or more advanced systems and countries that are contemporary, like multiparty democracy. In this, the President of Uganda who is also the Chairperson of the ruling NRM Party was cited by the Media Centre release of 14<sup>th</sup> January, 2011 saying that: *“We did not want to go to multi-party politics but we were forced there by those who cherished it.”*

This implies that every government and country ought to adopt best governance practices in order to live up to the expectations of the people and also be at par with other peoples of the world.

#### 4.5.6 Pearson Correlation

A Pearson correlation test was done between two indices; political caucusing and policy enactment and the results are shown in the **Table 12** below:

**Table 12 : Pearson Correlation test between political caucusing and policy enactment**

		Political caucusing	Policy enactment
Political caucusing	Pearson Correlation	1	0.418
	Sig (2tailed)		0.000
	N	103	103
Policy enactment	Pearson Correlation	0.418	1
	Sig (2tailed)	0.000	
	N	103	103

**Source: Primary data**

**Table 12** shows Pearson Correlation (R), Sig (2 tailed) and N where R= 0.418, Sig = .000 and N = 103. The R value indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between political caucusing and policy enactment which means that the more political caucusing takes place, the better policy enactment becomes. Therefore, the hypothesis that political caucusing does not

influence policy enactment was rejected and the alternate position that political caucusing influences policy enactment was accepted.

#### 4.5.7 Regression Model Summary

The researcher used the regression technique to determine the variations between political caucusing and policy enactment. The results are presented in **Table 13** below:

**Table 13: Regression model summary between political caucusing and policy enactment**

Mode	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Standard Error of the Estimate
1	0.418	0.175	0.167	0.60830

**Source: Primary data**

**Table 13** shows R, R<sup>2</sup>, adjusted R and the standard error of estimate. The adjusted R value of 0.167 (.167X100) = 16.7 percent, which explains the influence political caucusing has on policy enactment, which is minimal. This means that the activities of political caucusing contributed 16.7 percent to policy enactment and the remaining 83.3 percent was contributed by other factors.

Therefore, the results from the interview, both qualitative and quantitative, suggest that political caucusing influences policy enactment and indeed the more political caucusing occurs the better policy enactment is. Policies are enacted after thorough analysis by political caucuses and it is incumbent on the political party to ensure that its members influence decisions and voting to pass bills in their favour.

#### 4.6.0 Political Caucusing and Policy Outcomes

The third objective of the study was to establish the influence of political caucusing on policy outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda. The researcher came up with six questions in this regard and the results are as indicated in **Table 14** below

**Table 14: Descriptive statistics of respondents views on policy outcome**

Statement	(SA) 5	(A) 4	(NS) 3	(D) 2	(SD) 1	Mean	SD
Policy strategies are made during caucusing	16(15.5 %)	50(48.5%)	8(7.8%)	21(20.4%)	8 (7.8%)	2.56	1.202
Policy actors are active during caucusing	9 (8.7%)	41 (39.8%)	18 (17.5%)	28 (27.2%)	7 (6.8%)	2.83	1.130
Policy funding is decided during caucusing	12 (11.7%)	20 (19.4%)	19(18.4%)	41(39.8%)	11(10.7%)	3.22	1.204
Policy staff are identified during caucusing	9(8.7%)	15 (14.6%)	23(22.3%)	41(39.8%)	15(14.6%)	3.37	1.163
Policy legal implications are identified during caucusing	13(12.6%)	31 (30.1%)	15(14.6%)	31(30.1%)	13(12.6%)	3.00	1.276
Policy scope is determined during caucusing	11 (10.7%)	34 (33.0%)	17(16.5%)	31 (30.1%)	10 (9.7%)	2.95	1.208

**Source: Primary Data**

#### **4.6.1 Political caucusing and policy strategies**

The results in **Table 14** indicate that 16 (15.5%) respondents strongly agree that policy strategies are made during caucusing; 50 (48.5%) respondents agree; 8(7.8%) are not sure; 21 (20.4%) respondents disagree; and 8 (7.8%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 2.56 and a standard deviation of 1.202. The mean of 2.56 implies that most of the respondents were undecided on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.202 is quite low which shows that there is closeness in views.

During the interview a number of respondents concurred that policy strategies are done during caucusing, citing the 2011/12 Budget where the government announced the Youth Entrepreneurship Venture Capital Funds to help the jobless youth, which has not yet come to avail. According to documented data, the Youth MPs through their caucus threatened to walk naked unless their issues were looked into; *“We are tired of empty promises,”* One of the Youth MPs said. *“We want the Minister [of Finance, Planning and Economic Development] to explain why the Youth Fund cannot be accessed. We want to know whether this is incompetence or*

*something else. We have dialogued and sent letters but nothing is happening yet the youth need jobs,”* (Uganda Parliamentary Forum for Youth Affairs (UPFYA), 2012).

Caucuses at times put government under undue pressure to satisfy their needs which may at times hard press the Consolidated Fund.

The other instance is where the Opposition Caucus claims to have salvaged Mabira Forest that was to be given away for sugarcane planting as one of the key respondents said:

Mabira Forest would have gone if members of the Opposition and civil society organizations had not sat down. Mabira would have been history but because we were able to come together and bring civil society organizations on board and say, ‘Look Mabira is a mother to this country as far as the climate is concerned; as far as environmental issues are concerned; the life stream of Uganda depends on Mabira.’ We were able to save it and this to me is the thing in the region where President Museveni has had a change of heart to say, ‘Let us go slow; let us take it to Parliament.’ Remember there was a time when he said that he was going to wedge a war in order to get sugar production and that Mabira had to go.

This implies that the civil society may work with some caucuses secretly to lay strategies of how to salvage a situation and it ends up being considered at policy level.

#### **4.6.2 Political caucusing and policy actors**

The results in **Table 14** further indicate that 9 (8.7 %) respondents strongly agree that policy actors are active during caucusing; 41 (39.8%) respondents who are the majority agree; 18 (17.5%) respondents are not sure; 28 (27.5%) respondents disagree; and 7 (6.8%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives a mean of 2.8 and a standard deviation of 1.130. The mean of 2.8 implies that most of the respondents were undecided on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.130 is quite low indicating that there was closeness of thought.

During the interview, it was agreed that policy actors are active during caucusing unlike during legislation, which is done by few people’s representatives. All policy actors may attend caucus



meetings. More so, our political party caucus leaders (presidents) are not MPs but have to shepherd their flock.

According to documented data, policy-makers are usually influenced by special interest groups that include lobbyists, political groups, individuals, corporations, donors, NGOs and technical advisors. This also includes policy analysts who advise and inform policy-makers on alternative options, and likely effects of those alternatives plus the general public, who elect policy-makers.

One of the respondents in an effort to justify the role of policy actors said:

A caucus is a group of likeminded people who would like to pursue a similar vision, mission and objectives. So, it is a group of Members of Parliament who subscribe to similar views and want to push them through legislation, lobbying and advocacy. So, the role of a caucus is to ensure that you advocate for what you stand for through the parliamentary processes; through policy; through influencing policy and legislation towards the goals and objectives of what the caucus stands for.

This implies that members of a caucus come together due to their common interests; they would like to advocate for and pursue as a group for the common good of the other voiceless peoples in the country.

#### **4.6.3 Political caucusing and policy funding**

The results in **Table 14** further indicate that 12 (11.7%) respondents strongly agree that policy funding is decided during caucusing; 20 (19.4%) respondents agree; 19 (18.4%) respondents are not sure; 41 (39.8%) respondents disagree; and 11 (10.7%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 3.37 and a standard deviation of 1.163. The mean of 3.37 implies that most of the respondents were undecided on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.163 is quite low which indicates that there was closeness in views.

From documented data, policy funding is a prerogative of government as envisaged in Article 155 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. This in part states that: *“The President shall cause to be prepared in each financial year... estimates of revenues and expenditure of Government...”* The budget process is under the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. It is implemented in conjunction with Parliament’s Committees on National Economy and Budget and all permanent secretaries who are the accounting officers of the various ministries. This is also subject to the Appropriation Bill contained in *Article 156 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda*, which is debated and passed by policy makers in parliament.

One thing to note here is that what is usually discussed during caucus meetings such as NRM with a majority is geared towards implementation of its manifesto; to influence the policy funding despite the undesired results that it may come with. In the same perspective, one respondent noted that:

Whether we are the minority in terms of numbers, we are not the minority in terms of ideas. And the public out there is looking at it; the public out there has appreciated it; the public out there now knows, that yes it is not just this business of saying, ‘NRM pakalast,’ there is also a ray of hope from the minority side.

This implies that whereas members of the opposition are fewer, their otherwise good views in parliament can be adopted and implemented by government to the satisfaction of the masses through service delivery.

#### **4.6.4 Political caucusing and policy staff**

The results in **Table 14** further indicate that 9 (8.7 %) respondents strongly agree that policy issues are identified during caucusing; 15 (14.6%) respondents agree; 23 (22.3%) respondents are not sure; 41 (39.8%) respondents who are the majority disagree; and 15 (14.6%) respondents strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 3.37 and a standard deviation of 1.163. The mean of 3.37 implies that most of the respondents were undecided on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.163 is quite low which indicates that there was closeness of views.

During the interview, most respondents concurred with the quantitative data respondents that policy staff is not identified during caucusing in that appointment of public servants is done by the Public Service. Clause 6 of the Employment Act was cited to help fight against discrimination during employment and states thus in part: "... *it shall be the duty of all parties, including the Minister, labour office and industrial court to seek to promote equality of opportunity, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in employment.*"

The Parliamentary Commission is the governing body in charge of running the day-to-day activities in the Parliament of Uganda and its role, among others, is to: "*appoint, promote, and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding public office in Parliament,*" (The Administration of Parliament Act, 1997). The Parliamentary Commission carries out this mandate in consultation with the Public Service Commission.

The Commission may cause to be published in the Uganda Gazette or elsewhere invitations for persons to apply for appointment, promotion or transfer to any vacant office in the service (*The Administration of Parliament Act, 1997*).

This implies that recruitment of policy staff is done in a transparent manner based on clearly and legally laid out guidelines.

However, as earlier on noted, the bigger caucus in parliament may influence its decision while enacting laws and thus its decisions because even parliament, which drafts the bills setting up governmental organisations like parastatals are constituted according to the ratios of political party representation in Parliament. Most bills give sitting ministers excessive powers to appoint and fire top management in such organisations, which may in turn trickle down to the lower cadres in the said institutions. The common phraseology is, for example: "*This Act shall come into operation on a date appointed by the Minister by statutory instrument...*;" and "*The Minister shall develop and implement a macro-economic and fiscal policy framework for Uganda...*" (The Public Finance and Accountability Bill, 2002) This gives an individual in the name of a minister excessive powers which he or she can use to promote nepotism.

#### 4.6.5 Political caucusing and policy legal implications

The results in **Table 14** further indicate that 13 (12.6%) respondents strongly agree that policy legal implications are identified during caucusing; 31 (30.1%) respondents agree; 15 (14.6%) respondents are not sure; 31 (30.1%) respondents disagree; and 13 (12.6%) respondents strongly disagree. Those who agree tied with the ones who disagree. This gives a mean of 3.00 and a standard deviation of 1.276. The mean of 3.00 implies that most respondents were undecided on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.276 indicating that there was closeness of views.

During the interview, most respondents agreed that legal implications are identified during caucusing by the caucus' legal minds. The government side usually has Attorney-General. On the other hand, the Opposition has the Shadow Attorney-General to do all the legal interpretation during the caucus and posit the caucus's stand even before MPs go to either parliamentary committees or for plenary sessions. The caucus members ought to ensure that whatever they are putting forward is in tandem with the Constitution of the land and all other international charters and obligations.

A case cited was the recent interpretation of Article 50 (1) of the East African Community Treaty catering for the election of EALA MPs which provides that:

The National Assembly of each Partner State shall elect, not from among its members, nine members of the Assembly who shall represent as much as it is feasible, the various political parties represented in the National Assembly, shades of opinion, gender and other special interest groups in that Partner State, in accordance with such procedure as the National Assembly of each Partner State may determine.

The Speaker of Uganda's Parliament directed the Attorney-General to seek a legal interpretation from the East African Court of Justice, which the latter did. This implies that while sitting or mooting ideas, caucuses must endeavour to abide by the law.

The NRM caucus resolved to maintain six slots and let the opposition (FDC, DP, CP, JEEMA and UPC) take two slots and one for the independents because of its numerical strength in

parliament. In reaction, the opposition demanded that the law entitled each party, here being called a political shade, to a slot out of the seven political parties in parliament. The Prime Minister and Secretary General of the NRM, Amama Mbabazi argued that:

The NRM – the Government side - presented a position that since NRM is reflected politically in the country, we should have representation of six. First of all, we agreed, whatever representation, the process of getting this representation must have due regard to gender, different political opinion and special interest groups. This can be achieved by either side in the process of getting their people. The NRM proposed that - reflecting all those divergences - they should have six, the Opposition should have two and the Independents should have one. The Opposition did not accept this proposal, (*The Daily Hansard, May 22, 2012*)

This compelled the Speaker of Parliament, Rebecca Kadaga, to adjourn the House prematurely to the following week. This was with the view of allowing the NRM and the opposition agree on how to share the nine slots that each Partner State has to send to the regional parliament, The New Vision (2012). The elections were, however, held the following week, leaving FDC who boycotted the elections with no option but to seek legal redress from the East African Court of Justice to nullify the polls. This implies that should a caucus get aggrieved by a decision (s) taken by parliament, they can always go to court to seek redress.

#### **4.6.6 Political caucusing and policy scope**

The results in **Table 14** further indicate that 11(10.7%) respondents strongly agree that policy scope is determined during caucusing; 34 (33.0%) respondents who are the majority agree; 17 (16.5%) respondents are not sure; 31 (30.1%) respondents disagree; and 10 (9.7%) strongly disagree. This gives us a mean of 2.95 and a standard deviation of 1.208. The mean of 2.95 implies that most of the respondents were undecided on the matter and the standard deviation of 1.208 is quite low indicating that there was closeness of opinion.

During the interview, a number of respondents agreed that policy scope is determined during caucusing although it is normally in an effort to implement the party manifesto promised to the citizenry during elections. In a bid to fight HIV/AIDS prevalence among fellow youth, the Youth MPs through their bipartisan Youth MPs Caucus vowed to go to all places of worship. They pointed out that;

We will start with Gadaffi Mosque this Friday; go to All saints and Watoto churches on Sunday,” they said, “There is inequality in condom use and that has left women at the mercy of men,” added one of them: “We will talk to the lecturers and preachers to always spare 20 minutes of their lectures and sermons to tell people about the gravity of AIDS and how it can be kicked out of Uganda, (Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs, 2012).

This implies that when necessity arises, caucus differences could be put aside and a bipartisan stand sought by MPs in order to tackle an impending problem for the good of the nation or the masses.

#### 4.6.7 Pearson Correlation

A Pearson Correlation test was done between two indices; political caucusing and policy outcomes and the results are shown in **Table 15** below:

**Table 15: Pearson correlation test between political caucusing and policy outcomes**

		Political caucusing	Policy outcomes
Political caucusing	Pearson Correlation	1	.495
	Sig (2tailed)		.000
	N	103	103
Policy outcomes	Pearson Correlation	.495	1
	Sig (2tailed)	.000	
	N	103	103

**Source: Primary data**

**Table 15** shows Pearson Correlation (R), Sig (2 tailed) and N where R= 0.495, Sig = .000 and N = 103. The R value indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between political

caucusing and policy outcomes. This means that the more political caucusing occurs, the better political outcomes become. Therefore, the hypothesis that political caucusing does not influence policy outcomes was rejected and the alternate proposition that political caucusing influences policy outcomes accepted.

#### 4.6.8 Regression Model Summary

The researcher used the regression technique to determine the variations between political caucusing and policy outcomes. The results are presented in **Table 16** below:

**Table 16: Regression model summary between political caucusing and policy outcomes**

Mode	R	R Squared	Adjusted Squared R	Standard Error of the Estimate
1	0.495	0.245	0.237	0.58190

**Source: Primary data**

**Table 16** shows R, R<sup>2</sup>, adjusted R and the standard error of estimate. The adjusted R value of .237(.237X100) = 23.7 percent, explains the variation political caucusing has on policy outcomes. This means that the activities of political caucusing contributed 23.7 percent to policy outcomes and the remaining 76.3 percent was contributed by other factors.

Therefore, results from the interview, both qualitative and quantitative, suggest that political caucusing influences policy outcomes and indeed the more political caucusing occurs the better policy outcomes are. Policies are in place and are made after thorough analysis, debate and enactment of laws after political caucuses have made their input more so if it is the political (ruling) party, on the floor of parliament. It should, however, be noted that pro people policy outcomes are a result of thorough implementation, which is done by technocrats who are, however, supervised by politicians.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher gives the summary of the findings, discussions, conclusions and recommendations based on the influence of political caucusing on agenda setting, policy enactment and policy outcomes.

### 5.1. Summary of the findings

Here below is a summary of the findings:

#### 5.1.1 Political caucusing and agenda setting

The first objective of the study was to establish the influence of political caucusing on agenda setting in the Parliament of Uganda. The regression value of .227 ( $.227 \times 100$ ) = 22.7 percent explains the variation that political caucusing has on agenda setting. The key finding under this objective was that political caucusing has a significant influence on political analysis in the Parliament of Ugandan and that the more political caucusing takes place, the better agenda setting becomes. The study also noted that the caucus represents a party's views or policy agenda in parliament through the legislative process in committees and during plenary, which, however, may not have been fully discussed and agreed upon.

#### 5.1.2 Political caucusing and policy enactment

The second objective of the study was to establish whether political caucusing influences policy enactment in the Parliament of Uganda. The regression value of .167 ( $.167 \times 100$ ) = 16.7 percent explains the variation that political caucusing has on policy enactment. The key finding under this study indicated that political caucusing influences policy enactment in the Parliament of Uganda and that the more political caucusing takes place, the better policy enactment becomes. The study also found out that the caucus is the public voice through which members air their views on salient issues that affect the people. However, it was noted that, when confronted with a



situation where individual members disagree on a given party position, the floor of Parliament is used by individual MPs to garner support by directly lobbying for their electorates' needs and going against the agreed position in the caucus.

### **5.1.3 Political caucusing and policy outcomes**

The third objective of the study was to establish the influence of political caucusing on policy outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda. The regression value of .237 (.237x100) =23.7 percent explains the variation that political caucusing has on policy outcomes. The major finding under this objective was that political caucusing has a significant influence on policy outcomes in the Parliament of Uganda and that the more political caucusing takes place, the better policy outcomes become. The study also discovered that other than implementing the party manifesto, the party leadership has a pivotal role that it plays towards the achievement of policy outcomes either by inspiring the members of the party or by giving them direction towards the chosen plan of action. And it is on the basis of particular policy outcomes that agenda setting is done for agenda setting.

## **5.2 Discussion of the findings**

### **5.2.1 Political caucusing and agenda setting**

According to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI, 2008) *“The policy process opens a dialogue with people about the challenges facing the country in the future and the future priorities of individual citizens and uses that dialogue to shape and enrich the party’s political priorities.”* This implies that the policy process should strengthen the connection between the party elites and the supporters also known as voters at the grassroots so that they can easily identify with the party. This concurs with the policy formulation process in most Commonwealth countries where public policy is initiated by either government or private members’ bills to address situations affecting the populace.

Legislation could ensure that it cures what is affecting the people by applying the purpose approach of the mischief rule cited in Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7 where it was stated that

for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, four things have to be considered: the purpose of the common law before making of the Act; the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; the remedy that parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and the true reason of the remedy.

Much as the adage that “*What is good for the goose is good for the gander,*” commonly leads Commonwealth parliaments to benchmark one another’s legislation, it would be better for parliamentary caucuses to sieve out what is good for their people and leave out what would not work for them in light of Lord Denning’s warning about the applicability of the English Common law in Africa;

...Just as with an English oak, so with the English common law. You cannot transplant it...and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed, but it needs careful tending. ...In these far off lands the people must have a law which they understand and which they respect.

So, each parliament ought to come up with laws, which are directly applicable and can be understood by its citizenry and that are enforceable lest the legislation impacts negatively on the policy outcomes and raises dissent among the populace; which would call for a fresh process of legislation.

### **5.2.2 Political caucusing and policy enactment**

Max Weber’s elite theory emphasises among others the division in society of the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ where the former are fewer than the latter although the former allocate value to society. Elites in Uganda, according to this study, are Members of Parliament, scholars and the top cadre in the civil service, who share consensus on behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system.

The framers of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda vested the power to determine social systems in the Parliament of Uganda through Article 79 of the same Constitution which

stipulates that: *“Parliament shall have power to make laws on any matter for peace, order, development and good governance of Uganda.”* This is in agreement with Dye’s presupposition that public policies are whatever governments choose to do or not to do. Enactment of any policy is a function of government. It is the party in power’s vision that determines the policies to be pursued in that most bills are tabled by government. The party in power may either stifle or pass a private member’s legislation in that it may feign lack of sufficient funds to implement the policy. The government also controls not only the time but the vote on all important matters and so when the government introduces a bill, it is almost for certain that it will go through, (Nakachwa, 2009). Article 91 (1) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda which stipulates that: *“... the power of Parliament to pass laws shall be exercised through bills passed by Parliament and assented to by the President.”* However, should the President fail to assent to the bill, return the bill to the Speaker or write to the Speaker that he or she declines to assent to the bill within 30 days, Article 91 (7) of the same Constitution shall be invoked, which stipulates that:

*“The President shall have been taken to have assented to the bill and at the expiration of that period [30 days], the Speaker shall cause a copy of the bill to be laid before Parliament and the bills shall become law without the assent of the President.”*

Findings of the study indicate that however much a policy may be caucused on in political parties, the legitimacy of any policy can only be got through consensus on the floor of parliament after a bill has been passed by the Committee of the whole House and subsequently assented to by the President. The procedure on legitimising a policy by the whole House has largely created an attempt to have laws that to some extent represent the public views since the floor of the whole House is constituted by Members of Parliament of diverse political ideologies.

### **5.2.3 Political caucusing and policy outcomes**

Policy outcomes are a result of government’s deliberate chosen efforts of action so as to achieve its set goals in the election manifesto, Budget Speech and State of the Nation Address. This is in

line with (Dye, 1995) the presupposition that public policies are what governments decide to either do or not to do so as to achieve their set objectives.

Findings of this study, which are in line with Hogwood and Gunn (1984) indicate that policy outcomes focus on societal consequences after the policies have been implemented; vague objectives create vague inputs which inter alia produce vague outcomes.

The New International Version Bible, (1984) in the Book of Galatians 6:7 says, “*A man reaps what he sows,*” and so does a good policy reap good outcomes; and the vice versa is also true. Policies are measured by the effect they have on the masses. Policies could always be stable and adaptable for as long as there aren’t any exogenous interferences, which compel governments to adapt to them in order to avoid things like inflation, governance, electronic crime and terrorism, to mention but four. According to Aston, J. et al, (2006) policies are unstable because they have a strong ideological component and oscillate with changes in the Executive. The policy implementation process and monitoring of policy outcomes in Uganda is a function of the Executive. The role of parliament through relevant committees provided for under Part XXIV of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda (2012) is to provide an oversight function as an approach to monitor policy implementation under various ministries. Findings of the study indicate that, policy outcomes are hinged on agenda setting and enactment since a policy has been enacted; whether good or bad; there are already written guidelines to follow while implementing. Thus a good policy will produce good outcomes and a bad policy will produce bad outcomes.

## **5.3 Conclusions**

Following the findings of the study, the researcher concludes as follows:

### **5.3.1 Political caucusing and agenda setting**

The study concludes that policy positions and ideologies of a ruling party through the President’s campaign manifesto, State of the Nation Address, Budget Speech and exogenous factors, international conventions and treaties ratified form the basis of the government’s policy agenda brought through government bills as mandated by Article 111 of the 1995 Constitution of the

Republic of Uganda. However, interest groups such as the civil society, members of the parties in the opposition, donors and MPs are significant in influencing policy in order to address their (people's) needs through private member's bills as enshrined in rules 111 and 112 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda, which espouses Max Weber's elitist theory that it is the elitist who shape mass opinion. Strategies for consensus building in order to win the vote on the floor of parliament are made in the different caucuses in parliament and so it was concluded that political caucusing influences agenda setting.

### **5.3.2 Political caucusing and policy enactment**

Policy enactment is the mandate of parliament as enshrined in Article 91 (1) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda which provides that: "*... the power of Parliament to pass laws shall be exercised through bills passed by Parliament and assented to by the President.*" Parliament gives bills tabled before it legitimacy through a vote by the majority MPs and the President may only assent to a Parliamentary Act sent to him or veto it for further consideration. However, should parliament feel otherwise, it may go ahead and pass a bill into law without the President's assent. The party in power, through its caucus may either stifle or pass a private member's legislation, (Nakachwa, 2009).

### **5.3.3 Political caucusing and policy outcomes**

The study concluded that policy outcomes are a result of a ruling party's policies and ideologies. If they are good, the outcomes will be good and the vice versa is bound to be true. The study to some extent portrays that public policy is an output of the political system. However, a section of political actors in Uganda, including the civil society, tend to disapprove this theory by attempting to push for the public interest especially the marginalised sections of society. For example, in the recent Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, the ruling party used its numbers to come out victorious. Policies could always be stable for as long as there aren't exogenous interferences which compel the ruling party to turn around and adapt to them. Policies become unstable due to strong ideological components which oscillate with the changes that occur in the Executive and trickle down into the masses. So, it was concluded that policy caucusing influences policy outcomes.

## **5.4. Recommendations**

Basing on the findings of the study, the researcher recommends the following:

### **5.4.1 Political caucusing and agenda setting**

Parliament should form a Ways and Means Committee in lieu of the Budget Committee to work hand in hand with the Committee on National Economy to scrutinise bills' feasibility and effect on the Consolidated Fund and make a report to the House instead of leaving it to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development to issue Certificates of Financial Implications. This will consequentially mean amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda, 2012.

Political caucuses ought to hire professional researchers to help them do some analysis on the masses' views and best practices elsewhere so as to help them debate from an informed position. The researchers should regularly travel to various parts of the country, more so, the hard to reach areas for an on the spot policy impact assessment so as to generate better informed analyses.

Political caucuses should open up their meetings to other members of their parties; not necessarily MPs, in order to accommodate their views to augment their representative role in parliament and to help them own the party values, ideologies and policies. This will call for political caucuses to be more accommodative to each other and ready to take and implement alternative views so as to better theirs and thus have better outputs. This would perhaps help to avert the elitist theory where the flow of policies is from the elites down to the masses, and instead flow from down the masses up to the elites.

### **5.4.2 Political caucusing and policy enactment**

Political caucuses should work out the modus of debate on the floor of parliament to allow fewer of their representatives, more so professionals in the line of debate to assert their position since

not everybody can debate on the same subject given the big numbers of MPs in the current parliament. This may be done by asking the Speaker to allow the chosen Member(s) of Parliament to debate in total disregard of rule 69 - "*Interruption of debate*"- of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda, 2012 up to when they finish so that they are explicitly heard in order to make the political caucus' position clear and acceptable prior to policy enactment.

### **5.4.3 Political caucusing and policy outcomes**

Political caucuses should advocate for amendment of those provisions of the law that stifle achievement of better outcomes for the masses like Article 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (which restricts introduction of a private member's bill imposing a charge on the Consolidate Fund). It stifles increase of medical workers' salaries; an outcome that has exacerbated their plight in Uganda. Amendment would allow for private members' bills that would help to enhance salaries and other charges directly from the Consolidated Fund.

In addition to this is the need to amend the Public Finance Bill, 2012, Schedule 5 (2) (d) which provides that: "*a statement of arrears of revenue signed by the Accounting Officer showing the amount outstanding at the end of the financial year for each source of revenue and containing information in the form the Accountant General may direct; a nil return should be submitted if appropriate.*" This implies that all undisbursed funds must be refunded to the Accountant General. Therefore, policy implementation and outcomes are often disadvantaged because all incomplete projects have to undergo a fresh bidding and appropriation process in the next financial year. This stalls development in case such projects don't get funding again. That aside, it may also lead to haphazard completion of work; done for the sake of beating the financial year deadline. Amending such a law would enable districts retain the money to complete ongoing projects.

## **5.5 Further Research**

The study was, however, not exhaustive enough since it is a relatively novel concept. It, therefore, recommends an area for further research to include: the influence of stakeholders outside the ruling party in shaping public policy because they are either directly or indirectly

impacted upon by the policies and are better placed to initiate alternative views that can create a semblance of satisfaction in society; let alone owning the decisions that would have been reached and thus having the people's mandate.



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# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE

### UGANDA MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE

#### MMS (PROGRAMME)

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

**Dear Sir/Madam,**

I am a Masters candidate of Management Studies at the Uganda Management Institute (UMI) Kampala currently undertaking a dissertation entitled: *“Political Caucusing and Policy Legislation in Uganda’s Parliament.”* In view of this empirical investigation, may I request you to be part of this study by answering this questionnaire? Rest assured that the information you provide shall be kept with utmost confidentiality and will be used for academic purposes only.

As you answer the questionnaire, please be reminded to respond to all the items. Further to that, may I retrieve the filled out questionnaire five days from the date of distribution?

Thank you in advance

**David Ivan Masajjage**

**(Researcher)**

**0772/702 607277**

#### INFORMED CONSENT

I am giving my consent to be part of the Research study of Mr Masajjage David Ivan, which will focus on *“Political Caucusing and Policy Legislation in Uganda’s Parliament.”*

I shall be assured of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality and that I will be given the option to decline participation and the right to withdraw my participation any time.

I have been informed that the research is voluntary and academic, and that the results will be given to me if I ask for them.

Initials: .....

Date: .....

## Bio-data

1. What is your sex?

- a) Male
- b) Female

2. How old are you?

- a) 20-30 years
- b) 31-40 years
- c) 41-50 years
- d) 51 -59 years
- e) 60 years and above

3. How long have you worked with Parliament?

- a) 1-5 years
- b) 6-10 years
- c) 11-15 years
- d) 16-20 years
- e) 20-25 years
- f) 25 years and above.

4. In what capacity are you working with Parliament?

- a) Member of parliament
- b) Civil servant

5. What is your highest level of education?

- a) Masters
- b) Bachelors
- c) Diploma
- d) Other (Please, specify) .....

Please indicate by ticking in the corresponding box the extent to which you are in agreement with the statement(s) listed below ranging from strongly agree (SA); agree (A); not sure (NS); disagree (D); and strongly disagree (SD)

### Political Caucusing

Statement	(SA)	(A)	(NS)	(D)	(SD)
Policy issues are brought during caucusing					
Prioritisation of policy issues takes place during caucusing					
Peoples interests are taken care of during caucusing					
Strategies to advance political causes takes place during caucusing					
Manifesto development takes place during caucusing					
Monitoring progress takes place during caucusing					
Disciplining of errant members of the party takes place during caucusing					

### Agenda setting

Statement	(SA)	(A)	(NS)	(D)	(SD)
Problem structuring is done during caucusing					
Forecasting is done during caucusing					
Alternative creation is done during caucusing					
Monitoring is done during caucusing					
Evaluation is done during caucusing					

### Policy Outcomes

Statement	(SA)	(A)	(NS)	(D)	(SD)
Policy strategies are made during caucusing					
Policy actors are active during caucusing					
Policy funding is decided during caucusing					
Policy staff are identified during caucusing					
Policy legal implications are identified during caucusing					
Policy scope is determined during caucusing					

### Policy Enactment

<b>Statement</b>	<b>(SA)</b>	<b>(A)</b>	<b>(NS)</b>	<b>(D)</b>	<b>(SD)</b>
Policy assent is done during caucusing					
Policy viability is determined during caucusing					
Policy equity is determined during caucusing					
Policy consensus is reached during caucusing					
Policy benchmarking is done during caucusing					



## **APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE**

1. What do you think is the role of caucuses in Parliament?
2. There are various caucuses in the Parliament of Uganda like UWOPA, NRMO, DP, UPC, FDC, Opposition, West Nile Parliamentarians Association, Busoga Parliamentarians Association, et cetera, which one (s) do you belong to?
3. So far what is (are) the achievements of that (those) caucus (es) that you belong to?
4. What factors do you deem to influence Members debates and decisions in the House?
5. How would you analyse that the following individual characteristics would or did influence Members of Parliament in taking their decisions:
  - a) Level of education?
  - b) Age?
  - c) Gender (female or male)?
  - d) Wealth?
  - e) Religion?
  - f) Region or area of an individual MP's origin?
  - g) Electoral College - PWD, Army, Youth or Worker(s)?

## APPENDIX C: DOCUMENTARY CHECKLIST

### Documentary review guide

<b>Title of document</b>	<b>Particular topic</b>	<b>Data</b>
The Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Act, 2006	Amendment Cap.257	Extracting data to do with the manner of choosing and ceasing to hold the roles and functions of the Chief Government Whip, Chief Opposition Whip and all other party whips in parliament
The Parliamentary Score Card 2007-2008	The Performance of Parliament Page 38-59	Extracting data on political party caucuses in both committees and during plenary.
The Public Finance and Accountability Act	Schedule 5 (2) (d)	Extracting data to do with undisbursed funds that are returned to the Accountant General at the close of a financial year.
The Uganda National Budget2011/12	Youth Fund	Extracting data on the Youth Entrepreneurship Venture Capital Fund strategy.

## APPENDIX D: CONTENT VALIDITY INDEX

For CVI, the researcher gave this instrument to two experts in the field of study to rate its validity with a total of nine questions and the results are shown below:

(1) The first expert rated eight (8) questions out of the nine as relevant.

(2) The second expert rated all the nine (9) questions as relevant.

So, the CVI for this instrument was computed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CVI} &= \frac{8+9}{2} \\ &= \frac{8.5}{9} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{CVI} = 0.94 = 94 \%$$

The validity of 94 percent is way above 70 percent as recommended by Amin (2005) and so the instrument would collect valid data.