BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS AFFECTING COMPLIANCE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN UGANDA: A CASE STUDY OF KAMPALA CAPITAL CITY AUTHORITY (KCCA).

BY:
CATE BASUUTA

REG. NUMBER
10/MMS/PSCM//21/061

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTERS DEGREE IN
 MANAGEMENT STUDIES OF UGANDA 
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE

NOVEMBER, 2013
DECLARATION

I, CATE BASUUTA, declare that this dissertation has never been presented anywhere for any award in any University or Institution of Higher Learning.  I stand responsible for what is stated hereunder.  

Signed: ……………………………………………………………………………………

Date: ………………………………………………………………………………………

APPROVAL
This dissertation has been submitted to Uganda Management Institute for examination with my approval as supervisor.

UMI Supervisor: Ms. Pross Nagitta Oluka 
Signature…………………………………………………….
Date…………………………………………………………..

DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to my beloved parents Mr & Mrs. Ssemakula, my husband Mr. Charles Muwoge and my sons Isaac and James. 									

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I wish to acknowledge and register my sincere heartfelt gratitude to the following persons in their various capacities for their untiring efforts and dedication to the success of this research work. I appreciate the efforts of my husband Mr. Charles Muwoge and my sons Isaac and James for offering moral and financial support to meet the demands of the course.
I am particularly indebted to my supervisor Ms. Pross Nagitta Oluka for her tireless efforts during the study to make sure that this work was accomplished within scheduled time. Her guidance throughout the study is very much appreciated.
I also express my sincere gratitude to my parents Mr & Mrs. Ssemakula who contributed greatly to my education. Special thanks go to my friends who tolerated the inconveniences I caused in one way or another and contributed enormously to my academic success.  Thanks also to go my sisters and brothers for their moral and financial support towards the completion of this course. 
My indebtedness further goes to staff of Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) for their invaluable support in accepting to be part of the study. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION
APPROVAL
DEDICATION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
ACRONYMS
ABSTRACT

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
1. 2 Background
1. 2.1 Historical Background
1.2.2 Theoretical Background
1.2.3 Conceptual Background
1.2.4 Contextual Background
1. 3 Statement of the Problem
1.4 Purpose of the Study
1.5 Research Objectives
1.6.Research Questions
1.7 Research Hypotheses
1.8 Conceptual frame work
1.8 Scope of the Study
1.8.1Geographical scope
1.8.2Time scope
1.8.3Content scope
1.9 Significance
1.10 Justification
1.11 Operational definitions

CHAPTER TWOLITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Theoretical review
2.2.1Institutional Theory
2.2.2Socio-Economic Theory
2.2.3Principal agent theory
2. 3Familiarity with regulation and Compliance
2.4 Perceived behavioral control and compliance with regulations
2.5Enforcement, deterrence and compliance
2.6Summary of the literature review

CHAPTER THREE:METHODOLOGY
3.1Introduction
3.2Research design
3.3Study Population
3.4Sample size and selection
3.5 Sampling techniques and procedure
3.6:Data Collection Methods
3.6.1:Questionnaire Survey
3. 6.2: Interviews
3. 6.3:Documentary review
3. 7 Data Collection Instruments
3. 7.1:Questionnaire
3.7.2:Interview guide
3.7.3: Documentary review guide
3.8 Validity and Reliability of the Research Instruments
3.8.1: Validity
3.8.2: Reliability
3.9:Procedure for Data Collection
3.10: Data Analysis
3.10.1: Quantitative data analysis:
3.10. 2. Qualitative data analysis
3.11Measurement of Variables

CHAPTER FOUR:DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION
4.1Introduction
4.2 Response Rate
4.3 Demographical Characteristics
4.3.1 Gender of the respondents
4.3.2 Age group of the respondents
4.3.3 Working Tenure of the respondents
4.3.4 Categories of respondents
4.3.5 Education levels of the respondents * working period of the respondents
4.4 The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
4.3.2 Correlations
4.3.3 Regression Analysis
4.4 The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with PPDA Regulations
4.4.2 Correlations
4.4.3 Regression Analysis
4.5 The Effect of enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process on the compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority
4.5.2 Correlations
4.5.3 Regression Analysis
4.6: Dependent Variable (Compliance with procurement rules and regulations)
4.7 The effect of behavioral factors on  compliance behavior in Public Procurements in Uganda in Kampala Capital City Authority
4.8 Hypotheses Testing Using Statistical Techniques

CHAPTER FIVESUMMARY, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1  Introduction
5.2  Summary of findings
5.2.1 The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public     procurement
5.2.2 The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement    regulations in KCCA
5.2.3 The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
5.3 Discussion
5.2.1 The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in     public procurement
5.3.2The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
5.2.3The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
5.4Conclusions
5.4.1The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public     procurement
5.4.2 The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
5.4.3The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
5.5.1The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public     procurement
5.5.2 The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
5.5.3 The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
5.6  Implications of the Findings
5.7 Areas for further research
REFERENCES
APPENDIX A: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS
APPENDIX D: INTRODUCTORY LETTER

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1; Sample size and selection
Table 2: Reliability results
Table 3: Response rate of distributed questionnaires
Table 4: Gender of the respondents
Table 5: Age Group and Category of the respondents
Table 6: Working Tenure and Category of the respondents
Table 7: showing category of respondents
Table 8: Cross tabulation of Education levels of the respondents * working period of the     respondents
Table9: Respondents’ attitude on the effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in Public Procurement (N=192)
Table10:The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
Table11:The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
Table 12: Causal relationship between familiarity with the regulations and compliance in public procurement
Table 13: Respondents’ attitude on the effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with PPDA Regulations
Table 14: The effect of Behavioral factors on compliance with PDDA regulations
Table 15: Significance of behavioral factors to compliance
Table 16: Causal relationship between behavioral factors and compliance
Table 17: Model summary of behavioral factors and compliance
Table 18: The Effect of enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process on the compliance with PPDA regulations (N=192)
Table 19: The effect of enforcement & deterrence, and compliance with PDDA regulations
Table 20: Model summary between enforcement & deterrence, and compliance with PDDA regulations
Table 21: Causal relationship between enforcement & deterrence, and compliance
Table 22: The minimum and maximum range and mean results of respondents rating on Compliance with procurement rules and regulations in KCCA
Table 23: correlation between Familiarity, Behavioral Control and Enforcement and Deterrence on Compliance Behavior
Table 24: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis
Table 25: summary of results of tested hypotheses

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Relationship between behavioral factors and compliance
Figure 2: Theory of Planned Behaviour with Moral Reasoning

ACRONYMS
APRM 	African Peer Review Mechanism 
CG 		Central Government
CTB 		Central Tender Board 
GDP  		Gross Domestic Product 
KCCA		Kampala Capital City Authority  
LG		Local Government
OECD 		Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PDEs 		Procurement and Disposal Entities
PPDA		Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets
PPDR		Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations
PPOA		Public Procurement Oversight Authority

ABSTRACT
The study analyzed the behavioral factors affecting compliance in Public Procurements in Uganda focusing on Kampala Capital City Authority as a case study. The three objectives that guided the study were: To establish whether lack familiarity with the regulations affects compliance; to investigate how perceived behavioral control affects compliance with PPDA Regulations and to examine the extent to which enforcement and deterrence affects compliance with PPDA Regulations in Local Governments. The study used a cross sectional survey design which involved triangulation of out of one hundred ninety six (196) questionnaires distributed to the respondents, only 192 (one hundred and ninety two) questionnaires were returned. The findings revealed that familiarity with the regulations had a positive correlation with compliance in Public Procurement (r = 0.441** P< 0.01; that there was a positive but not significant relationship between behavioral factors and compliance with procurement regulations at (p<0.01, r = 0.139 and lastly there was a positive and significant effect between enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process and compliance with procurement regulations. The results showed that familiarity with procurement regulations is a significant predictor of compliance. Further, it was also found that deterrent measures can affect compliance with procurement regulations. In line with the findings and conclusions derived, the researcher recommended that: practical training of procurement staff be beefed up in order to boost their familiarity with the regulations; take advantage of e-procurement and blacklist contractors who do not meet the expectations of the PPDA act; and give staff incentives to encourage good behavior, while putting in place deterrents to discourage noncompliance.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 	Introduction
As a result of declining compliance levels in Uganda Public Procurement is an important issue which can no longer be ignored in the country (Eyaa and Oluka, 2010). According to Hakiza and Basheka (2012) Public Procurement has been scrutinized since it has increasingly been perceived as an area of waste and corruption which has prompted a few studies to relate compliance in Public Procurement to different  behavioural factors affecting compliance. For example, Eyaa and Oluka (2011) explained the non- compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda aiming at contributing to the debate on the causes of non – compliance with Public Procurement regulations in Uganda and many other researchers.

Although all the above studies and some scholars have conducted research on unethical practices in Public Procurement and tried to relate non- compliance with Public Procurement to different independent variables, none of them has related behavioural factors affecting compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda focusing on Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) or no comprehensive study has been carried out; thus creating the need for this study to empirically investigate the behavioral factors affecting compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda focusing on Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) as the case study. 

Therefore, this study was about the behavioural factors affecting compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda focusing on Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) as a case study. Behavioural factors were the independent variable whereas compliance in Public Procurement was the dependent variable. This chapter presents the background to the study, problem statement, purpose of the study, objectives, research questions, and hypotheses, scope of the study, significance of the study, study justification, conceptual framework and the operational definition of key terms. 

1. 2 	Background 
This part of the study presents the historical perspective, the conceptual issues of the study, the theoretical aspects and the contextual perspective that lead to the study.
1. 2.1	Historical Background 
Since the 1970s, there has been a growing, albeit sporadic, interest in strategic approaches to the procurement process, with an emphasis on the scope of pro-activity (Goh, Lau & Neo, 1999). On the other hand, worldwide, Public Procurement has also become an issue of public attention and debate, and has been subjected to reforms, restructuring, rules and regulations. According to Roodhooft and Abbeele (2006), public bodies have always been big purchasers, dealing with huge budgets. Mahmood, (2010) also reiterated that Public Procurement represents 18.42% of the world GDP.

Although several developing countries have taken steps to reform their Public Procurement systems, the process is still shrouded by secrecy, inefficiency, corruption, and undercutting. In all these cases, huge amounts of resources are wasted, (Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003), while in other developing countries, Public Procurement is increasingly recognized as essential in service delivery (Basheka and Bisangabasaija, 2010), and it accounts for a high proportion of total expenditure. For instance, Public Procurement accounts for 60% in Kenya (Akech, 2005), 58% in Angola, 40% in Malawi and 70% of Uganda’s public spending (Wittig, 1999; Government of Uganda, 2006) as cited in Basheka and Bisangabasaija, (2010). This is very high when compared with a global average of 12-20 % (Frøystad et al., 2010). Due to the colossal amount of money involved in Government procurement and the fact that such money comes from the public, there is need for accountability and transparency (Hui et al., 2011). Basheka & Tumutegyereize, (2011) sum up the quantitative debate by observing that the procurement of goods, services, and works required by government departments consumes a considerable part of government resources. 
Consequently, various countries, both in developed and least developed countries, have instituted procurement reforms involving laws and regulations. The major obstacle however, has been inadequate regulatory compliance. De Boer and Telgen (1998) confirm that the noncompliance problem affects not only the third world countries but also countries in the European Union. This position is further supported by Gelderman et al., (2006) who contend that compliance in Public Procurement is still a major issue.

Hui et al., (2011) while analyzing procurement issues in Malaysia established that procurement officers were blamed for malpractice and noncompliance to the procurement policies and procedures. Citing Yukl (1989), Gelderman et al., (2006) stipulate that compliance occurs when the target performs a requested action, but is apathetic about it, rather than enthusiastic, and puts in only a minimal or average effort. However, as an organizational outcome, compliance has traditionally been understood as conformity or obedience to regulations and legislation (Snell, 2004) cited in Lisa, (2010).

According to Kenyanya et al., (2011), Kenya has undergone significant development in the past three decades. From being a system with no regulations in the 1960s to a system regulated by Treasury Circulars in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s; the introduction of the Procurement Regulations of 2006 brought new standards for Public Procurement in Kenya. Many studies were carried out on procurement before the Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations of 2006 to evaluate the efficiency of the procurement process in existence at the time, (Kipchilat, 2006). The major findings of the studies were that Public Procurement was not operating efficiently and that the state was losing a lot of money through shoddy deals.

In order to improve the management of public procurement, many countries have come up with procurement reforms. According to Arrowsmith and Trybus (2003) the last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed the start of the global evolution in the public procurement. Nonetheless Thai, (2005) asserts that challenges in Public Procurement go beyond procurement regulations to include procurement process, methods, organizational structure and work force. This assertion is supported by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Country Review  Report on Uganda (2009), which asserts that non – compliance with the regulations is so high in Uganda. The same report estimates that more than Uganda Shillings 300 Billion (US Dollars 184) is lost every year due to non – compliance. De Boer and Telgen (1998) as cited by Gelderman et al., (2006) explain that compliance is a problem not only in the third world countries but also evident in the countries in the European Union. Gelderman, (Ibid) further advances reasons for noncompliance as explained by the tendency to avoid red tape involved in the procurement process. However Sewanyana (2009) asserts that the type of goods and services procured sometimes influences the degree of compliance with the procurement regulations.

As regards to Eyaa & Oluka (2011), in Uganda the need for procurement reforms became urgent because of internal and external pressure given the fact that the Government was losing huge sums of money in poorly managed procurement processes that cost the tax payer a lot of money. The procurement reforms that were recommended in 2001 in Uganda in the Country Procurement Assessment Report are; the abolition of the Central Tender Board; enactment of a Procurement Law (Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act); establishment of a policy regulation body, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority; establishment of Contract Committees and Procurement Units in procuring entities; harmonization of central and local government regulations; incorporation of procurement plans in sector investment programs; preparation of standard bidding documents, establishment of a procurement cadre in the civil service and restoration of professionalism in the procurement function. All procurements and disposals handled by public procuring and disposing entities (PDEs) are governed by the regulations in the PPDA Act (2003). These regulations specify procurement and disposal procedures that have to be followed by all persons involved in procurement and disposal processes in order to ensure fairness, transparency, competitiveness and non – discrimination to all potential providers of goods services and works (PPDA Act, 2003).

While the noncompliance school of thought regarding the failure to adhere to the provisions of the procurement law is still in its juvenile stage, some research has been undertaken specifically in Uganda and other developing countries. The Public and Private Development Centre - PPDC, (2011) studied compliance of various entities with the Nigerian Public Procurement Act of 2007 and found that compliance was low but on an upward trend. In Botswana, Joseph, et al., (2007) obtained compliance levels ranging between 58 to 61 percent. Osei-Tutu, Mensah, & Ameyaw, (2011) studied compliance to the procurement law in Ghana using two regions as a case study and found that compliance in Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions was 19.58 percent and 17.8 percent, respectively pointing to low levels of compliance in the country. 

More still in Uganda, some scholars have conducted research on unethical practices in Public Procurement but no comprehensive study has been carried out on the behavioural factors affecting or responsible for non - compliance in Public Procurement in KCCA. Moreover, there are no empirical studies that can be traced to explain why there is non– compliance in KCCA. Ntayi et al., (2010a) sought to explain the unethical behavior of Public Procurement officers using social cohesion, group think and ethical attitudes and established that these variables considerably contribute to explain the unethical procurement behavior of procurement officers in Uganda. Ntayi et al., (2010b) explained unethical procurement behavior using psychological climate, catharsis, organizational anomie, procurement planning behavior and psychological wellness. Basheka and Mugabira (2008) measured professionalism variables and their implication to procurement outcomes in Uganda’s public sector. National Integrity Baseline Surveys (2002, 2004, and 2006) have been conducted with the aim of establishing the most corrupt central government ministry or local governments, sectors and ministries. Several authors have advanced theories explaining the prevalence of corruption in the public sector (Ackerman, 2002; Basheka, 2010; Nagitta and Ssennoga, 2010, Epak, 2005; Palmier, 2000; Duperouzel, 2005; Khai, 2008; TI-Uganda Chapter, 2007; Preston and Snilsberg, 2002; Soreide, 2004 and Onapa, 2005), among others. However, none of the above authors explains the behavioural factors affecting or responsible for non - compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda, although Gelderman et al., (2006) attempts to establish factors responsible for noncompliance in the European Union as being lack of professionalism, and familiarity. 

Noncompliance is a wide spread problem both in developing and developed nations procurement systems (Gelderman, Ghijsen, & Brugman, 2006; Karjalainen & van Raaij, 2011). Noncompliance may occur for reasons internal to the buying organisation or for reasons attributed to a supplier (Kulp, Randall, Brandyberry, & Potts, 2006; Aberdeen Group, 2009). The noncompliance irregularities have been classified under five categories: transparency, professional standards, fairness, contract monitoring and regulation and procedural irregularities (Tabish & Jha, 2011).
Generally, the most rampant form of noncompliance is corruption. According to Tabish & Jha, (2011), Public Procurement is prone to corruption, which in the global construction market alone accounts for an estimated US$340 billion per year. Basheka & Tumutegyereize, (2011) note that Public Procurement corruption can be classified into (1) supplier induced corruption as a result of stringent competition for government contracts, (2) public official induced corruption through creating bureaucratic hurdles that would necessitate seeking faster services, (3) politically induced corruption where contactors with political connections receive favours for the fear of political persecution, (4) speed corruption which involves capacity to harass, delay, or withhold decisions handed down by procurement officials unless a bribe is given, (5) syndicate corruption which involves networks of strategically placed public officials who collude to embezzle public funds with impunity, and (6) management by crisis where public officials deliberately delay to plan in time in order to create a crisis and stampede the procurement process.

However, Basheka (2013) observes that while noncompliance with procurement guidelines could lead to private gain, not all noncompliance scenarios can be described as necessarily corruption cases. Therefore, framing the academic debate about noncompliance as corruption narrows the scope of the discourse. Furthermore, there is stigma attached to the practice of researching corruption and until a few decades ago it was “politically incorrect” (Quah, 2006) to undertake scholarly discussions on this problem (Thai, 2008).

1.2.2 	Theoretical Background   
This study was guided by four theories that is; Institutional Theory, Principal Agent Theory, Theory of Planned Behaviour and Rationalist and Behavioral Decision Theories. In this case the theories about compliance explain why individuals comply or do not comply and hence provide useful lenses for viewing and understanding compliance-related behavior and the reasons behind that behavior (behavioral motivations), and is expected to provide an insight into the puzzle of compliance. 

The Principal Agent Theory as advocated by Donahue, (1989) explains that procurement managers in public sector play a relationship role. But his findings are based on the buyer/supplier relationship and the need of the buyer, as the principal, to minimize the risks posed by the agent. The author argued that procurement managers including all civil servants concerned with Public Procurement must play the agent role. Therefore procurement managers take on the role of agent for elected representatives. The principal-agency theory holds that shirking is likely to occur when there is some disagreement between policy makers and the bureaucracy. The democratic perspective focuses on responsiveness to citizens and their representatives (Strom 2000; Lupia 2003). However, Soudry (2007) identifies this principal/agent relationship among the possible risks whereby procurement managers show apathy towards principal ‟preferred outcomes” or even overriding of the principals preferences, thus resulting into noncompliance.

The Theory of Planned Behavior is an extension of the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) made necessary by the original model limitations in dealing with behaviors over which people have incomplete volitional control.  Ajzen’s (1991) theory models behavior as depending on behavioral intention where Ajzen's (1991) theory of planned behavior (TPB) models behavioral intention as depending on three factors: (1) attitude toward the behavior (2) subjective norms (SN); and (3) perceived behavioral control (PBC). Attitudes relate to one’s own personal views about the behavior. Subjective norms are a function of an individual's perception that one or more relevant people would approve of a particular behavior and the extent to which the individual’s behavior will be influenced by that. Perceived behavioral control refers to an individual’s perception regarding the extent of control he or she has over a particular behavior. Perceived behavioral control is modeled as capable of influencing behavior directly as well as through its effect on intentions. The indirect link represents the motivational influence of control on behavior. To the extent people believe that they have limited control over performing a particular behavior, their intention to perform the behavior may be decreased. The direct link from perceived behavioral control to behavior represents the actual control an individual has over behavioral performance. The theory asserts that noncompliance behavior is determined by three factors: intention, perceived behavioral control and ethics.  

In view of the Institutional Theory, it is asserted that there is no single and universally agreed definition of “institution” or “Institutional Theory”. According to Scott (2004), institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources give meaning to life. The author explains the three pillars of institutions as regulatory, normative and cultural cognitive. The regulatory pillar emphasizes the use of rules, laws and sanctions as enforcement mechanism, with expedience as basis for compliance. The normative pillar refers to norms (how things should be done) and values (the preferred or desirable), social obligation being the basis of compliance. The cultural-cognitive pillar rests on shared understanding (common beliefs, symbols, shared understanding). In Uganda, Public Procurement is guided by the PPDA Act (2003), regulations and guidelines which are from time to time issued by the PPDA Authority only and which must be complied with to the latter by all PDEs and providers. However, the institutional model fails to provide theoretical explanation for the vicious spiral of noncompliant behaviour of public servants and violation of the law that is contrary to their interests with clear stated sanctions.

Lastly, the rationalist and behavioral decision theories follow the logic of consequences where regulated entities are conceived as rational actors that act to maximize their economic self-interest. These theories, therefore, emphasize enforcement and deterrence to change as postulated by Becker (1968), who contends that potential offenders respond to both the prospect of detection and the severity of punishment if detected and convicted (deterrence based). Thus, deterrence may be enhanced either by raising the penalty, by increasing monitoring activities to raise the likelihood that the offender will be caught, or by changing legal rules to increase the probability of conviction. From the foregoing, one can highlight one of the factors explaining noncompliance as laxity by entities to maintain a credible likelihood of detecting violations; swift, certain, and appropriate sanctions upon detection; and a perception among the regulated firms that these detection and sanction elements are not present. Therefore the work of enforcement agency under this view would be ensuring penalties and the probability of detection high enough that it becomes irrational for firms to violate the law. And these enforcement options could include extra-legal “punishments” such as moral stigma and loss in reputation.

Basing on the study, Institutional Theory, socio-economic theory and principal agent theories that explain noncompliance within the Public Procurement in reference to the behavioural factors affecting or responsible for noncompliance in Public Procurement in Uganda, focusing on KCCA, were considered the best theories since they are based on the three pillars of institutions as regulatory, normative and cultural cognitive. The regulatory pillar emphasizes the use of rules, laws and sanctions as enforcement mechanism, with expedience as basis for compliance. 

1.2.3 	Conceptual Background 
Payan and McFarland (2005, p72) and Gelderman et al., (2006) define compliance as referring to ‘acting in accordance with an influence attempt from source’ as reported by. The concept of compliance looks at the conduct of the regulated actor in comparison to the corresponding obligation that the actor is supposed to obey. Compliance maybe assumed to have a negative connotation since it is usually associated with enforced behavior. This negative connotation of compliance is given further emphasis by its definition in the marketing literature as ‘giving in to the wishes of a more powerful channel member’ (Hunt et al., 1987, Gelderman et al., 2006). The authors further reported that ‘….an individual accepts influence…not because he believes in its content but because he expects to gain specific rewards or approval and avoid specific punishments or disapproval by conforming’ (Kelman, 1958). In relating this to principal-agent theory, an agent acting on behalf of a principal may be forced to comply with the laid down rules since the actor assumes that he/she may be sanctioned for noncompliance or rewarded for compliance.  A Public Procurement practitioner therefore acting on behalf of the government of Uganda (principal) is enforced to comply with the regulatory regime of the new Public Procurement Act, 2003 since the inability to comply may result in the agent being sanctioned as mandated by the law. It has also been found that academic research in Public Procurement has been very inadequate (Thai, 2001), not to mention research with respect to compliance (Gelderman et al., 2006). Most compliance researches in developing countries are ‘more or less fact finding missions’. 

Noncompliance refers to the failure to meet regulatory or other requirements that have been imposed on an organization (United States Environmental Protection Agency - EPA, 2012). In the case of Public Procurement noncompliance alludes to the failure to comply with procurement legislations and regulations. In the case of Uganda, noncompliance alludes to failure to comply with the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 1, 2003 as well as associated regulations. In general, compliance means conforming to a rule, such as a specification, policy, standard or law. Regulatory compliance describes the goal that corporations or public agencies aspire to achieve in their efforts to ensure that personnel are aware of and take steps to comply with relevant laws and regulations. 

Public Procurement Regulations can be viewed as a set of laws that guide the purchasing, hiring or obtaining by any other contractual means of goods, construction works and services by the public sector. According to the Uganda Public Procurement & Disposal of Public Assets Authority – PPDA, (2012) Public Procurement means ‘acquisition by purchase, rental, lease, hire purchase, license, tenancy, franchise, or any type of works, services or supplies or any combination up to the time a user consumes or utilises a service as per his requirement and in line with the procurement Act and regulations of the country’. Arrowsmith, (2010) defines Public Procurement as the ‘government’s activity of purchasing the goods and services [as well as works] which it needs to carry out its functions’. There are three phases of the Public Procurement process (Arrowsmith, 2010) namely; (i) Deciding which goods or services are to be bought and when (procurement planning); (ii) The process of placing a contract to acquire those goods or services which involves, in particular, choosing who is to be the contracting partner and the terms on which the goods or services are to be provided; and (iii) The process of administering the contract to ensure effective performance.

Public Procurement is defined as the purchase of commodities and contracting of construction works and services if such acquisition is effected with resources from state budgets, local authority budgets, state foundation funds, domestic loans or foreign loans guaranteed by the state, foreign aid as well as revenue received from the economic activity of state. Public Procurement thus means procurement by a procuring entity using public funds (World Bank, 1995a). 

1.2.4 	Contextual Background 
Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) is a legal entity, established by law, responsible for the operations of the Capital City of Kampala in Uganda. It replaced the former Kampala City Council (KCC).The headquarters of KCCA are located on Nakasero Hill, in the central business district of Kampala, Uganda's capital city. The headquarters are immediately southwest of the Uganda Parliament Building. Kampala is divided into five divisions; Central, Nakawa, Lubaga, Makindye and Kawempe divisions, each headed by a elected Mayor. The divisions are preserved under the new KCCA Law, Kampala Capital City Authority Act, 2010. The affairs of Kampala Capital City have been brought under the direct supervision of the central Government following allegations of corruption tendencies over the last ten years in particular; the officials of the defunct Kampala City Council were said to be particularly corrupt. Public property was disposed for personal gain and millions of shillings were siphoned off into personal accounts. It is against that background there is an investigation of factors that influence compliance to PPDA Act and regulations was conducted.

In a study conducted in Uganda by the PPDA (2010), the introduction of the legal and regulatory procurement framework; the establishment of the PPDA as an oversight body; the development of a framework for contract administration and the new appeals mechanism were among those aspects of the procurement system rated as having been positively affected by the Regulations. In contrast, the existing institutional development capacity in procuring entities and functioning of the procurement market were assessed as being among the weakest aspects of the system in Uganda, mostly in KCCA. The report noted that although procedures supporting systematic procurement planning have been established within KCCA, research showed that these were far from always being complied with. It was found out, for example, that there was a low share of procurements that were done through open tendering.

In another study by KPMG International carried out after the introduction of the regulations, it was found out that Public Procurement in KCCA still suffers from fraud and misconduct (KPMG, 2010). A study by KACC, also noted that public officials distort the regulations to restrict the participation of interested firms in procurement, or still direct the outcome of others.

The introduction of the Regulations almost coincided with the introduction of Free Secondary Education (FSE) in 2007. The PPDR included public secondary schools among the institutions whose procurement systems were to be regulated by the Regulations. The Public Procurement and Disposal Act granted teachers and subordinate staff the power to control the tendering and procurement process in public schools by setting up of Tendering Committees to oversee the whole process of procurement. This was also aimed at decentralizing the procurement process which was a preserve of principals for a long time. The disbursement and utilization of funds meant for Free Secondary Education (FSE) programmes is subject to the provisions of the Government Financial Management Act, (2004) which emphasizes good financial management in public institutions. The Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations were supposed to supplement this goal by making Public Procurement more transparent (PPDA, 2007).

In a study by Kenyanya et al., (2011) it was found that the established legal and regulatory framework in public entities like KCCA in Uganda has added some strength to the Public Procurement system, weaknesses still exist in the framework. For example, although open tenders in KCCA were found to be the preferred method of tendering used by most of the public entities in Uganda thus bringing it closer to its intended status as the default method of procurement, it is clear that the procurement functioning needs to developed further and considerable effort put into defining strategies for how to make open tendering the main method of procurement. 
According to Anti-corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU), Uganda loses Uganda Shillings 500 Billion annually, as a result of flaws in Public Procurement processes. This position is confirmed by the Transparency International Report (2009) on Uganda which revealed that Public Procurement is marred by high levels of noncompliance with procurement regulations. The 2009 African Peer Review Mechanism Report on Uganda APRM, (2009) noted that noncompliance with regulations in Uganda is so high. 

1. 3 	Statement of the Problem 
Uganda has attempted to address weaknesses in its Public Procurement process by the passage of several procurement financial and legal instruments without considering capacity trainings. These have come in the form of constitutional, legislative instruments, administrative instructions and financial circulars.  Indeed in 2003, the Government of the Republic of Uganda enacted the Public Procurement and Disposal Act with an aim of enhancing transparency, accountability and value for money. This requires, in part, that the whole process is well understood by both the actors (the government, the procuring entities, the business community / supplies and other stakeholders, including the professional associations, academic entities and the general public.

Despite those reforms as indeed noted by Court and Hyden (2001), many sub-Saharan African countries continue to be deficient on accountability, transparency and equity in the provision of public services despite the existence of laws, rules and procedures.  A critical review of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA) audit reports for KCC and now KCCA since 2005 reveals cross cutting noncompliant issues relating to: procurement structures, contract placement and award, solicitation and bidding procedures, evaluation process, contract placements, reporting, performance of contracts and record keeping. (PPDA Audit Reports, 2006/2007; 2007/2008 and 2009/2010). Additionally, the absence of an explanation for selective compliance behaviours by Public Procurement employees undermines the principles for which they are employed. Failure to explicate this nonconforming behaviour is disquieting because it undermines the basic canons of public service and the legitimacy of the prevailing institutional framework. One wonders whether it is perceived behavioral control, lack of familiarity with laws or poor enforcement and deterrence affecting compliance. This is likely to result in continued loss of scarce resources which the country is in dare need. It is against this background that this study was conducted, to investigate the factors that contribute to noncompliance with procurement regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority.

1.4 	Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study was to analyze the factors affecting compliance behavior in Public Procurements in Uganda taking a case of Kampala Capital City Authority.

1.5 	Research Objectives
The study was guided by the following specific objectives:
i.	To establish whether lack familiarity with the regulations affects compliance in Public Procurement at Kampala Capital City Authority 
ii.	To investigate whether perceived behavioral control affects compliance with PPDA Regulations at Kampala Capital City Authority.
iii.	To examine whether enforcement and deterrence affects compliance with PPDA Regulations at Kampala Capital City Authority.
1.6.	Research Questions
i)	To what extent does familiarity with PPDA regulations affect compliance in Public Procurement at Kampala Capital City Authority?
ii)	 How does perceived behavioral control affect compliance with PPDA regulations at Kampala Capital City Authority?
iii)	 To what extent does enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process affect compliance with PPDA regulations at Kampala Capital City Authority?
1.7	Research Hypotheses  
H1	Familiarity with PPDA regulations affects compliance 
H2	Perceived behavioral control significantly affects compliance with PPDA regulations. 
H3	Enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process affects compliance with PPDA regulations 
1.8 	Conceptual frame work 
The conceptual framework shows the relationship between behavioral factors and compliance	
Independent Variable 					Dependent variable

Familiarity with regulations
-	Planning 
-	Advertisement
-	Bidding
-	Evaluation
-	Orders
-	Delivery of goods and services

Perceived Behavioral Control
-	Staff  incentives and motivation
-	Behavioral intention
-	Self efficacy
-	Attitude 

Enforcement and deterrence 
-	Regular  compliance assessments 
-	prospects of detection   through  audits
-	severity of punishment  

•	Adherence to rules and regulations
•	Clear Procurement or disposal process.
•	Clear Record keeping 
•	Planning and expenditure budget.

	Behavioral factors						Compliance

Figure 1: Relationship between behavioral factors and compliance in Public Procurement
Source:  Adopted from Ajzen (1991); Becker (1968), and modified by the researcher
From the conceptual framework in Figure 1 above; Behavioral factors were considered as the independent variable which was operationalised in terms of Variables such as Familiarity with regulations which was hypothesized in terms of planning, advertisement, bidding, evaluation, orders and delivery of goods and services; Perceived Behavioral Control was also operationalised in terms of staff incentives and motivation, behavioral intention, self-efficacy and attitude; and lastly Enforcement and deterrence was hypothesized in terms of Regular  compliance assessments, prospects of detection   through  audits and severity of punishment.  On the other hand Compliance within Public Procurement was hypothesized as the dependent variable and operationalised in terms of the areas of compliance such as rules and regulations, procurement or disposal process, record keeping, planning and expenditure budget.

1.8 	Scope of the Study
1.8.1 	Geographical scope
The study was conducted in Kampala Capital City Authority focusing on Kawempe, Lubaga, Makindye, Nakawa, and Kampala Central. Kampala as the Capital City of Uganda hosts a number of state activities that are procured under the PPDA therefore the geographical scope was able to provide the necessary information to the study.
1.8.2 	Time scope
The time scope of this research covered the period 2012-2013. This period was significant because Kampala Capital City Authority is now fully established and an autonomous body which facilitated the study to get the information needed for the study. 
1.8.3 	Content scope 
The study assessed the behavioral factors affecting compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda focusing on the case study of Kampala Capital City Authority. The behavioral factors included; familiarity with regulations (planning, advertisement, bidding, evaluation, orders, delivery of goods and services), Perceived Behavioral Control (staff incentives and motivation, behavioral intention, self-efficacy, attitude) and Enforcement and deterrence (regular compliance assessments, prospects of detection   through audits and severity of punishment).

1.9 	Significance 
The study findings might add new knowledge in the area of compliance with PPDA Act and regulations for future researchers. The study is in line with National Development Framework which emphasizes time value for money in enhancing service delivery. This would also contribute to achieving transparency in procurement activities of the government. The study findings may provide a ground for the KCCA and PPDA to create avenues for general awareness on the consequences of noncompliance to procurement regulations in government institutions. It may also provide the business community, with information concerning factors that lead to noncompliance and the dynamics behind it. 
1.10 	Justification
While a lot of attention has been directed toward implementation procedures in acquisition of goods and services in public institutions in Uganda, little has been done to establish the best practices in compliance to procurement regulations public institutions in Uganda more especially in KCCA. This study investigated the behavioral factors influencing compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda focusing on the case study of Kampala Capital City Authority. It is intended that the findings of this research project may be useful to Kampala Capital City Authority in strengthening the acquisition, implementation and integration of procurement practices in administration. The study would also inform government policy with regard to designing changes to streamline the acquisition of goods and services in public institutions as set by the Public Procurement act of 2007 and Ministry of local government. The study also formed a basis on which academic researchers can do further studies on compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda.

1.11	Operational definitions
Public Procurement: Arrowsmith, (2010) defines Public Procurement as the ‘government’s activity of purchasing the goods and services and  works which it needs to carry out its functions.
Compliance, according to Payan and McFarland (2005, p72), is defined as ‘acting in accordance with an influence attempt from source’ as reported by Gelderman et al., (2006). 
Noncompliance refers to the failure to meet regulatory or other requirements that have been imposed on an organization (United States Environmental Protection Agency EPA,2012).  

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 	Introduction
This chapter covers both the theoretical and reviews of the literature on the behavioral factors affecting compliance behavior in Public Procurements under themes like; the effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance, the effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with PPDA Regulations and the effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with PPDA Regulations.

2.2 	Theoretical Review 
Several theories have been put forward which have implications on behavior factors affecting compliance in Public Procurements amongst which are the Principal Agent Theory, Institutional Theory, Behavioral Theory and Socio-Economic Theory. 

2.2.1	Institutional Theory
As cited by Defee et al., (2010), good research should be grounded in theory (Mentzer et al., 2008). In this study Institutional Theory was amongst the theories that guided the study. The Institutional Theory is the traditional approach that is used to examine elements of Public Procurement (Obanda, 2010). There is no single and universally agreed definition of “institution” or “Institutional Theory”. According to Scott (2004), institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources give meaning to life. The author explains the three pillars of institutions as regulatory, normative and cultural cognitive. The regulatory pillar emphasizes the use of rules, laws and sanctions as enforcement mechanism, with expedience as basis for compliance. The normative pillar refers to norms (how things should be done) and values (the preferred or desirable), social obligation being the basis of compliance. The cultural-cognitive pillar rests on shared understanding (common beliefs, symbols, shared understanding). In Uganda, Public Procurement is guided by the PPDA Act (2003), regulations and guidelines which are from time to time issued by the PPDA Authority only and which must complied with to the latter by all PPOA and providers.
In relation to the study, cultural-cognitive pillar rests on shared understanding (common beliefs, symbols, shared understanding) are the fundaments of compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda. But the theories are objectivistic with respect to the evaluation of compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda. This therefore means that for compliance in Public Procurement to be existent, they must a positive attitude regarding regulations and guidelines of public procurement. This sudden change in status necessitates not only change in knowledge, but also attitudes and practices to compliance in public procurement.

However, the Institutional Theory, singularly fails to appreciate that human behavior is more complex, and that compliance may not be obtained through laws and regulations.  The widespread noncompliant behaviour of public servants undermines the decisions handed down by the state in form of policies and legislative enactments, raising questions of legitimacy of the law, fairness and justice. A significant body of literature has revealed that if authorities treat people with neutrality, fairness, respect and trust such people will tend to cooperate and comply with authority decisions and rules (Murphy and Tyler, 2008).
2.2.2 	Socio-Economic Theory
Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) propounded the socio-economic theory of compliance by integrating economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for moral obligation and social influence as determinants of individuals’ decisions on compliance. According to Lisa (2010) psychological perspectives provide a basis for the success or failure of organizational compliance. Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) also add that the legitimacy theory postulates that the organization is responsible to disclose its practices to the stakeholders, especially to the public and justify its existence within the boundaries of society. In relation to the study, this theory focused on the relationship and interaction between an organization and the society and provided a sufficient and superior lens for understanding government procurement system (Hui et al., 2011). From this theory, the perceived legitimacy of Public Procurement rules has been identified as one of the antecedents of Public Procurement compliance behavior.

Ntayi et al. (2012) assert that one’s capacity to survive and sustain his/her life effectively and humanely are rooted in social settings. This ultimately means that society plays a major role in determining the ground rules on what is expected and approved behaviour in any given social setting. Therefore the ground rules constitute social values or codes of behaviour that all members of a particular society, community or profession should comply with. These human interactions must be structured and governed by informal institutions. Social values promote cooperative tendencies with people who are considered close (Jones and Rachlin, 2006). This view is supported by work on social discounting which reveals that people are less willing to sacrifice for others and/or support a cause that benefits individuals who are socially distant to them (Rachlin and Raineri, 1992; Jones and Rachlin, 2006). Individuals who are socially cohesive tend to exhibit spontaneous (Holland et al., 2004) shared beliefs, behavior, expressions and work performance outcomes (Ntayi et al., 2010). Ntayi et al. (Ibid), using Ntayi et al. (2010) using data from Ugandan Public Procurement officers  have revealed that constitutive social relations result into social cohesion, groupthink behaviour and ethical attitudes which contribute significantly to the explanation  of ethical behaviour. Their findings are suggestive of the need to understand and tackle noncompliant behaviour of procurement officers from unconventional perspectives.

Despite a general consensus on the importance of social value orientations, surprisingly there is little hard evidence on its nature and effect on regulatory compliance. Previous scholars have tended to omit social value orientation in the compliance model, yet people tend to weigh their individual preferences (subjective attitudes or norms) regarding the distribution of outcomes to self and others while performing certain functions (Cyr and Choo, 2010). A critical review of literature has revealed that the social value orientation ignores the fact that sometimes, human beings deviate from social values and pursue self-interests and competitive behaviour. Sivacek and Crano (1982) have empirically shown that self-interest predicts human behavior; productive work behaviours and the tendency for people to systematically overrate themselves in rankings of their peers (Baker et al., 1988; Schwert, 1993).

However, Brennan (1994, p. 37) contend that individuals are “‘capable of rising above their own narrow self-interest’ especially if their responsibility is greater than the welfare of others.” Green and Cowden (1992) defend the self-interest view by arguing that before individuals are involved in self-interest behaviour, they undergo a cost-benefit analysis. The cost element prompts “self-interest reflection” by first asking “Is it worth it” (expected utility) before displaying compliant behaviour. It is against these arguments that governments craft and sanction coercive mechanisms in order to regulate self-interest and promote compliance. Proponents of the institutional framework argue that laws, rules and regulations check the actions of public service employees, promote cooperation, limit employee discretion (Norris, 2003) and diminish the cost of punishing noncompliant behaviours. 

2.2.3	Principal Agent Theory
The principal agent theory as advocated by Donahue, (1989) explains that procurement managers in public sector play a relationship role. But his findings are based on the buyer/supplier relationship and the need of the buyer, as the principal, to minimize the risks posed by the agent. The author argued that procurement managers including all civil servants concerned with Public Procurement must play the agent role. Therefore procurement managers take on the role of agent for elected representatives. The principal-agency theory holds that shirking is likely to occur when there is some disagreement between policy makers and the bureaucracy. The democratic perspective focuses on responsiveness to citizens and their representatives (Strom 2000; Lupia 2003). However, Soudry (2007) identifies this principal/agent relationship among the possible risks whereby procurement managers show apathy towards principal’s preferred outcomes or even overriding of the principals preferences thus resulting into noncompliance.

2.2.4 Theory of Planned Behaviour
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior (TPB) models behaviour as depending on behavioural intention. Theory of suggests that a person's behavior is determined by his/her intention to perform the behavior and that this intention is, in turn, a function of his/her attitude toward the behavior and his/her subjective norm. The best predictor of behavior is intention. The theory models behavioral intention as depending on three factors: (1) attitude toward the behavior (2) subjective norms (SN); and (3) perceived behavioral control (PBC). Intention is the cognitive representation of a person's readiness to perform a given behavior, and it is considered to be the immediate antecedent of behavior. This intention is determined by three things: their attitude toward the specific behavior, their subjective norms and their perceived behavioral control. The theory of planned behavior holds that only specific attitudes toward the behavior in question can be expected to predict that behavior (Ajzen, 2002).

Figure 2: Theory of Planned Behaviour with Moral Reasoning
Source: Ajzens organizational behavior and human decision processes 50, 179-211 (1991)
Attitudes relate to one’s own personal views about the behaviour. Subjective norms are a function of an individual's perception that one or more relevant people would approve of a particular behaviour and the extent to which the individual’s behaviour will be influenced by that. Perceived behavioural control refers to an individual’s perception regarding the extent of control he or she has over a particular behaviour. Perceived behavioural control is modeled as capable of influencing behaviour directly as well as through its effect on intentions. The indirect link represents the motivational influence of control on behaviour. To the extent people believe that they have limited control over performing a particular behaviour, their intention to perform the behaviour may be decreased. The direct link from perceived behavioural control to behaviour represents the actual control an individual has over behavioural performance.

However, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) caution that it is risky to collectively conclude that the behavioral variability across situations is the same and may not predict a specific behavior in a given situation. It was meant to demonstrate that general attitudes and personality traits are implicated in human behavior, but that their influence can be discerned only by looking at broad, aggregated, valid samples of behavior. Their influence on specific actions in specific situations is greatly attenuated by the presence of other, more immediate factors. Indeed, it may be argued that broad attitudes and personality traits have an impact on specific behaviors only indirectly by influencing some of the factors that are more closely linked to the behavior in question 
In summary, upon the review of various theories in line with the behavior factors affecting compliance in Public Procurements, the study was based on four theories; principal agent theory, Institutional Theory, theory of planned behavior and socio-economic theory, which explain the effect of behavioral factors in affecting compliance behavior in Public procurement. 

2. 3	Familiarity with regulation and Compliance 
In a context where the procurement profession is still regarded as new in Uganda, with the regulations having come into force in 2003, it is possible that the level of familiarity with regulations is still low. On the other hand, there is a possibility that those who are familiar with the regulations have mastered them and as such know how to beat the loopholes to their advantage. The ambiguities and gaps in the rules also lead to different interpretation and practices that are mainstreamed. The procurement exercise follows steps according to the PPDA of 2003. These steps must be observed in order to ensure that all the stakeholders involved in the procurement exercise obtain fair treatment. The steps include; planning for the required procurement over a given period, identifying the source of the items, highlighting specifications/initiation of procurement, determination of procurement procedure, Sourcing (soliciting) offers, evaluation of offers, post qualification, commencement of contract, contract performance (delivery) and management, record keeping and accountability, payment and post contract performance (PPDA Act, 2003). 

Many corporate board members in Africa, especially of state-owned companies, have limited understanding of their roles, and are usually open to manipulation by management, chairpersons, or principal shareholders. Some are outright incompetent. However many simply act as rubber stamps for decisions taken outside the board (Charles & Oludele, 2003). In this perspective, compliance arises from a dynamic equilibrium between the various powers of the state and understanding what their roles are (Fisher, 2004). 

According to De Boer and Telgen (1998) as quoted by Gelderman et al. (2006), one of the factors responsible for noncompliance with procurement regulations is the level of familiarity with the procurement regulations. De Boer and Telgen, (Ibid) assert that during the early days of the inception of Public Procurement regulations in the Netherlands, many municipalities could not comply to the regulations because they were not familiar with them. Gelderman et al., (2006) confirmed this position in a survey on compliance with EU procurement directives. 

In many central government entities, compliance to laid down rules is very low. The procurement audits carried out by the PPDA have revealed that out of 322 contracts audited as at end 2005, only 7 (2%) were assessed as being clean, i.e., carried out in accordance with the law and with internal structures observed. Among the key weaknesses identified were inadequate procurement planning, leading to an excessive use of direct procurements and failure to align procurement with the budgetary process; poor record-keeping, leading to many procurement documents being untraceable (or procurements having taken place without documentation); and abuse of process, for example, contracts being awarded to a company other than the best evaluated bidder, retrospective approvals for contracts, inconsistencies in tender evaluation and interference in the contract award process by unauthorized parties.

Familiarity of rules can best be described as having the knowledge with respect to the rules, processes and procedures in carrying out a procurement function. According Hunja, (2003) knowledge is a key ingredient of a well-functioning, modern legal and institutional Public Procurement framework and that the lack of it brings about capacity problems. How knowledgeable a Public Procurement practitioner is, is an agent’s characteristics that the principal may not have complete information about at the time of engagement of the agent by the principal, according to the principal-agent theory (Douma and Schreuder, 2002).

2.4 	Perceived behavioral control and compliance with regulations
Perceived  behavioral  control  is  modeled  as  capable  of   influencing  behavior directly  as  well  as  through  its  effect  on  intentions. The indirect link represents the motivational influence of control on behavior.  The  extent  that  people  believe  that  they  have  limited  control  over   performing  a  particular behavior, their  intention  to  perform  the  behavior  may  be  decreased.  The  direct  link  from  perceived  behavioral  control  to  behavior  represents  the  actual  control  an individual  has  over  behavioral  performance. Therefore, perceived behavioral factors affect the willingness of procurement staff to comply with regulations. As in the original theory of reasoned action, a central factor in the theory of planned behavior is the individual’s intention to perform a given behavior. Intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much effort they are planning to exert in order to perform the behavior. As a general rule, the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the more likely should be its performance.

It should be clear, however, that a behavioral intention can find expression in behavior only if the behavior in question is under volitional control, i.e., if the person can decide at will to perform or not perform the behavior. Although some behaviors may in fact meet this requirement quite well, the performance of most depends at least to some degree on such non motivational factors as availability of requisite opportunities and resources (e.g., time, money, skills, cooperation of others (Ajzen, 1985). Collectively, these factors represent people’s actual control over the behavior. To the extent that a person has the required opportunities and resources, and intends to perform the behavior, he or she should succeed in doing so.
Understanding  and  motivating  individual  behavior  involving  pro-social  activities  is  of  great  interest  among  researchers  and  policy  makers.  A  large  body  of  research  has  examined  whether  intrinsically  motivated  activities  and,  in  particular,  altruistic  behavior  can  be  stimulated  by  offering  extrinsic  rewards.  Although  pro-social  activities  present  a  substantial  part  of   social  life,  for  many  of  them  compliance   is  still  lacking. This is certainly the case with public procurement.  Although there are laws and regulations governing Public Procurement in place, many times they are ignored or bypassed, leading to loss of huge sums of money by the government.  Even  among  the  eligible  and  informed  individuals,  it  appears  that    compliance  with procurement regulations falls short.  

 “Standard  economic  theory  predicts  that  offering  any  additional  incentive  for performing  an  activity  will  increase  the  supply  of  that  activity” (Lacetera, Macis and Slonim, 2010, pg.1). Lacetera et al. (2010)  asserted  that  when  individuals are  informed  about  the  offering  of  an  incentive,  there  will  be  a  strong  positive  effect  of  incentives  on  the compliance. Lacetera and Macis (2008)  contended  that  symbolic  rewards  tend  to  increase  the  frequency  compliance   but  only  if  they  are  publically  awarded  and  the  recipient’s  name  published  in  the  local  newspaper,  meaning  that  practitioners may mind about   social  recognition  attached  to  their   actions.  This may mean that   respond  to  material  incentives  and  public  recognition  as  predicted  by  standard  economic  theory. Several  economic  and  psychological  studies  have however  showed  that  incentives  have  discouraging  effects  on  pro-social  behaviors  (Abolghasemi and Hossein-Divkalayi, 2010). However, the researcher allays fears that incentives will have discouraging effects on compliance   in   Uganda.

The idea that behavioral achievement depends jointly on motivation (intention) and ability (behavioral control) is not new yet it constitutes the basis for theorizing on such diverse issues as learning (Hull, 1943), level of aspiration (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944), performance on psychomotor and cognitive tasks (e.g., Pleishman, 1958; Locke, 1965; Vroom, 1964), and person perception and attribution (e.g., Heider, 1944; Anderson, 1974). Locke, Mento, & Katcher (1978) contend that the assumption is usually made that motivation and ability interact in their effects on behavioral achievement. Thus, intentions would be expected to influence compliance performance of procurement function. Interestingly, despite its intuitive plausibility, the interaction hypothesis has received only limited empirical support. Perceived behavioral control refers to people’s perception of the ease or difficulty of performing the behavior of interest. The theory of planned behavior places the construct of self-efficacy belief or perceived behavioral control within a more general framework of the relations among beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behavior. As a general rule, the more favorable the attitude and subject norm with respect to a behavior and the greater the perceived behavioral control the stronger should be an individual’s intention to perform the behavior under consideration (Ajzen, 1985).

2.5	Enforcement, deterrence and compliance 
The main assumption in the economic analysis of criminal behavior is that the individual is a rational decision-maker who considers the costs and benefits of participation in illegal activities (Ali & Abdullah, 2010). In the present context, procurement practitioners are assumed to subjectively weigh the potential gains and losses of committing a regulatory infraction. Attitudinal  change  in  most  cases  comes  as  a  result  of  education  and  awareness  of   procurement and stakeholders,  about  self-selection  and  self-exclusion (IFRC, 2001).  In  the  context  of  procurement compliance,  education  and  recruitment  are  totally  interrelated. “Education is the foundation of quality supplies and adherence to the regulations” (IFRC, 2002).  Education allays all fears and reinforces public confidence in public procurement. Successful  procurement   occurs  as  a  result  of   well-planned   education  and  awareness campaigns  that  are  firmly  rooted  in  the  culture,  attitudes  and  expectations  of  the  country’s  population (IFRC, 2002).

Recruiting  and  retaining  staff with the right attitudes is still a challenge and should   involve  continuous  education  of  the  stakeholders,  not  only  about  the  need  for compliance but  also  about  risky  behavior.  Compliance should change attitudes to ensure availability and sustainability of requirements (Tapko et al., 2006). Campaigns  can  be  boosted  by  overcoming  negative  feelings  through  planning  and  a  good  mix  of  education  and  information (IFRC, 2002). 

Michelson (2007) asserts awareness promotes compliance.  It  can  change  behavior  and attitudes  towards  procurement compliance  so  that  more  stakeholders  become  compliant   since  it  involves  information,  education  and motivation (IFRC, 2002)  especially through the media. Therefore, regular  and  sustainable  publicity  campaign  with  a  professional  approach  of  all channels  of  media  has  to  be  utilized.  Azjen (1991) emphasized  the  need  for  a  planned  program  to  create  awareness  amongst  the  general  public  so  as   to  ensure  a  regular  supply of  safe  blood  without  experiencing  shortages.  The  researcher  wonders  whether  PPDA  has  ably  utilized  social  marketing  strategies  to  ensure  compliance  or  not?

Monitoring is an essential part of procurement management and control and is linked with compliance, performance and behavior. With respect to behavior, the monitoring of Public Procurement practitioners’ behavior is expected to influence the degree of compliance due to the fear that noncompliance would lead to imposition of sanctions. The verification of behavior of the agent by the principal when the principal has sufficient information is expected that the agent will more likely behave in the best interest of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989) and therefore the need for a governance mechanism that limits the agent’s self-serving behavior in the form of monitoring is important (Jensen, 1983). The sanctioning of agents (Public Procurement practitioners) who do not comply and the reward of those who comply in terms of incentives is expected to increase the intensity or degree of compliance (Gelderman et al., 2006). Blau and Scott (1962) and Murray and Heide (1998) also argued that in addition to the incentive effect of monitoring, monitoring arrangements can also increase member compliance. 

2.6	Summary of the literature review
The  above  literature  review  showed  that  there is    a  big  challenge  in  investing  in programs  and  activities  that  promote compliance with regulations in respect to compliance with procurement regulations.  However,  no  known  research  had  been  conducted  in  connection  with  an  assessment  of  the  behavioral  factors  that  affect compliance with regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority while  focusing  on familiarity of staff with regulations, perceived behavioral control and monitoring of the procurement process in Kampala Capital City Authority,  hence  presenting  a  substantial  knowledge  gap  which  if  bridged,  can contribute to the  improvement of  compliance levels in developing countries.  

Ntayi et al.,( 2011) argues that Uganda has got many good laws but with low level regulatory compliance. Respect of laws by the general society or community is low since the chance of an offender and enforcee of being punished is negligible. Suffice to say that procurement-related corruption observed in Ugandan public office is a microcosm of the wider values of the Ugandan society (Ntayi et al., 2010). Ntayi et al. (2010, 2011a, b) have revealed that social cohesion explains noncompliant behaviour in Ugandan Public Procurement officers. This is especially true in public institutions where employees work in a team oriented corrupt environment (Ntayi et al., 2010). Such institutionalized work structures present patterned organizational social arrangements which determine the actions of the Public Procurement officers and reduce their autonomy and independence (Ntayi et al., 2011). The connection between collusive cooperation, wide spread institutionalized self-interest, competition and regulatory compliance in Uganda has not attracted empirical research.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.1	Introduction
The methodology section of a research study describes and explains methods and procedures that were followed in conducting the study (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2010). This chapter therefore provides a detailed account of the strategy and methods that were used in collecting and analyzing data. It includes the research design, study population, sample size and sample selection procedures, data collection methods and instruments reliability and validity, procedure for data collection, measurement of variables and data analysis. 

3.2	Research Design
A cross - sectional survey design was used in the study. Cross sectional designs are simple and least costly alternative to use with larger area coverage, (Sekaran, 2003). Cross sectional design also allows for a wider range of the sample to be studied at the same time and more data is covered within a short period of time, (Sekaran, 2003).  The cross sectional survey design involved triangulation (use of multiple data collection techniques simultaneously) i.e. utilizing both quantitative and qualitative approaches at the same time. Alongside the cross-sectional design, the researcher used a descriptive study design ascertain and be able to describe the characteristics of variables in the study (Sekaran, 2008, p. 121).   
Mugenda and Mugenda (2010) define quantitative approach as that approach that produces discrete numerical data while the qualitative approach produces textual and non-numerical data. They further state that the advantages of using both approaches is that they help supplement each other as each method checks on another to reduce bias. The quantitative approach was used to gather information for proper analysis and making appropriate inferences, generalizations and conclusions to the population (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2010). Qualitative approach was employed so as to capture the information on attitudes and behavior, hence supplementing information from quantitative sources (Arya and Yesh, 2001).  

3.3 	Study Population
Kombe and Tromp (2006) define population as a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement or a larger group from which the sample is taken. Therefore, the study population comprised 400 subjects, who included both procurement staff and administrative staff at the authority headquarters and those within Kampala Capital City Authority which included Kawempe, Lubaga, Makindye, Nakawa, and Kampala Central (KCCA Human Capital Management Half year Report July 2012/3).

3.4	Sample size and selection
 Sekaran (2003) consider a sample as a subset of the population that comprises of some members of the population selected to represent the population of the study.  A representative sample of 196 respondents was selected from a population of 400.  The selection of the sample size was based on the sample size selection table by Krejcie and Morgan (1970), cited in Amin, (2005).  The sample size selected included procurement staff, middle staff, service provider and top management within KCCA as indicated by Sekaran, (2000).	
Table 1; Sample size and selection
Category	Target Population	Sample Size	Sampling Technique 	
Administrative staff 	20	10	Purposive sampling 	
Service providers (contractors)	50	30	Simple random sampling	
Kawempe	60	33	Simple random sampling	
Lubaga	70	33	Simple random sampling	
Makindye	70	30	Simple random sampling	
Nakawa	70	30	Simple random sampling	
Kampala Central	60	30	Simple random sampling	
Total 	400	196		
Source: Adapted and modified from KCCA Human Capital Management Half year Report July 2012/3.

3.5	 Sampling techniques and procedure
The researcher employed simple random sampling for selecting the staffs in the various departments of KCCA within the five municipalities. This was done by choosing randomly and entirely by chance, such that each individual has the same probability of being chosen at any stage during the sampling process. 
Purposive sampling was used to select heads of department and Senior Officers who were knowledgeable on how behavioral factors affected compliance in Public Procurement in Kampala Capital City Authority and these participated as key informants. The selection of key informants was done basing upon a variety of criteria which included specialist knowledge about the effect of the behavioral factors on compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda focusing on Kampala Capital City Authority and also ability and willingness to participate in the research.

3.6:	Data Collection Methods
Primary data was collected using questionnaires, guided interviews and face to face interviews while secondary data was obtained through documentary reviews. 

3.6.1: 	Questionnaire Survey
A questionnaire is a data collection method consisting of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents (Mellenbergh, 2008). A structured questionnaire was developed and administered to the respondents to extract information on their opinions on the effect of the behavioral factors on compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda. The reason for selecting the questionnaire was because it was an appropriate method for collecting data, it offered greater assurance of anonymity, could be filled at the respondent’s convenience hence increasing chances of getting valid information and it was a cheap way of collecting data from a wide geographical area (Amin 2005). The questionnaire survey method of data collection was used to collect data from the procurement staff, middle staff, and service providers from the five municipalities of Kampala Capital City Authority.

3. 6.2:	 Interviews
An interview is one of the methods of collecting data from respondents to obtain information on the issues of interest (Sekaran, 2003).  Interviews can be unstructured or structured, and conducted either face to face or by telephone or online. Interviewing involves face to face encounters and requires maximum cooperation between the researcher and the respondent if reliable information is to be obtained. 

In-depth interviews with key informants (KIs) were conducted to generate findings that were directly used in the report. Interviewing allows key informants a wider chance to give detailed information that is not possible to obtain using questionnaires. This method was used to throw a completely different light on an issue that the interviewer has previously never considered on the kind of the effect of the behavioral factors on compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda. The researcher gathered data through interviews with key informants who mainly comprised of top management and key administrative staff of KCCA. This helped the researcher to address the questions to one key informant at a time. 

3. 6.3: 	Documentary review
It involved obtaining information by studying written documents. These included; research reports, KCCA and PPDA policy documents for example; Contract award performance reports and surveys, journals and conference papers. 

3. 7	 Data Collection Instruments
The researcher used a set of data collection instruments namely questionnaires, interview guide and documentary review checklist.

3. 7.1: 	Questionnaire
The researcher used two sets of questionnaires namely self-administered and researcher administered questionnaires as data collection instruments to respondents (refer to Appendix 1).  A self-administered questionnaire was designed on a likert scale that was used to collect data from respondents who could write and read well. This enabled to reach a sparse population (the five municipalities are spread apart). The technique was also found suitable since it was time saving to both the researcher and the respondents; it was cost effective for the researcher and helped to ensure confidentiality.

3.7.2:	Interview guide
An interview guide is a set of items that the researcher interviews about. It can have structured, semi- structured or unstructured questions (Kombo and Tromp, 2006). 
An interview guide with pre-determined set of open –ended questions was followed and used during the interview to enable cover the variables under study. The instrument was followed by the researcher to ask questions prompting responses from KIs who were mainly members of top management in KCCA (refer to Appendix 2).

3.7.3:	 Documentary review guide
To support the interview and observation methods, a documentary review checklist and interview was used to gather and collect secondary data. This involved analyzing documents mainly the organization’s procurement reports for additional information, reviewing books, articles, journal articles published with keen interest on the study variables. This also helped the researcher to document literature as well as conceptualizing the variables in the study. The instrument was used in guiding the researcher to review relevant documents in order to collect data required to answer the research questions (Punch, 2000, p.10).
3.8	 Validity and Reliability of the Research Instruments 
3.8.1:	 Validity
In order to test and improve the validity of the data collection instruments, the researcher availed the instruments to the respondents, who looked at the items and checked on language clarity, relevancy, content comprehensiveness and length of the questionnaire. 

3.8.2:	 Reliability
To ensure this, the researcher measured the internal consistency using the Cronbach alpha (Cronbach, 1951) basing on the five point likert scale items. Table 2 below shows the results the reliability results obtained.
Table 2: Reliability results
Variable 	Anchor 	Cronbach Alpha Value 	
familiarity with the regulations	5-Point	.6832	
perceived behavioral control	5-Point	.9134	
enforcement and deterrence	5-Point	.8724	
Source: Primary data
Familiarity with the Regulations: This was measured using an instrument developed by Milani (1975). The instrument has a 5-point Likert-scale. A respondent’s overall score for this variable was the average of the score for the items in the instrument. A reliability check of the instrument for the study revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.6832, which shows that the measure was reliable.

Perceived behavioral control: This was measured using an instrument developed by Milani (1975). The instrument has a 5-point Likert-scale. A respondent’s overall score for this variable was the average of the score for the items in the instrument. A reliability check of the instrument for the study revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.9134, which shows that the measure was reliable.
 
Enforcement and deterrence: this was measured by 5-point Likert-scale instrument developed by Hollenbeck et al, (1989). The scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A reliability check of the instrument for the study revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.8724 which showed that the measure was reliable and likely to yield consistent results over time.       

3.9:	Procedure for Data Collection 
Upon successful proposal defense, the researcher was issued a letter releasing her to conduct the data collection exercise. The exercise was preceded by conducting a pretest of the study instruments, after which they were edited where adjustments needed to be made. The researcher then issued the questionnaires to the respondents and where necessary, the questionnaires were researcher administered. Contacts were also made with the respondents who were meant to participate in the key informant interviews, appointments secured, after which the interviews were conducted directly by the researcher.  During the face to face interviews, the researcher also took notes. The researcher too conducted documentary review and took notes, as well as taking note of the visual occurrences under observation. In all data collection procedures, protocol was observed by obtaining and presenting permission letters to collect data both from UMI and KCCA city hall and all its 5 municipalities,  to enable access to study elements and to convince the responsible people to give the data. 

3.10:	 Data Analysis
Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of information gathered (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). Data collected from the field was sorted, coded by assigning themes to the study variables and later entered into a computer using statistical software (SPSS) to enable analysis. The data was able to answer the research questions and hypotheses. 

3.10.1: Quantitative data analysis:
The analysis of quantitative data encompasses calculations such as averages, totals as compared to totals of responses expected. The process of data analysis involved editing, examining the collected raw data to detect errors and omissions and to correct where necessary. The first editing was done in the field and scrutinizing of the completed questionnaire. It was done on a daily basis after the interviews and at times on spot. After fieldwork, central editing was also done to review and edit when all questionnaires had been completed and returned to the researcher. Corrections for wrong entries and omissions were then done. After central editing, questionnaires were then brought back to where computer data entry was done into a statistical package for social scientist (SPSS) software version 17.0.

A statistical software SPSS was used to capture data, data analysis and management. Tables were generated and these were then exported from SPSS into the word document and interpretation was done. In addition, the researcher described or summarized data using descriptive statistics. The researcher obtained measures of central tendency (mean, mode and median) as well as measures of dispersion (standard deviation). The final outputs and selected summary tables were transferred into the main report, findings presented, interpreted and conclusions deduced. In order to find out the degree, direction and strength of association between the study variables, the researcher conducted Pearson correlations. To confirm the correlation results and establish the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, the regression analysis was done. 

3.10. 2. Qualitative data analysis
The researcher organized and prepared the qualitative data for analysis by sorting and arranging the data into various themes as it was reflected in the key informant guide, while ensuring that the themes reflected the study objectives and questions. The researcher read through all the data to obtain a general understanding of the information collected, coded the responses, generated themes for analysis and interpretation of the meaning of the data. The qualitative data helped to supplement the data that had been generated quantitatively.

3.11	Measurement of Variables
To measure variables in a quantitative approach is to transform attributes of the conceptual framework of variables studied into numerical quantities. According to Amin (2005, pg 261), measurement is the process of transforming abstractly conceived concepts or variables into numerical quantities. The independent variable  behavioural factors   was measured using: familiarity with regulations; (Planning; Advertisement; Bidding; Evaluation; and delivery of goods and services); Perceived Behavioral Control (Staff incentives and motivation, behavioral intention; self-efficacy and attitude); enforcement and deterrence (Regular  compliance assessments; prospects of detection   through  audits and severity of punishment, while compliance was measured in terms of rules and regulations; procurement or disposal process, record keeping and compliance to planning and expenditure budget

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
4.1	Introduction 
This chapter presents  results and their interpretation. The presentation in shows the results as tested according to the objectives of the study. The chapter presents the  response rate of the distributed questionnaires and interviews carried out, secondly the demographic characteristics of the respondents such as age, educational level, tenure and gender, which were all presented using cross tabulations. Lastly the descriptive statistics for the variables under study, that is, the correlation and regression results are analyzed, presented and interpreted according to the objectives of the study. All statistical test results were computed at the rate of 2 – tailed level of significance in accordance with the non- directional hypothesis testing.
4.2 	Response Rate 
The study took an inquiry into knowing the response rate of the respondents in the study.
Table 3:	Response rate of distributed questionnaires 
	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Response	192	97.5	97.5	
Non-response	4	2.0	100.0	
Total	196	100.0		
Source; primary data
Ten (10) key informants were interviewed among the administrative staff of KCCA at city hall while 196 questionnaires were distributed to the members of staff of KCCA. The results in Table 3 show that out of the one hundred and ninety six (196) questionnaires distributed to the respondents, only 192 (one hundred and ninety two) questionnaires were returned. Therefore 192 respondents who had completed and returned the questionnaires together with the ten (10) key informants interviewed comprised the total number of respondents used for testing the hypothesis of the study. This gave a response rate of 97.5%, which according to Mugenda and Mugenda (2010:83) is a very good response rate. This implied that nearly all the respondents who were selected to take part in the study actually participated in the study.

4.3	Demographical Characteristics
To present demographical characteristics, cross tabulations and frequency distributions were used to indicate variations of respondents based on age, educational level, tenure and gender. The sample characteristics were presented basing on the responses from the respondents.
4.3.1	Gender and category of the respondents  
Cross tabulation was used by the researcher to present the Gender and category of the respondents. Table 4.2 below presented the results:
Table 4: Gender of the respondents  
 	Category 	Total	
	Administrative staff 	Junior staff 		
Gender	Male	Count	22	74	96	
		Row %	(22) 23%	(74) 77%	100	
		Column %	11.46%	38.54%	50%	
	Female	Count	21	75	96	
		Row %	(21) 21.39	(75) 78.61	100	
		Column %	11%	39%	50%	
Total	Count	43	149	192	
	Row %	22.4%	77.6%	100%	
	Column %	100	100	100%	
Source: Primary data
From the results in table 4above, out of the 192 respondents, (21) 21.39% were administrative staff and (75) 78.61 were junior staff, whereas, for the female respondents, (22) 23% were administrative staff and (74) 77% were junior staff for the male respondents.  From the results, there was relative representation of the gender for the respondents.

4.3.2	Age group and Category of the respondents  
Cross tabulation was used by the researcher to present the age group and category of the respondents. Table 5 below presented the results:
Table 5: Age Group and Category of the respondents  
 	Respondent Category	Total	
	Administrative staff 	Junior staff 		
Age Group	18-24 yrs	Count	 	7	7	
		Row %	 	100	100	
		Column %	 	2.63	1.84	
	25-29 yrs	Count	15	27	42	
		Row %	35.71	64.29	100	
		Column %	13.04	10.15	11.02	
	30-34 yrs	Count	23	39	62	
		Row %	37.10	62.90	100	
		Column %	20	14.66	16.27	
	34-39 yrs	Count	51	106	157	
		Row %	32.48	67.52	100	
		Column %	44.35	39.85	41.21	
	Over 40 yrs	Count	26	87	113	
		Row %	23.01	76.99	100	
		Column %	22.61	32.71	29.66	
Total	Count	58	134	192	
	Row %	30.18	69.82	100	
	Column %	100	100	100	
Source: Primary data
According to the results in table 5 above, 7 (1.84%) of the respondents belonged to the 18-24 years age group, 42 (11.02%) belonged to the 25-29 years age group, (62) 16.27% belonged to the 30-34 years age group, 157 (41.21%) belonged to the 34-39 years age group and (113) 29.66% belonged to the 40 years and above age group. Additionally, 58 (30.18%) of the respondents were Administrative staff and 134 (69.82%) were junior staff. From the findings, the majority of the respondents belonged to the 34-39 years age group. This implied that KCCA employs more of young people in the age range of 18-35 years, thus most of these respondents had recently been recruited in the new formed KCCA. 
.
4.3.3 	Working Tenure of the respondents  
Frequency tabulation was used by the researcher to present tenure and category of the respondents. Table 4.4 below presented the results:
Table 6:	Working Tenure and Category of the respondents  
Tenure	Frequency	% age	Cumulative %	
0-3yrs 	37	32.17	32.17	
3-6 yrs 	47	40.87	73.04	
6-9 yrs 	25	21.74	94.78	
Over 9 yrs 	6	5.22	100	
Total	115	100	 	
Source: Primary data
According to the results in table 6 above 37 (32.17%) of the staff had worked with the KCCA for 0-3 years, 47 (40.87%) had worked for 3-6 years, 25 (21.74%) had worked for 6-9 years and 6 (5.22%) had worked for over 9 years. From the results the majority of the respondents had worked for 3-6 years with the KCCA. The survey revealed that over 70 of the staff most especially  other KCCA staff had served KCCA  for the period not exceeding 6years thus indicating that most lower level staff lacked experience which affected the KCCA’s Public Procurement policies hence creating an effect of the behavior factors against public procurement. 
4.3.4 	Categories of respondents
Frequency tabulation was used by the researcher to present the category of the respondents. Table 7 below presented the results:
Table 7: showing category of respondents 
 Type 	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent 	
Procurement staff	37	19.2	19.2	
Middle staff from user departments	122	64.0	83.2	
Service providers	33	16.8	100.0	
Total 	192	100		
Source: Primary data
The study considered three categories of respondents which included procurement staff from all the five divisions 37 (19.2%), middles staff from user departments 122 (64.0%) who were selected from departments of administration, audit, human resource, valuation and physical planning, legal affairs, treasury, education and social services department among others. Also, 33 (16.8%) of the respondents were selected from service providers who included mainly the contractors. This was aimed at getting compressive information related to compliance with procurement rules and regulations. 
4.3.5 	Education levels of the respondents * working period of the respondents
Cross tabulation was used by the researcher to present the education levels of the respondents and their working period. Results are presented in Table 8.
Table 8 : Cross tabulation of Education levels of the respondents * working period of the respondents 
	working period of the respondents	Total	
	Less than one year	2 - 3 Years	3 - 5 Years		
education levels of the respondents 	Certificate	Count	16	13	17	46	
		% of Total	8.3%	6.8%	8.9%	24.0%	
	diploma	Count	4	12	1	17	
		% of Total	2.1%	6.2%	.5%	8.9%	
	Degree	Count	13	68	25	106	
		% of Total	6.8%	35.4%	13.0%	55.2%	
	Others specify	Count	9	8	6	23	
		% of Total	4.7%	4.2%	3.1%	12.0%	
Total	Count	42	101	49	192	
	% of Total	21.9%	52.6%	25.5%	100.0%	
Source: Primary data

According to the results in table 8 above, 16 (8.3%) of the respondents had certificate,4(2.1%) had  diploma, 13 (6.8%) had degree and other categories not mentioned were 9 (4.7%) ; they had worked for the period of less than one year;   from those between 2- 3 years were 13 (6.8%) had certificate, 12 (6.2%) had diploma, 68 (35.4%) had degree and 8 (4.2%) were in other categories not mentioned; 17 (8.9%) of the respondents had certificate, 1 (.5%) had  diploma, 25 (13.0%) had degree and other categories not mentioned were 6 (3.1%) ; they had worked for the period  between 3 - 5 years. From the findings, the majority of the respondents were degree holders. On the other hand, the majority of the respondents had worked for the period between 2 - 3 years in KCCA. This implied that majority of the staff are newly recruited with KCCA or suppliers have also worked with KCCA for a less than three years since its inception. 

4.4	 The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
Regarding the effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement, the respondents were asked to provide their views on this objective and below were the results obtained from the survey. The respondents were asked to indicate their attitude, views and perceptions on their familiarity with regulations, using a total of eight (8) items. The results in Table 9 were generated using a scale which was coded such that the views from the respondents would reflect their level of agreement or disagreement (SA = strongly agree, A = agree, NS = not sure, D disagree SD = strongly disagree), ranging from (5, 4, 3, 2 and 1) respectively. A mean close to 1 or 2 shows disagreement, while one close to 4 or 5 shows agreement. Means values close to 3 reflect uncertainty with the issue at hand, while those close to 4 or 5 indicate agreement. The smaller values for standard deviation were also a reflection of responses were majority of the respondents were more inclined to agreement and the reverse was also true. 

Table 9: Respondents’ attitude on the effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in Public Procurement (N=192)
The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement	Responses in percentages (%)	
	SD	D	NS	A	SA	Mean	SD	
Familiarity with procurement rules and regulation is a basic requirement for the work function at KCCA	1.4 %
(3)	8.2%
(16)	5.5%
(11)	57.5%
(110)	27.4%
(52)	3.71	1.60	
Procurement officers and committee members make informed decisions regarding procurement operations, rules, and regulations	2.7%
(5)	2.7%
 (5)	9.6%
(19)	76.7%
(147)	8.2%
(16)	4.29	0.89	
Staff have basic knowledge about the objectives of the established procurement rules as stipulated by the PPDA regulations	1.4%
(3)	9.6%
(19)	11%
(21)	69.9%
(134)	8.2%
(16)	3.05	0.59	
Applicable procurement rules are clearly stated and easily understood	2.7%
(5)	8.2%
(16)	16.4%
(31)	60.3%
(116)	12.3%
(24)	2.44	1.21	
The procurement knowledge base of other players (suppliers, other buyers etc) of the PPDA regulations has an impact on compliance	0	4.1%
(8)	13.7%
(26)	69.9%
(134)	12.3%
(24)	3.50	1.60	
Only those familiar with procurement rules in this office are allowed to carry out procurement tasks	1.4%
(3)	2.7%
(5)	5.5%
(11)	68.5%
(132)	21.9%
(41)	3.86	0.64	
Procurement work functions at KCCA is done only by practitioners with academic or professional qualifications	5.5%
(11)	12.3%
(24)	13.7%
(26)	57.5%
(110)	11%
(21)	3.07	0.86	
Training programs are frequently organized for the staff of KCCA to increase knowledge on procurement related rules and regulations	6.8%
(13)	4.1%
(8)	17.8%
(34)	53.4%
(103)	17.8%
(34)	3.86	0.64	
Key: Strong Agree (SD), Agree (A), Not sure (NS), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD)	    5		         4			3		2		1
Source: Primary data
Results in Table 9 represent the respondents’ attitude on the effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in Public Procurement in Uganda.  The study used 8 questionnaire items based on a five point Likert scale to measure this variable. When the respondents were asked to give their attitudes whether familiarity with procurement rules and regulation is a basic requirement for the work function in this KCCA, out of the 192 respondents who answered the questionnaire; 52 (27.4%) strongly agreed, 110 (57.5%) agreed, 11 (5.5%) were not sure, (16) 8.2% disagreed and 3 (1.4%) strongly disagreed. This indicated that familiarity with procurement rules and regulation is a basic requirement for the work function in KCCA since the majority, 163 (84.9%) agreed to this. 

On whether procurement officers and committee members make informed decisions regarding procurement operations, rules, and regulations; 16 (8.2%) strongly agreed, 147 (76.7%) agreed, 19 (9.6%) were not sure, 5 (2.7) disagreed and 5 (2.7) strongly disagreed, which showed that the procurement officers and committee members make informed decisions regarding procurement operations, rules, and regulations. This implied that overall, the procurement officers and committee members make informed decisions regarding procurement operations, rules, and regulations since the majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Asked whether Staff have basic knowledge about the objectives of the established procurement rules as stipulated by the PPDA regulations; 16 (8.2%) strongly agreed, 134 (69.9%) agreed, 21(11%) were not sure, 19 (9.6%) disagreed and 3 (1.4%) strongly disagreed. This implied that generally, staff at KCCA have basic knowledge about the objectives of the established procurement rules as stipulated by the PPDA regulations since 78.1% agreed to this.  On whether the Applicable procurement rules are clearly stated and easily understood; 24 (12.3%) strongly agreed, 116 (60.3%) agreed, 31 (16.4%) were not sure, 16 (8.2%) disagreed, and 5 (2.7%) strongly disagreed. This implied that applicable procurement rules are clearly stated and easily understood by the majority of the staff. 

On the issue of whether the procurement knowledge base of other players (suppliers, other buyers etc.) of the PPDA regulations has an impact on compliance; (24) 12.3% strongly agreed, 134 (69.9%) agreed, 26 (13.7%) were not sure and 8 (4.1%) disagreed. This meant that the procurement knowledge base of other players (suppliers, other buyers etc.) of the PPDA regulations has an impact on compliance. On the question of whether Only those familiar with procurement rules in this office are allowed to carry out procurement tasks; 21.9% strongly agreed, 68.5% agreed, 11 (5.5%) were not sure, 5 (2.7%) disagreed, and 3 (1.4%) strongly disagreed. This revealed that only those familiar with procurement rules in this office are allowed to carry out procurement tasks since 90.4% agreed to this.  

On whether Procurement work functions in KCCA is done only by practitioners with academic or professional qualifications; 110 (57.5%) strongly agreed, 21 (11%) agreed, 26 (13.7%) were not sure, 11 (5.5%) disagreed and 24 (12.3%) strongly disagreed. This serves to explain that Procurement work functions in KCCA are done only by practitioners with academic or professional qualifications. 

On this issue of whether the training programs are frequently organized for the staff of KCCA to increase knowledge on procurement related rules and regulations; 17.8% (34) strongly agreed, 53.4% (103) agreed, 17.8% (34) were not sure, 4.1% (8) disagreed and 6.8% (13) strongly disagreed. This showed that KCCA took the trouble to conduct regular training for the staff, in order to increase their knowledge and familiarity on procurement related rules and regulations since 78.8% agreed to this. Consequently, when staff are knowledgeable and have transformed attitudes through regular training, this can result into more compliance with the procurement regulations. 
The quantitative results were further supplemented by the findings from the key informants who further affirmed that the procurement exercise follows steps according to the PPDA of 2003.

One of the respondents shared;
“……….These steps must be observed in order to ensure that all the stakeholders involved in the procurement exercise obtain fair treatment. At KCCA, the steps we follow include; planning for the required procurement over a given period, identifying the source of the items, highlighting specifications/initiation of procurement, determination of procurement procedure, Sourcing (soliciting) offers, evaluation of offers, post qualification, commencement of contract, contract performance (delivery) and management, record keeping and accountability, payment and post contract performance, as stipulated in the PPDA Act, 2003” 

In response to the challenges related with compliance to regulations in procurement, one respondent shared: 
“Many corporate board members in Africa, especially of state-owned companies, have limited understanding of their roles, and are usually open to manipulation by management, chairmen, or principal shareholders. Some are outright incompetent. Non-executive directors in Africa need to play any meaningful role in the ensuring compliance. However many simply act as rubber stamps for decisions taken outside the board. In this perspective, compliance arises from a dynamic equilibrium between the various powers of the state and understanding what their roles are”.
This meant that quite often, the reasons for noncompliance to regulations in procurement is also attributed to external pressures from other players who make the procurement professionals in organisations act more as rubber stamps.
The above findings are supported by the findings from key informants whereby one of the auditors from KCCA has this to say;“….Familiarity with the rules by the contractors gives incentives to comply with procurement with KCCA. This is achieved through educating and training them which in turn increases the compliance with the directives”
Therefore, this further indicated that familiarity with procurement regulations significantly improves compliance with procurement regulations.
4.3.2	Correlations
To further explain the descriptive statistics results and establish whether a relationship existed between familiarity with procurement regulations and compliance, to test the strength and direction of that relationship, Pearson correlation results were computed, as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10:	The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
Correlations	
		Familiarity with the regulations	Compliance 	
Familiarity with the regulations	Pearson Correlation	1	.441**	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	
	N	192	192	
Compliance	Pearson Correlation	.441**	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		
	N	192		
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The results in the Table 10 above reveal that familiarity with the regulations had a positive and significant correlation with compliance in Public Procurement (r = 0.441** P< 0.01). This means that the two variables are positively related, implying that any positive change in familiarity with the regulations by way of training the staff, sensitisation and the like, there is a likelihood that this will result into change in compliance. This supports the hypothesis that there is a positive and significant relationship between familiarity with PPDA regulations and compliance in Kampala Capital City Authority. This also implied that familiarity with procurement regulations is a significant predictor of compliance with procurement regulations and therefore, with more familiarity with the regulations by the procurement personnel, more compliance will be registered
4.3.3	Regression Analysis 
A linear regression model was used to determine the proportion that the independent variable, familiarity with the regulations accounts for the compliance with procurement regulations. The results are summarized in tables below as shown.  
Table 11: The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
ANOVAb	
Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	
1	Regression	8.165	1	8.165	193.604	.000a	
	Residual	8.182	195	4.217E-02			
	Total	16.347	196				
a. Predictors: (Constant), familiarity with the regulations	
b. Dependent Variable: Compliance with procurement regulations	

The independent variable, familiarity with the regulations, was statically significant in affecting compliance with procurement regulations, Sig. (.000<0.01) as shown in table 11 above. This implies that there is a meaningful positive relationship between the independent variable familiarity with the regulations and the dependent variable compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA. 
Table 12: Causal relationship between familiarity with the regulations and compliance in public procurement
Coefficientsa	
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.455	.048		9.451	.000	
	Familiarity	.445	.039	.441	13.914	.000	
a. Dependent Variable: Compliance				

The regressions results from the table 12 above show that a unit of change in familiarity with the regulations brings about .441 or 44% change in compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA. Hence, H1 which states that familiarity with the regulations positively affect compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA is supported and accepted.
4.4	The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with PPDA Regulations 
The results in the table 4.11 below were generated using a scale which was coded such that one represents (SA = strongly agree, A = agree, NS = not sure, D = disagree SD = strongly disagree), ranging from (5, 4, 3, 2 and 1) respectively. 

Table 13: Respondents’ attitude on the effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with PPDA Regulations 
	Responses in percentages (%)	
	SD	D	NS	A	SA	
Tender Evaluation is conducted by competent persons	1.4 % (3)	8.2%
(16)	5.5%
(11)	57.5%
(110)	27.4%
(52)	
Penalties stipulated in the procurement law lead to fear of the violation of the procurement laws and regulations	2.7%
(5)	2.7%
(5)	9.6%
(19)	76.7%
(147)	8.2%
(16)	
KCCA staff uphold code of ethics in procurement process	1.4%
(3)	9.6%
(19)	11%
(21)	69.9%
(134)	8.2%
(16)	
Economic incentives and other fringe benefits motivate staff to be committed to their job	5.5%
(11)	5.5%
(11)	16.4%
(31)	52.1%
(100)	20.5%
(39)	
Workers at KCCA are usually sanctioned for not complying with procurement regulations	2.7%
(5)	8.2%
(16)	16.4%
(31)	60.3%
(116)	12.3%
(24)	
Procurement staff are qualified and experienced to handle Procurement process.	0	4.1%
(8)	13.7%
(26)	69.9%
(134)	12.3%
(24)	
Practitioners weigh the benefits against the negative outcomes of not complying with the procurement regulations	1.4%
(3)	2.7%
(5)	5.5%
(11)	68.5%
(132)	21.9%
(41)	
Sanctions are usually effected immediately after the violation of the regulations are detected	5.5%
(11)	12.3%
(24)	13.7%
(26)	57.5%
(110)	11%
(21)	
The stipulated sanctions are well known by employees	6.8%
(13)	4.1%
(8)	17.8%
(34)	53.4%
(103)	17.8%
(34)	
Key: Strong Agree (SD), Agree (A), Not sure (NS), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD)
	    5		         4			3		2		1
Source: Primary data
In regard to the respondents’ attitude on the effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with PPDA Regulations in KCCA, responses were as shown in the Table 13 above. Respondents’ views on perceived behavioural control were tested using nine (9) questionnaire items based on a five point Likert scale. When the respondents were asked to give their opinion on whether tender evaluation is conducted by competent persons, out of the 192 respondents who answered the questionnaire; 52 (27.4%) strongly agreed, 110 (57.5%) agreed, 11 (5.5%) were not sure, 16 (8.2%) disagreed and (3)1.4% strongly disagreed. This indicated that the tender evaluation is conducted by competent persons since the majority, 84.9% agreed to this. 

On whether the penalties stipulated in the procurement law lead to fear of the violation of the procurement laws and regulations; (16) 8.2% strongly agreed, 147 (76.7%) agreed, 19 (9.6%) were not sure, 5 (2.7%) disagreed and 5 (2.7%) strongly disagreed, which showed that a good number of respondents agreed.  Asked whether the KCCA staff uphold the code of ethics in procurement processes; (16) 8.2% strongly agreed, (134) 69.9% agreed, (21) 11% were not sure, (19) 9.6% disagreed and (3) 1.4% strongly disagreed. This implied that the KCCA staffs uphold code of ethics in procurement process since 78.1% agreed to this. 

On whether the economic incentives and other fringe benefits motivate staff to be committed to their job; (39) 20.5% strongly agreed, (100) 52.1% agreed, (31) 16.4% were not sure, 5.5% (11) disagreed and 5.5% (11) strongly disagreed, which showed that a good number of respondents agreed that the economic incentives and other fringe benefits motivate staff to be committed to their job.  On whether workers in KCCA are usually sanctioned by management for not complying with procurement regulations; (24) 12.3% strongly agreed, (116) 60.3% agreed, (31) 16.4% were not sure, (16) 8.2% disagreed, and (5) 2.7% strongly disagreed. This implies that workers in KCCA are usually sanctioned for not complying with procurement regulations. It was noted that in cases where KCCA flouts the procurement regulations, the responsible personnel are summoned by management and there are also cases where they have been called to explain such scenarios before the Public Accounts Committee of parliament.  

On whether the procurement staff are qualified and experienced to handle Procurement process; 12.3% (24) strongly agreed, 69.9% (134) agreed, 13.7% (26) were not sure, and lastly 4.1% (8) disagreed, which showed that a good number of respondents agreed.  Asked whether the Practitioners weigh the benefits against the negative outcomes of not complying with the procurement regulations; 21.9% (41) strongly agreed, 68.5% (132) agreed, 5.5% (11) were not sure, 2.7% (5) disagreed and 1.4% (3) strongly disagreed. This implied that the Practitioners weigh the benefits against the negative outcomes of not complying with the procurement regulations since 78.1% agreed to this. 

Lastly on whether sanctions are usually effected immediately after the violation of the regulations are detected; 11% (21) strongly agreed, 57.5% (110) agreed, 13.7% (26) were not sure, 12.3% (24) disagreed and 5.5% (11) strongly disagreed, which showed that a good number of respondents agreed that sanctions are usually effected immediately after the violation of the regulations are detected.  On whether the stipulated sanctions are well known by employees; 17.8% (34) strongly agreed, 53.4% (103) agreed, 17.8% (34) were not sure, 4.1% (8) disagreed, and 6.8% (13) strongly disagreed. This implies that the stipulated sanctions are well known by employees. 

Views were sought from the key informants to further explain matters related to perceived behavioral control in respect to compliance with procurement regulations. The above results are in line with those of the key informants were it was revealed that some of the behavioral factors affect compliance positively. One of the senior KCCA staff pointed out professionalism as one of the major variable that positively influence compliance or lack of professionalisms can also affect compliance negatively. He pointed out that there is professionalism among the staff of KCCA and this explains why there is compliance with PDDA regulation but he was quickly to add that generally there is lack of professionalism in Uganda and it is high amongst Public Procurement officers in Uganda or in some areas it is nonexistent. 

4.4.2	Correlations
These findings were further analyzed using Pearson correlation Analysis in order to establish the strength and direction of the relationship between the variables in the study. Regression Analysis was used to examine the variance in compliance (dependent variable) that is explained by perceived behavioral control (independent variables). 
 
Table 14: The effect of Behavioral factors on compliance with PDDA regulations
Correlations	
		Compliance 	Behavioral factors 	
Compliance 	Pearson Correlation	1	.139 	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.027	
	N	192	192	
Behavioral  factors 	Pearson Correlation	.139 	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.027		
	N	192	192	
Source: Primary data
The study revealed that the relationship between behavioral factors and compliance with procurement regulations was positive but not significant (p0.027>0.01, r = 0.139). This implies that behavioral factors are not significant predictors of compliance with procurement regulations as regards to KCCA.
4.4.3	Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was used to determine the extent to which behavioral factors predict compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA. The results obtained are shown by table 15, 16 & 17 below:
Table 15: Significance of behavioral factors to compliance
ANOVAb	
Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	
1	Regression	8.165	1	8.165	1.198	.027a	
	Residual	8.182	195	4.217E-02			
	Total	16.347	196				
a. Predictors: (Constant), Behavioral factors	
b. Dependent Variable: Compliance with procurement regulations	

From the Table 15 the independent variable, behavioral factors, was not statistically significant in explaining compliance (Sig=0.027, p>0.05, F=1.198), as shown in table above. This implies that when management under takes efforts to improve behavioral factors, compliance reduces as indicated by the negative standardized beta values in Table 16 
Table 16: Causal relationship between behavioral factors and compliance 
Coefficientsa	
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.190	.211		9.451	.000	
	Familiarity	.252	.112	.441	13.914	.000	
a. Dependent Variable: Compliance				
The regressions results from the Table 16 above shows that a unit changes in behavioral factors, account for 1.9% variation in compliance with procurement regulations. This implies that behavioral factors are not significant predictors of compliance with procurement regulations while on the other hand it also implies that focus on improving compliance should not be put on minimizing the effect of behavioral factors.
Table 17: Model summary of behavioral factors and compliance
Model Summary	
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	
1	. 019a	.019	.003	.48413	
Predictors: (Constant), Behavioral factors 
	
Source; primary data

From the above tables Table15, 16 and 17; it can be concluded that the findings did not support the H2 that states that behavioral factors affect compliance levels.

4.5	The Effect of enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process on the compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority
The researcher wanted to know whether enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process have an effect on compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority. The findings are summarized in the Table 18 below. The results in the table below were generated using a scale which was coded such that one represents (SA = strongly agree, A = agree, NS = not sure, D disagree SD = strongly disagree), ranging from (5, 4, 3, 2 and 1) respectively. A mean close to 1 or 2 shows Disagreement, while one close to 4 or 5 shows Agreement. Means close to 3 reflect uncertainty with the issue at hand.

Table 18: The Effect of enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process on the compliance with PPDA regulations (N=192)
The Effect of enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process on the compliance with PPDA regulations 	Responses in percentages (%)			
	SD	D	NS	A	SA	Mean	SD	
We are frequently asked to report our procurement performance	1.4 % (3)	8.2%
(16)	5.5%
(11)	57.5%
(110)	27.4%
(52)	4.29	1.62	
There is effective monitoring and auditing of procurement activities by oversight bodies	2.7%
(5)	2.7%
(5)	9.6%
(19)	76.7%
(147)	8.2%
(16)	3.71	1.60	
We provide extensive information regarding our procurement practice to our supervisors	1.4%
(3)	9.6%
(19)	11%
(21)	69.9%
(134)	8.2%
(16)	4.39	0.89	
Workers in KCCA are usually sanctioned for not complying with procurements laws and regulations	5.5%
(11)	5.5%
(11)	16.4%
(31)	52.1%
(100)	20.5%
(39)	2.44	1.21	
We are frequently inspected to see if we adhere to the established PPDA regulations	2.7%
(5)	8.2%
(16)	16.4%
(31)	60.3%
(116)	12.3%
(24)	3.17	1.17	
Performance reports are verified through physical checkups.	0	4.1%
(8)	13.7%
(26)	69.9%
(134)	12.3%
(24)	3.50	1.60	
Penalties stipulated in the PPDA lead to fear of violation of procurements laws and regulations	1.4%
(3)	2.7%
(5)	5.5%
(11)	68.5%
(132)	21.9%
(41)	3.86	0.64	
Practitioners weigh the benefits against the negative outcomes of not complying with the procurements laws and regulations.	5.5%
(11)	12.3%
(24)	13.7%
(26)	57.5%
(110)	11%
(21)	3.07	0.86	
Key: Strong Agree (SD), Agree (A), Not sure (NS), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD)
	    5		         4			3		2		1
Source: Primary data

The results in the Table 18 present the respondents’ attitudes on the effect of enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process on the compliance with PPDA regulations in KCCA. The respondents were asked whether they are frequently asked to report their procurement performance and to this, most of them strongly agreed at a (Mean = 4.29). In response to whether there is effective monitoring and auditing of procurement activities by oversight bodies, the observed mean value was (Mean = 3.71); while a mean value of 4.39 was noted in response to whether KCCA staff provided extensive information regarding procurement practice to the supervisors.  However, majority of the respondents disagreed that workers in KCCA are usually sanctioned for not complying with procurements laws and regulations at a (Mean = 2.44). On the contrary the majority of the respondents indicated agreement to the statement “we are frequently inspected to see if we adhere to the established PPDA regulations”, with  (Mean = 3.17). Further, most respondents agreed that performance reports are verified through physical checkups at a (Mean = 3.50) and that penalties stipulated in the PPDA lead to fear of violation of procurements laws and regulations at a (Mean = 3.86). Lastly there was uncertainty by the respondents on whether Practitioners weigh the benefits against the negative outcomes of not complying with the procurements laws and regulations at a (Mean = 3.07). This implied that enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process is hampered by the fact that procurement officers in Uganda do not have a high level of work autonomy and control over their pay. Many times, such a situation puts them in compromising positions, thereby affecting their professionalism. Fourthly, basing on the fact that the procurement profession is still relatively new, procurement officers were not appointed to high levels that are recognized in the organizational structure in Government Structure. It is a recent development that the position of Principal Procurement Officer (PPO) was created and procurement professionals appointed to the positions of Commissioner due to increased recognition of the procurement function and its contribution. 

The above results are in line with those of the key informants. Notably, one key informant revealed that;
….procurement is a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intense preparation including instruction in skills and methods, maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and committing its members to continued study and to a kind of work to which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service” 
4.5.2	Correlations
These findings were further analyzed using Pearson correlation Analysis in order to establish the strength and direction of the relationship between the variables in the study. Regression Analysis was used to examine the variance in compliance (dependent variable) that is explained by enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process (independent variables). 
Table 19: The effect of enforcement & deterrence, and compliance with PDDA regulations 
		Enforcement and deterrence 	Compliance	
Enforcement and deterrence	Pearson Correlation	1	.618** 	
	N	192	192	
Compliance	Pearson Correlation	.618** 	1	
	N	192	192	
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
From the Table 19 above, the findings revealed positive and significant relationship between enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process and compliance with procurement regulations (p<0.01, r = 0.618**). When the correlation value was squared in order to establish the effect of the independent variable dimension to the dependent variable, the results revealed that 0.38 or 38% was the percentage effect of enforcement and deterrent on compliance. This implied that lack of enforcement & deterrence could lead to another cause of noncompliance since there will be lack of professionalism. On the other hand, where there is enforcement and deterrent practices, compliance can be realized, for fear of the negative repercussions.  The PPDA Audit Report (2008) revealed that lack of professionalism was high amongst Public Procurement officers in Uganda and this can still be attributed to the fact that the profession is still young in Uganda. 
4.5.3	Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was used to determine the extent to which enforcement & deterrence predict compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA. The results obtained are shown by Tables 20 and 21;
Table 20: Model summary between enforcement & deterrence, and compliance with PDDA regulations
Model Summary	
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	
1	.618a	.380	.610	.48254	
a. Predictors: (Constant), Enforcement and deterrence	

Table 21: Causal relationship between enforcement & deterrence, and compliance 	
Coefficientsa	
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	1.268	.252		5.026	.000	
	Enforcement and deterrence	.354	.149	.618	2.369	.020	
a. Dependent Variable: Compliance 					

From the regression Table 20 and 21 above, the findings further revealed that there is a significant positive relationship between enforcement, deterrence, and compliance with PDDA regulations.  The standardized coefficient of 0.618 or 61.8% shows that 61.8% of the successfulness of compliance with the procurement regulations can be explained by the enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process by KCCA.  Therefore, the null hypothesis which stated that “enforcement, deterrence in Public Procurement improves compliance levels was accepted and alternative hypothesis accepted.

4.6:	Dependent Variable (Compliance with procurement rules and regulations)
The purpose of the study was to analyze the behavior factors affecting compliance behavior in Public Procurements in Uganda taking a case of Kampala Capital City Authority. In order to achieve this purpose of the study, respondents were asked whether they agree with the variables that constitute compliance and the various roles played by different stakeholders. 
Table 22: The minimum and maximum range and mean results of respondents rating on Compliance with procurement rules and regulations in KCCA
Compliance with procurement rules and regulations	Min.	Max.	Mean	
Procurement planning and needs assessment is usually undertaken by KCCA	1.00	5.00	4.52	
Procurement product design and document preparation is usually done by KCCA in line with compliance	1.00	5.00	4.44	
Tender process (including advertising, invitation to bid, prequalification, bid evaluation, post qualification) is usually followed by KCCA	1.00	5.00	3.56	
Bid specifications are tailored to compliance requirements	1.00	5.00	4.61	
Bids are opened in public to ensure compliance	1.00	5.00	3.60	
There are no delays between deadline for submission and opening of bids  	1.00	5.00	2.08	
There is transparent process for handling complaints	1.00	5.00	2.73	
Contract award and implementation is usually known by all parties	1.00	5.00	3.67	
Contract specifications are usually upheld after contract award	1.00	5.00	3.57	
Final accounting and audit is usually undertaken to ensure compliance	1.00	5.00	3.01	
Procurement audit reports are published in time	1.00	5.00	2.34	
There is transparency and access to information at every stage of procurement process to ensure compliance	1.00	5.00	3.77	
Source; primary data
In regard to the dependent Variable (Compliance with procurement rules and regulations), responses were as shown in Table 22 above. The results revealed that in KCCA, the respondents agreed that procurement product design and document preparation is usually done by KCCA in line with compliance at a (Mean 4.44); Tender process (including advertising, invitation to bid; prequalification, bid evaluation, post qualification) is usually followed by KCCA at a (Mean 3.56); Bids are opened in public to ensure compliance at a (Mean 3.60). However, they disagreed that there are no delays between deadline for submission and opening of bids at a (Mean 2.08); There is transparent process for handling complaints at a (Mean 2.73); Procurement audit reports are published in time at a (Mean 2.34);  while on the other hand the respondents were uncertain as to whether Final accounting and audit is usually undertaken to ensure compliance at a (Mean 3.01) respectively. 

The respondents agreed as regards to whether Contract award and implementation is usually known by all parties at a (Mean 3.67); Contract specifications are usually upheld after contract award at a (Mean 3.57); Bid specifications are tailored to compliance requirements at a (Mean 4.61); Procurement planning and needs assessment is usually undertaken by KCCA at a (Mean 4.52) and lastly that there is transparency and access to information at every stage of procurement process to ensure compliance at a (Mean 3.77), respectively. This implies that by combining on-the-job training with classroom instruction, Apprenticeship provides an employer with fully-trained employees since it creates better skilled workers for the company by providing skill training and job-related theory to meet the company’s needs. 

It was further revealed by the key informants that Compliance levels within KCCA continue to be low despite efforts by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDAA) to put in place measures to improve compliance (PPDA Capacity Building Strategy Report, 2011-2014). However procurement audits carried out in PDEs reveal non – compliance with procurement regulations. As one of the respondents had to say that;
Audits carried out in KCCA by the PPDA in the financial years 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 revealed that the levels of non – compliance with the regulations was very high and procurement regulations were being flaunted (PPDA Audit Reports, 2006/2007; 2007/2008).
It was further revealed by the PPDA Capacity Building Strategy Report (2011-2014) that states that the overall performance under the compliance areas where both Central Government (CG) and Local Government (LG) Procurement and Disposal Entities (PDEs) scored lowest were record keeping and contract award and contract management. The report further revealed mixed performance as follows: there were significant variances between the actual and indicative time frames in the processing of procurements from the stage of approval of procurement to the award and signing of contracts. 

The variance in days was higher with the more competitive method of open bidding of negative 26 days as opposed to the less competitive methods of request for quotations/proposals of 6 days; the variances in the time with regard to the contractual payment period revealed that 29.5% of the procurements had a time variance against the contractual payment period as compared to 21.8% of the procurements that did not have a time variance and 48.7% of the procurements where the procurement files lacked the actual information on contract payments. This position is supported by the finding that only 43.3% of the procurement cases were reported to have had copies of all contract documents.
4.7	The effect of behavioral factors on  compliance behavior in Public Procurements in Uganda in Kampala Capital City Authority
To test the effect of behavioral factors on compliance behavior in Public Procurements in Uganda focusing on Kampala Capital City Authority, each of the independent variables (familiarity with PPDA regulations, perceived behavioral control and enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process) was individually computed into a single variable with the dependent variable (compliance behavior) using SPSS by calculating their combined new variables namely:
a)	Familiarity with PPDA regulations 
b)	Perceived behavioral control 
c)	Enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process 
These variables were correlated with dependent variable, compliance behavior. The correlation results are presented in Tables 23 and 24 below.
Table 23: correlation between Familiarity, Behavioral Control and Enforcement and Deterrence on Compliance Behavior
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Behavioral Control	1.000 				
Familiarity	-.013 	1.000 			
Enforcement and Deterrence	.192 	.717** 	1.000 		
Compliance Behavior	.139 	.566**	.482**	1.000 	
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Findings revealed positive and significant results between familiarity with procurement regulations and compliance (p<0.01, r = 0.566) and Enforcement and Deterrence and compliance with procurement regulations (p<0.01, r = 0.482). The relationship between Behavioral Control and compliance with procurement regulations was positive but not significant (p<0.01, r = 0.139). 
Regression Analysis 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to address the effect of the all independent variables (familiarity with PPDA regulations, perceived behavioral control and enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process) of the study and compliance with procurement regulations in Kampala capital city authority and the results below were obtained:
Table 24: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.514	.310		1.658	.099	
	familiarity with PPDA regulations	.581	.068	.443	8.514	.000	
	perceived behavioral control	-0.003 
	0.217 	-0.003 	6.815	.217	
	enforcement and deterrence	.250
	.043	.303	5.815	.207	
a. Dependent Variable: compliance with procurement regulations	
R	.630	
R Square	.397	
Adjusted R Square 	.392	
F Statistic 	87.430	
Sig. F Statistic 	.000	
Source: Primary Data
Results from Table 24 above indicate that familiarity with PPDA regulations and enforcement and deterrence explain 39.7% of the variance in the compliance with procurement regulations in Kampala capital city authority (Adjusted R Square = .392). Results further indicate that familiarity with PPDA regulations (Beta = .443, sig. < .01) are a better predictor of compliance with procurement regulations in Kampala capital city authority than the perceived behavioral control (Beta = .303, sig. < .01). The regression model was significant at the 99% confidence level. Lastly perceived behavioral control (Sig=0.217, p>0.05) and enforcement and deterrence (Sig=0.207, p>0.05) are not significant predictors of compliance at the 0.05 level. The only significant predictor is familiarity with procurement regulations (Sig=0.000, p<0.05). When behavioral control and enforcement and deterrence improve, compliance reduces as indicated by the negative standardized beta values. The variable with the positive and highest beta is familiarity with procurement regulations.

4.8	Hypotheses Testing Using Statistical Techniques
Table 25: summary of results of tested hypotheses 
Hypothesis	Results 	Results	
H1 familiarity with PPDA regulations significantly affects compliance bahaviour in public procurement	r = 0.579
p = 0.000 (p < 0.01)	
Accepted 	
H2 Perceived behavioral control is significant in affecting compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority	
r = 0.139
p = 0.000(p < 0.01)	

Rejected 	
H3 Enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process  affect compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority	
r = 0.485
p = 0.013(p < 0.05)	

Accepted	
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
H1:	familiarity with PPDA regulations significantly affects compliance bahaviour in Public Procurement 
From the hypotheses testing, it shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between familiarity with PPDA regulations and compliance bahaviour in Public Procurement in Kampala Capital City Authority. The value of 0.579 indicates that familiarity with PPDA regulations is positively correlated to compliance bahaviour in Public Procurement in Kampala Capital City Authority and its p-value is 0.000 (p< 0.01). Hence, H1 is supported.
H2: Perceived behavioral control is significant in affecting compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority 
From the hypotheses testing, it shows that the relationship between Perceived behavioral control and compliance with procurement regulations was positive but not significant. The value of 0.139 indicates that Perceived behavioral control was positive but not significant to compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority and its p-value is 0.00 (p<0.01,). Hence, H2 is rejected.
H3: Enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process affect compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority
From the hypotheses testing, it shows that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between independent variable Enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process and compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority. The value of 0.485 indicate that enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process is positively correlated to compliance with PPDA regulations in Kampala Capital City Authority and its p-value is 0.013 (p<0.05). Hence, H3 is supported.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1	 Introduction
This chapter presents the summary of the study, discussions of the findings, conclusions and recommendations made. It also presents proposed areas for further research. The discussions, conclusions, and recommendations are presented according to the objectives of the study. 
5.2	Summary of findings 
5.2.1	The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
It was found out that familiarity with the regulations had a positive correlation with compliance in Public Procurement (r = 0.441** P< 0.01). This meant that the two variables were positively related at a rate of 44.1% and therefore, with any enhancement in familiarity with the regulations, there was likely to be a related effect in compliance.  This supported the hypothesis that there was a positive and significant relationship between familiarity with PPDA regulations and compliance in Kampala Capital City Authority. A unit change in familiarity with the regulations by KCCA could bring about .455 or 45.5% changes in compliance in public procurement. The study revealed that that familiarity with procurement regulations is a significant predictor of compliance with procurement regulations. The implication is that the more procurement personnel are familiar with the regulations, the more compliant they will be.

5.2.2 	The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
The study findings revealed that there was a positive but not significant relationship between behavioral factors and compliance with procurement regulations at (p<0.01, r = 0.139). This implied that behavioral factors are not significant predictors of compliance with procurement regulations as regards to KCCA. This implied that the independent variable, behavioral factors, was not statistically significant in explaining compliance (Sig=0.278, p>0.05, F=1.198) while on the other hand a unit changes in behavioral factors, accounted for 1.9% variation in compliance with procurement regulations. This implied that behavioral factors were not significant predictors of compliance with procurement regulations while on the other hand it also implied that focus on improving compliance should not be put on minimizing the effect of behavioral factors.

5.2.3 	The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
The findings revealed that there was a positive and significant results between enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process and compliance with procurement regulations (p<0.01, r = 0.618). This implied that the absence of enforcement & deterrence would be another cause of non- compliance since there will be lack of professionalism.  On the hand the findings further revealed that there was a significant positive relationship between enforcement, deterrence, and compliance with PDDA regulations whereby 25.8% of the successfulness of compliance with the procurement regulations was explained by the enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process by KCCA. This therefore meant that with enforcement and deterrents in place, there was likelihood that compliance with procurement regulations can be realized.

5.3	Discussion 
5.2.1	The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
The findings revealed that familiarity with the regulations had a positive correlation with compliance in public procurement; in this Familiarity with procurement regulations is a significant predictor of compliance with procurement regulations. The implication is that the more procurement personnel are familiar with the regulations, the more compliant they will be. This finding is in agreement with Gelderman et al., (2006) who in his study on the causes of noncompliance with European Union procurement directives established that familiarity with procurement regulations improves compliance. 

Lukic (2007) in his paper on how to improve compliance with international environmental law argues that compliance can be improved by increasing knowledge of the law. This argument is based on the notion that once people are aware or familiar with what they are supposed to do or not to do, it becomes easier for them to do the right thing, which in this case is compliance. 

According to Howsam (1985), “some of the indicators of professionalism include skills based on theoretical knowledge, existence of a professional association, extensive period of education, testing of competence, institutional training, licensed practitioners, work autonomy, code of professional ethics, self-regulation, legal recognition, control of pay and high status and rewards. Therefore in Uganda focusing on KCCA, familiarity with rules and compliance is said to very low whereby according to procurement audits carried out in 2005 by PPDA revealed that on 2% of the contracts were carried out in accordance with the law and with internal structures observed.  According Hunja (2003) knowledge is a key ingredient of a well-functioning, modern legal and institutional Public Procurement framework and that the lack of it brings about capacity problems. 

The findings further concur with the revelations of De Boer and Telgen (1998) as quoted by Gelderman et al. (2006), who note that one of the factors causes of noncompliance with procurement regulations is the level of familiarity with the procurement regulations. De Boer and Telgen (Ibid), further asserts that during the early days of the inception of Public Procurement regulations in the Netherlands, many municipalities could not comply to the regulations because they were not familiar with them.

In a related view, Hunja (2003) observes that knowledge is a key ingredient of a well-functioning, modern legal and institutional Public Procurement framework and that the lack of it brings about capacity problems. Douma and Schreuder, 2002 assent to the same view, holding that how knowledgeable a Public Procurement practitioner is, is an agent’s characteristics that the principal may not have complete information about at the time of engagement of the agent by the principal according to the principal-agent theory.
5.3.2 	The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
The findings revealed that perceived behavioral control were also found not to be significant predictors of compliance with procurement regulations. This finding disagrees with the finding of Ntayi et al., (forth coming) who studied psychological climate, catharsis, organizational anomie, psychological wellness and ethical procurement behaviour in Uganda’s public sector and found that they were predictors of compliance with procurement regulations. This implied that focus on improving compliance should not be put on minimizing the effect of perceived behavioral control. 

These findings were in confirmatory with Guy (2000), who argued that there are six dimensions though which we can judge the level of institutionalization of any structure and its ability to adapt to change, including: autonomy, complexity, coherence, congruence and exclusivity as a result of perceived behavioral control. Implementation of organizational activities depends on the relationships between and within organizations. 

One way to explain this relationships and its effect on implementation of organizational activities is through the principal-agency theory, which holds that shirking is likely to occur when there is some disagreement between policy makers and the bureaucracy. Civilian political leaders (principals) delegate authority to the bureaucracy (agent) with the expectation that the agent does not move quickly enough to reflect the policy preferences of principal, the committee members could show their displeasure by cutting the funding of the organization. Leaders (the principals), through powers of appointment and the purse are in position to influence bureaucratic outputs. Guy, (2004) quoting Calvert et.al, (1989), Moe (1985) and wood Waterman (1991) found that politicians wield considerable power in affecting bureaucratic outputs via the power of appointment. Calvert et al posits that the chief executive’s power of appointment and the threat of legislative sanctions influence bureaucratic output. Moreover, they assert that there is a boundary in which agents are allowed to exercise various amounts of discretion. The amount of discretion allowed to agents is determined by the importance of a policy-the more important a policy, the lesser the amount of discretion that will be allowed to agents and conversely, the less important a policy to a principal, the more discretion that will be accorded to the agent.

5.2.3 	The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
The findings revealed that there was a positive and significant result between enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process and compliance with procurement regulations. This related the fact that procurement is still a relatively new profession in Uganda, not more than ten (10) years old, having been introduced in 2003/2004, implying that a number of persons holding positions in the procurement function do not have a law regulating the professional training in procurement. The Institute of Public Procurement of Uganda (IPPU) exists but has not yet been passed by law, implying that it does not have the mandate to monitor procurement professionals and also to punish them for wrong doing. The lack of a local professional association also implies that practitioners are not licensed. One can practice as long as they have the relevant qualifications. A number of procurement practitioners in Uganda are members of the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS – United Kingdom) by virtue of having attained the qualification but this institution (CIPS) does not extend to monitoring the actions of the professionals as they do their work in their home countries.
Thirdly, professionalism is hampered by the fact that procurement officers in Uganda do not have a high level of work autonomy and control over their pay. This many times puts them in compromising positions, thereby affecting their professionalism. Fourthly, basing on the fact that the procurement profession is still relatively new, procurement officers were not appointed to high levels that are recognized in the organizational structure in Government Structure. It is a recent development that the position of Principal Procurement Officer (PPO) was created and procurement professionals appointed to the positions of Commissioner due to increased recognition of the procurement function and its contribution. Howsam, (1985) provides an almost perfect explanation as to why professionalism is not a significant predictor of compliance with procurement regulations in Uganda. However, it should be noted that professionalism levels amongst procurement professionals is likely to improve given what is taking place and the changes that are likely to take place.

5.4	Conclusions
This section presents the conclusions, reflecting key lessons that were observed on the basis of the study results and the preceding discussion.
5.4.1	The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
The study sought to investigate the effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement. Also on a full analysis, it is clear that Familiarity with procurement regulations is a significant predictor of compliance with procurement regulations. The implication is that the more procurement personnel are familiar with the regulations; the more compliant they will be. 
5.4.2    The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
The results revealed that there was a positive but not significant relationship between behavioral factors and compliance with procurement regulations. The results showed that behavioral control factors explain 24.5% of the variation in influencing the compliance of PPDA regulations in KCCA, implying that if efforts to improve compliance are to be well directed, they should be put on minimizing the effect of perceived behavioral control.

5.4.3	The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
From the correlation and regression results, it was clear that there was a positive and significant results between enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process and compliance with procurement regulations (p<0.01, r = 0.618). This implied that enforcement & deterrence add that another cause of non – compliance since they will be lack of professionalism.  On the hand the findings further revealed that there was a significant positive relationship between enforcement, deterrence, and compliance with PDDA regulations whereby 25.8% of the successfulness of compliance with the procurement regulations was explained by the enforcement and deterrence of the Procurement Process by KCCA.

5.5	Recommendations
In light of the research findings, the following recommendations are made:
5.5.1	The effect of familiarity with the regulations on compliance in public procurement
There is a need for continuous practical training of procurement staff and suppliers especially on procurement rules and regulations especially in procurement planning, documentation, contract management, procurement methods and procedures and tender evaluation to enhance compliance.
Further, there is a need for regular and continuous monitoring and assessment of procurement systems in KCCA with regard to their compliance with the procedures, rules, and regulations setup in the PPDA Act. 2003 must be strictly enforced.

5.5.2    The effect of perceived behavioral control on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
There is a need to develop e-procurement approach to encourage KCCA to utilize websites and encourage suppliers to assess tender documents as well as contract awards on line. This will enable staff of KCCA and service providers to comply with rules and regulations on lines by establishing controls in the system that will enforce rules and regulations. 
The study recommends a need to adapt ICT strategies to enhance the process of effective tendering through advertisement, sourcing reviews and greater awareness of new development and these enable departments provide excellent services to stakeholders in an effective and transparent manner hence influencing compliance. 

To ensure compliance with rules and regulation there is a need to prevent corruption in public departments by seriously blacklisting bidders who have contravened the provisions of the PDDA Act 2003. There is also a need to take disciplinary action against public officials who engage in irregularities. Merely appearing on Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament every year is not deterrent enough to address corruption and compliance in public procurement.

5.5.3	The effect of enforcement and deterrence on compliance with procurement regulations in KCCA
Performance incentives need to be offered to employees of KCCA employees to reward good performance. This will help to increase on the compliance of procurement rules and regulations. At the same time, there is also need to enforce strict control measures that can act as deterrents, such that there is greater compliance to the procurement rules and regulations.

5.6	Implications of the Findings 
This study raises a number of implications that have to be addressed if compliance with procurement regulations is to be improved. First and foremost, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority [PPDAA] and the Public Entities should work together to improve on the familiarity of staff with Public Procurement procedures. This can be done through taking procurement skills assessment and training staff through refresher courses, workshops, seminars and conferences where staff meet and share experiences. The PPDAA can also work together with willing organizations like the COMESA, European Union to promote professionalism because these bodies have been funding development of procurement capacity in the country.
Secondly, the PPDAA should push for the legalization of the IPPU in order to promote professionalism in the procurement function and also punish procurement professionals when they do not comply. 

Thirdly, the National Council for Higher Education should work together with the PPDAA, universities and organizations to develop internship opportunities so that graduates who are produced are familiar with the procurement regulations and have the necessary experience.

5.7	 Areas for further research 
Basing on the study that was undertaken a number of gaps were identified that required further research in line with compliance with public procurement. Therefore, further studies  should be carried out to establish impact of external factors that affect the compliance of Public Procurement rules and regulations and to investigate the challenges faced by service providers in complying with the rules and regulations of Public Procurement in Uganda. 

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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
QUESTIONNAIRE ON FACTORS INFLUENCING COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS IN UGANDA: A CASE STUDY OF KAMPALA CAPITAL CITY AUTHORITY
Dear respondent,
Introductory Information
I am Basuuta Cate, a student of Masters Degree in Management Studies of the Uganda Management Institute. I am collecting information for academic research on the topic: behavioral factors influencing compliance with Public Procurement Regulations in Uganda: a Case Study of Kampala Capital City Authority. The study finding will be used to develop recommendations for improving compliance with Public Procurement regulations in Uganda.

I am kindly requesting you to answer the questions below as candidly as possible. Your honest answer and other comments are important for the success of this study. All answers shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. 

SECTION A:  Background data.
Your age  (tick where applicable)
	1. 18-28 year. 	
	2. 29- 39 years           
	3. 40- 49 years
	4. 50- above year
2)    Gender. (Tick where applicable)
       1.  Male                        2. Female
3) Education level 
       1.  No formal education                         2. Primary 
       3.  Secondary                                            4. Certificate/diploma
       5.  Degree                                               6. Others specify ……………………

4)  Your unit or department………………………………………………………
5)  Position Held: ……………………………….………………………… 
6) How many years have you served in the procurement department? ...........

Section B: Familiarity with the Procurement regulations and compliance in Capital City Authority
	Statements	Strongly
Agree  	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
1	Familiarity with procurement rules and regulation is a basic requirement for the work function in this KCCA.					
2	Only those familiar with procurement rules in this office are allowed to carry out procurement tasks.					
3	Procurement work functions in KCCA is done only by practitioners with academic or professional qualifications					
4	Applicable procurement rules are clearly stated and easily understood.					
5	Training programs are frequently organized for the staff of KCCA to increase knowledge on procurement related rules and regulations.					
6	The procurement knowledge base of other players (suppliers, other buyers etc) of the PPDA regulations has an impact on compliance					
8	Procurement officers and committee members make informed decisions regarding procurement operations, rules and regulations.					

Section C: Behavioral factors and Compliance with PPDA Regulations in KCCA.	
	Statements	Strongly
Agree  	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
1	KCCA staff uphold code of ethics in procurement process					
4	Recognition and prizes motivate staff to comply with PPDA regulations.					
5	Economic incentives and other fringe benefits motivate staff to be committed to their job					
6	Workers in KCCA are usually sanctioned for not complying with procurement regulations.					
7	Sanctions are usually effected immediately after the violation of the regulations are detected					
8	The stipulated sanctions are well known by employees					
9	Penalties stipulated in the procurement law lead to fear of the violation of the procurement laws and regulations					
10	Practitioners weigh the benefits against the negative outcomes of not complying with the procurement regulations					

11. What other behavioral factors influence the compliance of PDDA rules and regulations? 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………................
Section D: Enforcement, deterrence and compliance with PPDA rules and regulations. 

	Statements	Strongly
Agree  	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
1	We are frequently asked to report our procurement performance					
2	There is effective monitoring and auditing of procurement activities by oversight bodies					
3	We are frequently inspected to see if we adhere to the established PPDA regulations					
4	Workers in KCCA are usually sanctioned for not complying with procurements laws and regulations					
5	Penalties stipulated in the PPDA lead to fear of violation of procurements laws and regulations					
6	Practitioners weigh the benefits against the negative outcomes of not complying with the procurements laws and regulations.					
7	Performance reports are verified through physical checkups.					
8	We provide extensive information regarding our procurement practice to our supervisors					

Section E: Compliance (Dependent Variable)
	Statements	Strongly
Agree  	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
1	Procurement planning and needs assessment is usually undertaken by KCCA 					
2	Procurement product design and document preparation is usually done by KCCA in line with compliance 					
3	Tender process (including advertising, invitation to bid, prequalification, bid evaluation, post qualification) is usually followed by KCCA					
4	Bid specifications are tailored to compliance requirements					
5	Bids are opened in public to ensure compliance 					
6	There are no delays between deadline for submission and opening of bids  					
7	There is transparent process for handling complaints 					
8	Contract award and implementation is usually known by all parties. 					
9	Contract specifications are usually upheld after contract award.					
10	Final accounting and audit is usually undertaken to ensure compliance					
11	Procurement audit reports are published in time.					
12	There is transparency and access to information at every stage of procurement process to ensure compliance.  					
13. What are the challenges associated with compliance with the rules and regulation of PPDA
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
14 What should be done to strengthen compliance with the rules and regulations of PPDA?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Thank you for your precious time

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS

I am Basuuta Cate, a student of Masters Degree in Management Studies of the Uganda Management Institute, conducting a study on factors affecting compliance with Public Procurement Regulations in Uganda: a Case Study of Kampala Capital City Authority. I am requesting you to be part of this study as a respondent and the information you will provide will be treated as confidential and it will only be used for academic purposes. Kindly fill this questionnaire.
 Thank you in advance.
SECTION A Background data 

1)   Department …………………………………………
2)    Position ………………………………………….
3)    Gender.                   1.  Male                        2. Female
4)    For how long have you been in this office? ……………..
Section B
Do you engage in procurement activities?
Do you prepare annual procurement plans? 
Do you publish notices of procurement contact award/tender notices on the KCCA website?
What are behavioral factors influencing compliance with PPDA Act and regulations?
Do you gain value for money from your procurement activities? 
Are PPDA training activities and training kits effective and supportive to you? 
Do you think cost Public Procurement is more expensive than in the private sectors? 
How would you rate the enforcement of the rules and regulations of PDDA act?
What challenges do you encounter in enforcing the PPDA Act and regulations?
What contribution does Kampala Capital City Authority make towards compliance of PPDA Act and regulations?

APPENDIX D: INTRODUCTORY LETTER